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Abstract 
Since the economic reform was initiated in 1978, the Chinese banking sector has 
undergone significant changes, particularly during the period under our investigation. 
This is primarily induced by the WTO entry in 2001, which brought in to full openness 
the financial market in China. The ultimate objective of the recent banking reform is to 
promote competition and efficiency as a way of improving the overall competitiveness 
and banking performance, in order to cope with challenges from foreign competitors. 
 
With the purpose of examining whether the recent banking reform is effective in 
achieving the targets as well as suggesting future policy directions, this study investigates 
market competition, cost efficiency and profitability in the Chinese banking industry over 
those critical years (1997-2006) before and after the WTO entry. We first employ both 
structural (the SCP) and non-structural (the Panzar-Rosse) approach to evaluate market 
competition. Then we estimate cost efficiency for Chinese banks under the Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA). Finally, we assess the relationship between profitability and 
market structure under the structure-performance hypothesis and the efficient-structure 
hypothesis.  
 
Our findings show that Chinese banking market become less concentrated and more 
competitive since the WTO entry. Chinese banks improve their cost efficiencies, with 
state-owned banks are the least efficient while joint equity banks are the most efficient. 
The explanation for the relationship between profitability and market structure is quite 
mixed. The acceptance of which hypothesis depends on which dependent variable is 
used. 
 
Key words: Market structure, Competition, Stochastic Frontier Approach, Cost efficiency, 
Bank performance, Shadow return on equity, Chinese banking reform  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 The motivation of the research 
 
Banking competition has always been the center of debate in the economic literature. It is 
controversial because competition in the banking sector can be both beneficial and 
detrimental (Canoy et al 2001, Berger et al 2009, and Liu et al 2010). On the one hand, 
banking competition is generally expected to have positive impact on the level of efficiency, 
price, quality, innovation and international competitiveness (Claessens and Laeven 2004). 
Specifically, higher competition encourages banks to enhance their efficiencies (reduce 
costs), lower prices, improve quality of products and services, promote (technological and 
financial) innovations, and finally result in increase in profitability and competitiveness. On 
the other hand, competition may hamper financial stability through excessive risk taking by 
banks. To the extreme case, such risky behaviour will cause financial crisis, such as the 
financial crisis in 2008. These potential impacts always make regulators face a dilemma in a 
trade-off between competition and instability. Moreover, the expected gains and losses are 
also a particularly major issue for countries in which capital markets are underdeveloped and 
banks represent the main channel for finance, as is the case in China.  
 
China, one of the fast growing economies in the world, sustained the phenomenon of 
continuous annual GDP growth around 9% for the last three decades since the economic 
reform has been initiated in 1978 (CBRC report 2008). As part of the economic reform, 
China’s banking sector has undergone gradual but profound reforms before the WTO entry. 
Since China’s accession into the WTO in 2001, the pace and strength of the banking reform 
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has been accelerated and intensified, in order to cope with challenges from foreign banks 
under the WTO agreement which required full openness of Chinese financial market. The 
ultimate objective of the recent banking reform implemented by the Chinese government is 
to build an efficient, competitive and stable banking system in order to improve its 
profitability and competitiveness. 
 
The banking sector is the most important player in the Chinese financial system. The total 
assets of China’s banking sector amounted to RMB 43.95 trillion (US$ 5.81 trillion) in 2006 
and accounted for 87% of the total assets in the entire financial sector (CBRC report 2006). 
Although the capital market in China is also growing fast, it is still underdeveloped and 
incomplete. Banks continue to dominate China’s financial landscape as indirect financing 
remains the main channel of financing for business enterprises in China. In 2006, 
approximately 83% of financing was still through banks, while stocks were only 5% and 
bonds 12% (11% government bonds and 1% corporate bonds) (CBRC report 2006). 
Moreover, the banking system is the main financier of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which 
contributed 43.5% of China’s GDP 2006, so that bank reform (1997-2006) will have a direct 
impact on the Chinese economy through the SOEs. Additionally, the Chinese banking 
market is so large that the way in which the reform is resolved could have systemic 
consequences. More details about the Chinese banking sector and recent banking reform 
(1997-2006) will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
1.2 The objective and contribution of the study 
 
Despite a substantial amount of empirical literature exists in the American and European 
banking systems and the gradually increasing empirical evidence pertaining to developing 
countries, only a few empirical studies have been undertaken in the Chinese banking sector. 
It is insufficient to match the importance of China in the world economy today. As the vital 
Chapter 1 
3 
 
role of banking sector in China and significant changes under the recent banking reform 
(1997-2006), this thesis describes and assesses China’s recent ongoing banking reform to 
help draw conclusions and recommendations, which may be of interest to policy makers, 
regulators and economists. 
 
The main objective of this study is to assess and evaluate the market competition, cost 
efficiency and profitability in the Chinese banking sector during those critical years before 
and after the WTO entry in 2001, when Chinese banks experienced significant changes 
under the recent banking reform. In particular, this study attempts to address the following 
questions: 
 
1. Estimate the level of market competition in the Chinese banking sector by using both the 
traditional structure conduct performance (SCP) model and the new empirical industrial 
organization (NEIO) approach: the Panzar-Rosse method 
2. Assess the impact of the recent banking reform on the competition in the Chinese 
banking market 
3. Measure the cost efficiency for Chinese banks by employing the stochastic frontier 
approach (SFA) 
4. Examine price elasticity, economies of scale and shadow return on equity  
5. Compare and check the consistency of the results under different models 
6. Compare the level of cost efficiency based on ownership differences 
7. Investigate the impact of the recent banking reform on the cost efficiency in the Chinese 
banking market 
8. Explore the relationship among profitability, market power and efficiency in the Chinese 
banking industry by following the Berger’s (1995) methodology. 
 
The five expected contributions of this research are listed below 
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1. Provide an excellent and concise introduction to the Chinese banking system as well as 
the recent banking reform in China 
2. Fill the literature gap by measuring and examining competition and efficiency in the 
Chinese banking market 
3. Use a comprehensive and recent dataset to provide updated evidence 
4. Define and measure the shadow return on equity, i.e. the shadow price of the capital 
constraint and utilize it as alternative measure of profitability in the model specification  
5. Help draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the Chinese banking reform and 
provide recommendations on the direction of future policy 
 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
 
The whole thesis is organized in eight chapters as follows:  
 
Chapter 2: Overview of China’s banking system, current reforms and the WTO 
accession 
 
This chapter provides the background which is necessary and essential for understanding the 
empirical analysis of the Chinese banking sector presented in subsequent chapters of this 
thesis. It mainly overviews the structure of Chinese banking system as well as the banking 
reforms and institutional arrangement for WTO accession in 2001. We first briefly review 
the current banking reforms which have been motivated by the full openness of Chinese 
financial market under the WTO requirement. Then we explain the detailed arrangement of 
China’s WTO accession as well as discuss challenges that the Chinese banks have to face 
after the WTO entry. Finally, we outline the institutional mechanisms and structure of the 
Chinese banking sector and summarize some important features of the Chinese banking 
sector.  
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Chapter 3: Market competition in Chinese banking industry: application of 
traditional Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) 
 
The competitive environment in which banks operate has long been of interest to 
researchers and policymakers. Most of the early literature on competition in banking 
markets was based on the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm which claims 
that bank performance is positively related to market concentration. The aim of this chapter 
is to test the validity of the SCP hypothesis in Chinese banking market. Our empirical results 
find no support for the traditional SCP hypothesis as explanation for the bank performance in 
the Chinese banking industry during the period under consideration. This is mainly due to 
the weakness of the SCP model itself, and motivates us to adopt more advanced approach 
Panzar-Rosse method and Berger’s (1995) method in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 4: Market competition in the Chinese banking industry: application of new 
empirical industrial organization (NEIO) Panzar-Rosse approach 
 
In this chapter, we extend the previous market competition literature by employing the new 
empirical industrial organization (NEIO) Panzar-Rosse model to empirically estimate the 
competitive bank behaviour in China between 1997 and 2006. Four alternative 
specifications for dependent variable (bank performance) are employed in the model, we 
find out that all different specifications report similar values of Panzar-Rosse H statistics, 
which lead to the same conclusion that Chinese banks operate under condition of 
monopolistic competition rather than monopoly in such highly concentrated market in China. 
The results also show that current banking reform is effective in improving market 
competition. 
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Chapter 5: Cost efficiency and shadow return on equity in Chinese banking industry 
 
This chapter investigates the efficiency level from cost perspective in the Chinese 
commercial banking market. In our study, we employ six models under the stochastic 
frontier approach to ensure the robustness of our results, namely, the fixed effect model, 
random effect model, Pit and Lee model, Battese and Coelli 1992 model, Battese and Coelli 
1995 model, and conditional mean conditional variance model. We first assess the efficiency 
level and efficiency change for our sample of banks as a whole.Then we carry out a similar 
analysis for three sub-groups based on ownership differences. In additional, we carry out 
rank correlation tests to check efficiency consistency and conduct monotonicity and 
concavity tests to check the properties of the translog cost function. 
 
Our results show clear evidence that the cost efficiency of the Chinese commercial banks is 
greatly enhanced over our examination period, and the gap among different ownership types 
of banks has shrunk. The improved cost efficiency enjoyed by Chinese banks shows that 
they reacted positively to the recent banking reforms which focus on improving their asset 
quality, capital adequacy, profitability and competitiveness. 
 
In this chapter, we also measure the shadow return on equity which is derived from the cost 
function. And we find out that the shadow return on equity turns to be negative after 
recapitalization. This might suggest that efficiency gains may be offset by the 
recapitalization cost. 
 
Chapter 6: Explaining profitability in the Chinese banking industry: the structure 
conduct performance hypothesis vs the efficient-structure hypothesis 
 
This chapter analyses what explains the profitability of the Chinese commercial banks for 
the period 1997-2006 under the debate of the traditional structure-performance hypothesis 
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and the efficient-structure hypothesis. This study follows the test developed by Berger (1995) 
which incorporated direct measures of efficiency and integrate four specific hypotheses in 
the regression, namely the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP), relative market 
power (RMP), X-efficiency (ESX) and scale efficiency (ESS).We innovate Berger’s study 
by incorporating computed shadow return on equity as an alternative measure of profitability. 
Moreover, we test the ‘quiet life’ hypothesis in addition to the above four typical hypotheses 
in Berger’s test.  
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the main findings of our study and discusses policy 
recommendations based on our evaluation as well as suggestions for future research 
directions. 
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Chapter 2: Overview of China’s banking system, 
current reforms and the WTO accession 
 
 
Since the Chinese economic reform was started in 1978 which aimed to transform China's 
stagnant, impoverished planned economy into a market economy capable of generating 
strong economic growth and increasing the well-being of Chinese citizens, China's economy 
experienced one of the world's biggest booms. China is playing an increasingly important 
role in the world’s economy (world trade in particular) and is widely seen as world factory 
and an engine of world growth. After three decades of change, the success of China's 
economic reform has resulted in massive changes in the Chinese economy. The 
unprecedented economic growth occurred, with the real GDP increasing by 9.5% on average 
a year (see Table 2.1). China's economy became the second largest after the US, based on the 
GDP figure, and poverty was reduced, as indicated by the GDP per capita growth (see 
Figure 2.1).  
 
As part of the economic reform1, the Chinese financial sector has experienced significant 
institutional and structural changes over the last thirty years. Because of the incomplete 
development of capital market in China, the Chinese financial system is heavily dominated 
by banks. The main objective of this chapter is to give a introduction about the banking 
system in China as well as summarize several main features characterizing the Chinese 
banking system. Moreover, we review recent banking reforms and the detailed arrangement 
of the WTO accession. In particular, this chapter provides the background which is essential 
                                                 
1
 Economic reforms occurred in two stages. The first stage, in the late 1970s and 1980s, involved the decollectivization 
of agriculture, the opening up of the country to foreign investment, and permission for entrepreneurs to start up 
businesses. The second stage of reform, in the1990s, involved the privatization and contracting out of state-owned 
enterprises and reforming the financial sector. 
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Table  2.1: China’s nominal GDP, nominal GDP per capita and GDP growth rate at 
constant prices from 1978-2006 
 
Year Nominal GDP 
  
Nominal GDP per capita Real growth rate % 
 (Billion RMB) (RMB)  
1978 362.4 379 11.7 
1979 403.8 417 7.6 
1980 451.8 460 7.8 
1981 486.2 489 5.2 
1982 529.5 525 9.1 
1983 593.5 580 10.9 
1984 717.1 692 15.2 
1985 896.4 853 13.5 
1986 1,020.2 956 8.8 
1987 1,196.3 1,104 11.6 
1988 1,492.8 1,355 11.3 
1989 1,690.9 1,512 4.1 
1990 1,854.8 1,634 3.8 
1991 2,161.8 1,879 9.2 
1992 2663.8 2,287 14.2 
1993 3,463.4 2,939 13.5 
1994 4,675.9 3,923 12.6 
1995 5,847.8 4,854 10.5 
1996 6,788.5 5,576 9.6 
1997 7,446.3 6,054 8.8 
1998 7,834.5 6,038 7.8 
1999 8,206.8 7,159 7.1 
2000 8,946.8 7,858 8 
2001 10,965.5 8,622 8.3 
2002 12,033.3 9,398 9.1 
2003 13,582.3 10,542 10 
2004 15,987.8 12,336 10.1 
2005 18,386.8 14,040 9.9 
2006 21,087.1 16,084 11.1 
Source: Financial yearbook published by the China National Bureau of Statistics 
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Figure  2.1: China’s nominal GDP and nominal GDP per capita from 1978-2006 
 
 
 
for understanding the empirical analysis of the Chinese banking sector presented in 
subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 will briefly review the banking 
reforms which have taken place over the last decade. Section 2.2 outlines the institutional 
mechanisms and structure of the Chinese banking sector. Section 2.3 summarizes some 
important attributes of the Chinese banking sector. Finally, Section 2.4 will explain the 
arrangement of China’s WTO accession as well as discuss challenges that the Chinese banks 
have to face after the WTO entry. 
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2.1 Current reforms in the Chinese banking industry 
 
In spite of rapid economic growth in China and fast expansion in banking sector, the whole 
banking system is highly inefficient and wasteful. In order to ensure that the banking sector 
will be able to support continued rapid economic growth, substantial effort has been made to 
reform China’s banking system over the last three decades since the economic reform 
proposed in 1978, including regulatory reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, introduction of 
competition from foreign banks entry in the 1990s, and substantial reforms following 
China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) entry in 2001. In the following, we provide some 
background information on the reforms in the Chinese banking industry.  
 
The banking reform in China can be classified into three distinct periods. The first period is 
known as dated from 1979 to 1989. The second period is recognized as started from 1990 
until 1996. And the third period is identified from 1997 to 2006. We will briefly explain the 
first two periods, and concentrate more on the third period which is more recent and has 
much more influences. 
 
2.1.1 First period 1979-1989 (institutional change from 
mono-bank system to multi layered system) 
 
The reform of the Chinese banking system started with an institutional shake-up. Prior to 
1979, the Chinese banking system followed a mono-bank model, where the People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC) combined the roles of central and commercial banking. The first and the 
foremost important step was replacing the mono-bank system with a multi layered system 
that separates commercial activities from central banking functions. In September 1983, a 
true central bank was created: the People’s Bank of China. By establishing four state-owned 
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specialised banks – Bank of China (BOC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and China Construction Bank (CCB), with each having 
its own specific business focus, the PBOC was left to focus on its central banking 
responsibilities alone. Furthermore, a number of new medium and small-sized commercial 
banks were established with the objective of providing competition for the Big Four banks, 
such as the joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks. In addition, 
non-banking financial institutions, such as investment and trust corporations and insurance 
companies, also emerged and multiplied during this period. 
 
2.1.2 Second period 1990-1996 (separation of commercial 
banking activities from policy lending activities and legislative 
reform) 
 
Since the quality of SOCBs assets deteriorated significantly2, the government started to 
reconsider their political interventions on bank lending decisions. The second period was 
characterized by the separation of commercial banking activities from those policy lending 
activities which were designed for economic development. To fulfil this objective, three 
policy lending banks were established in 1994, namely China Development Bank (CDB), 
China Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and China Agricultural Development Bank (CADB), in 
order to take over all policy lending from SOCBs for development purposes and transform 
the Big Four into true commercial banks. Moreover, two major legislative reforms occurred 
in 1995. One is the Central Bank Law which was enacted in March, 1995. The Central Bank 
                                                 
2
 Stated-owned commercial banks served as policy-lending institutions for the government, and provided loans to 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Policy loans have accounted for more than one third of total loans for SOCBs. The 
industrial reforms which began in 1984 made the number of loss-making SOEs dramatically increased. As a result, the 
state-owned banks accumulated an enormous volume of non-performing loans.  
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Law further enhanced the legal status of the Peoples’ Bank of China and reduced 
government intervention. According to this law, three main responsibilities of the PBOC 
were specified: monetary stability, banking supervision and oversight of the payments 
system. Another is the Commercial Banking Law which was also approved in 1995. It aims 
to establish a diversified market-oriented and independent modern banking system. Also it 
defines a series of requirements for commercial banks to encourage market-based 
management and pricing principles. 
 
2.1.3 Third period 1997-2006 (market-oriented reform) 
 
The third period from 1997 to 2006 was highlighted by marketization, as the reform in this 
period aimed to transform the Chinese banking industry into a modern, more flexible and 
market-oriented banking system. This effort has been largely motivated by the prospects of 
facing increased foreign competition in the banking market under the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) requirements since China’s entry in 2001.The latest reforms signal to 
the rest of the world that China is truly going to modernize its banking system, however this 
take place gradually through last ten years. 
 
China successfully joining in the WTO in 2001 set the background for this phase of reform. 
Once the transition period (2002-2006) ended in 2006, for the first time the Chinese banking 
industry would be fully exposed to international competition. However, according to current 
performance, the Chinese banks are far less able to compete with those foreign rivals. 
Chinese banks exhibit weaknesses in many aspects, such as the efficiency, profitability, 
assets quality, international network, variety of products, technologies, financial innovations, 
staff quality and corporate governance etc. Therefore, in order to cope with the pressure and 
challenge from the entry of foreign banks, it is quite urgent to accelerate and intensify the 
reform progress for domestic banks. As the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) play a 
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vital role in China's economic and social developments as well as they take a leading role in 
the country's banking system, unquestionably, the reform of the state-owned banks should be 
given high priority in restructuring the banking industry and set them as the primary targets 
for the reform. In the following, we will discuss recent reform process based on three main 
pillars, namely restructure of the state-owned banks, reduced government intervention and 
strengthened regulation and supervision. 
 
2.1.3.1 Restructure of the state-owned banks 
 
The first pillar is bank restructuring, also known as bank recapitalization. Bank restructuring 
has probably been the most important pillar of current phase bank reform since poor asset 
quality, coupled with very low capitalization was a very serious problem. Bank restructuring 
has mainly focused on the SOCBs because of their formidable sizes and systemic natures.  
 
As we have mentioned above, in previous decades, many years of government-directed 
lending has presented the Chinese state-owned banks with a large accumulated amount of 
NPLs which has become unmanageable by banks themselves. Without the government’s 
financial support, it would take much longer for the state-owned banks to clean up their 
balance sheet. Hence, the government plays an indispensable role in providing invaluable 
assistance to the Big Four to effectively reduce their NPLs. As a result, a series of strategic 
reforms were deployed as well as sequential steps were arranged for the state-owned banks. 
Three steps can be clearly identified for the restructure process of the SOCBs. The first step 
is government capital injections for dealing with NPLs. The second step is diversifying the 
ownership structure by introducing foreign strategic investors to become joint-shareholding 
companies. The last step is seeking opportunities for stock market listing. Each step will be 
explained in turn below.  
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In order to accomplish the first step that reduces the NPLs and rehabilitate the balance sheets 
of the four largest state-owned banks, government established four asset management 
companies (AMCs) to take over and deal with ‘bad loans’ (approximately over US$ 1600 
billion in total) from the Big Four state-owned banks by using foreign exchange reserves 
from the central bank3. China has used part of its international trade surplus to recapitalize 
its underperforming banking system, a form of indirect foreign investment. Before the 
WTO accession, the government has injected more than US$ 160 billion to recapitalize the 
four largest banks and has transferred US$ 200 billion worth of NPLs out of these banks in 
2001 alone. At the end of 2006, the total value of such transfers was about US$ 432 billion, 
about 18% of China’s 2006 GDP. 
 
The government capital injection enabled the Big Four to reduce both the absolute amount of 
NPLs and the NPLs ratio. With the combination of rapid credit expansion, implementation 
of conservative lending policies and tough over-sight by the regulator, the Chinese banking 
sector has clearly made enormous progress in dealing with the NPLs problem. The central 
bank figures showed the total outstanding amount of NPLs for SOCBs at the end of 2006 had 
fallen by half of the original amount in 2002, but still totalled RMB 1170 billion. The NPLs 
ratio fell from 19.8 % at the end of 2003 to 8.7% in 2006.  
 
After dealing with the NPLs problem, the ‘Big Four’ started to seek for foreign strategic 
investors. As joint stock banks and some of city commercial banks have healthier balance 
sheet and better asset quality, they also follow the footstep of the SOCBs by hunting for 
foreign strategic investors. By the end of 2006, a total of 20 overseas strategic investors have 
                                                 
3
 The four AMCs were established in 1999, namely Orient AMC, Great Wall AMC, Cinda AMC and Huarong AMC. 
They are legally independent agencies and originally designed to assign one AMC to each state-owned bank. Cinda AMC 
was assigned to CCB, Oriental AMC was assigned to BOC, Great Wall AMC was assigned to ABC, and Huarong AMC 
was assigned to ICBC. These AMCs were under the supervision of the PBOC. They are responsible for collecting NPLs, 
repacking them through restructuring or converting into viable assets, and sell them off to investors. They are also 
responsible for issuing bonds and borrowing from financial institutions to pay for the NPLs they receive. Finally, they are 
also in charge of restructuring SOEs and recommending companies for listing.  
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been introduced by 25 Chinese commercial banks, providing equity worth US$ 18.1 billion.  
 
The four state-owned banks are playing an important role in the banking market as they 
account for about 75 percent of the country's banking business volume, so keeping a 
controlling share in the state's hands is crucial for the big four banks to operate in a sound 
way, which will enable them to have a relatively stable shareholding structure. Current 
regulation regarding foreign equity investment in the Chinese financial institutions is that a 
single foreign investor can hold up to a 20% ownership stake in a domestic bank, and total 
foreign investments in one domestic bank are not permitted to exceed 25 % of total equity. 
Therefore, foreign strategic investors have only been permitted to take a minority stake in 
the Chinese banks. This may be because the ultimate purpose of the introduction of foreign 
investors is not for their capital, but for introducing advanced foreign management practices, 
expertise, and standardized corporate governance to improve internal control and 
management, and promote financial innovations. In addition to bring in foreign strategic 
investors, some private entrepreneurs also are invited to buy a minority stake. 
 
Following the introduction of strategic investors, the state-owned banks prepared to go 
public. This step is viewed as the most important part of the financial reforms in China. The 
previous two steps: NPLs write off and the introduction of foreign strategic investors 
actually serve as preparation to achieve the goal of listing finally.  The government officials 
believe going public will prompt the banks to speed up their reforms. The aim of the 
state-owned banks' going public is not just to broaden fund procurement channels for them, 
but also for transparency in operation, establishing corporate governance, and enhancing 
competition capability with overseas rivals. 
 
The China Construction Bank (CCB) was selected as pilot, the first among the big four 
state-owned banks to seek stock market listing. It went public in Hong Kong in 2005. Its IPO 
raised US$ 9 billion funds. A foreign strategic investor, Bank of America acquired a 9 
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percent stake for US$ 3 billion. Temasek Holdings bought US$ 2.47 billion for a 5.88 
percent stake. After the success of the CCB’s IPO, two other state-owned banking giants, the 
Bank of China (BOC) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) went public 
one year later in June and October 2006 respectively.  
 
The BOC raised US$9.7 billion from its IPO on Hong Kong stock exchange. The bank held 
another IPO on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in the same year, raising around RMB 20 
billion (US$2.5 billion). The Royal Bank of Scotland Group purchased a US$3.1 billion 
investment which would give the British bank control of 10 percent stake in the Bank of 
China. Further investments were made by Swiss bank UBS AG who acquired 1.6%, and 
Temasek Holdings gained 5.0%. 
 
China’s largest commercial bank by total assets, the ICBC was simultaneously listed on both 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange in October 2006. It created 
the world's largest IPO to date, surpassing the previous record US$18.4 billion IPO created 
by Japan's NTT in 1998. It is also the first Chinese company to debut simultaneously on both 
the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges. The ICBC raised US$19.1 billion in total, 
with US$14 billion in Hong Kong and another US$5.1 billion in Shanghai. A group of 
foreign strategic investors invested $3.78 billion in total for a 10% stake in the ICBC. 
Goldman Sachs invested US$2.6 billion for a 7% stake. Allianz Group paid US$1 billion for 
2.5% of the ICBC, while American Express invested an additional US$216 million. 
Goldman Sachs agreed to offer support in related business areas such as asset management, 
investment banking, disposing of non-performing assets, risk management and internal 
control systems. Allianz Group pledged to sell insurance and asset-management services to 
the ICBC's clients. American Express had an agreement to issue American Express branded 
credit cards through the ICBC. 
 
By the end of 2006, the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) is the only state-owned bank 
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among the Big Four remained unlisted due to the bank's unusually large amount of 
non-performing loans. For preparing the ABC listing, the government made a bigger 
investment in the ABC than in the other three banks to further write off non-performing 
loans and improve the capital-adequacy ratio and the balance sheet. It has required capital 
injection of about RMB 900 billion (US$115 billion) in total. The ABC was the last among 
the Big Four in China to go public in 2010. It was listed on both the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. It created the world's biggest IPO (US$22.1 
billion) surpassing the one set by the ICBC (US$21.9 billion) in 2006. 
 
The successful reform of China's state-owned commercial banks has substantially improved 
the asset quality and enhanced the international image of the Chinese banks. Becoming 
public firms help banks improve their performances, as listed firms are subject to greater 
transparency, tighter supervision and close scrutiny by regulators and shareholders. Now 
almost all major Chinese commercial banks follow the roadmap of the state-owned banks 
reform and have formulated plans to seek market listing with the aim of improving their 
structure, operations and corporate governance. It is a tough task for Chinese banks to shift 
to “commercial banks” in real sense, and there is still a long way to go after public listing. 
However, the massive injections of additional equity capital by the state will/may have 
implications for the shadow of return on equity and this is an issue that will be tested in 
Chapter 5 later in the thesis. 
 
2.1.3.2 Financial liberalization and government intervention reduction 
 
Financial liberalization and reduction of government intervention in the banking market is 
another important pillar of the recent banking reform in China. For quite a long time, 
government intervention in the Chinese banking system was massive and still is, in certain 
aspects. Liberalization efforts aim to eliminate several major obstacles hindering the 
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formation of a competitive environment for the banking industry in China. Financial 
liberalization has been undertaken from several aspects, such as freeing interest rates by 
introducing market mechanism on pricing, opening up to foreign competition and 
liberalizing exchange rate controls. 
 
Reducing the government intervention in the banking system started in the 1990s with a 
number of different actions. An important one was the reduction of reserve requirements 
from 20 to 8 percent in 1998 and again to 6 percent in 19994. Moreover, the remuneration of 
excess reserves was lowered to discourage banks from hoarding liquid assets and encourage 
them to manage their assets. Furthermore, the SOCBs were given more responsibility for 
their lending decisions and some of their credit quotas were removed. Another important 
step was taken in 1999, when government interference in commercial lending was restricted, 
and private capital was allowed to enter JSCBs and CCBs. 
 
Moreover, domestic banks are encouraged for financial innovation to increase their 
competitiveness. Banks should develop and innovate new products and services in addition 
to their core business, such as mortgage, credit card, online banking service and portfolio 
investment. In addition, the PBOC encouraged banks to diversify their portfolios by 
increasing their services to the private sector and consumers. In July 2000, a personal credit 
rating system was launched and used to assess consumer credit risk and set rating standards. 
This was seen as an important move in developing China’s consumer credit industry and 
increase bank’s evaluation and supervision ability over loans to individuals. 
 
Furthermore, interest rate liberalization (i.e. moving from a position where the central bank 
                                                 
4
 Western central banks rarely alter the reserve requirements these days, although it was a relatively common way in 
1970s and 1980s, because it would cause immediate liquidity problems for banks with low excess reserves. They prefer 
to use open market operations (OMO) to implement their monetary policy. However, in recent years the PBOC uses 
changes in reserve requirements frequently, especially as an inflation-fighting tool. The reason of not using OMOs is that 
capital market in China is relatively uncompetitive and underdeveloped. 
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imposes an interest rate structure to one where interest rates are market determined) is 
another important element of China’s efforts to enhance the role of market forces in resource 
allocation. It is also a prerequisite for increasing the competitiveness of financial 
institutions.The central bank is poised to accelerate its pace of freeing up interest rates. This 
market-based interest rate reform is intended to establish the pricing mechanism of the 
deposit and lending rates based on market supply and demand which allows the market 
mechanism to play a dominant role in financial resource allocation. This could help China 
establish modern banking system like in the UK and the US. 
 
The approach towards interest rate liberalization has been gradual and is not yet completed. 
The sequence of the reform is to liberalize interest rates in money markets and bond markets 
first, followed by the gradual liberalization of the interest rates of loans and later deposits. In 
addition, the interest rate of foreign currency was liberalized before that of domestic 
currency, and large amount and long term before small amount and short term.  
 
Here we briefly list some major events concerning the interest rate liberalization which took 
place under the current phase of reform.The interest rates in the interbank market were firstly 
liberalized in 1996. The interest rate in the bond repo market was also freed from controls in 
1997 and the issuing rate of government bonds started to be determined by market forces in 
1998. In 2000, the central bank liberalized the interest rates for foreign currency loans and 
large deposits (US$3 million and over), while rate for deposits below US$3 million remain 
subject to the PBOC control. In March 2002, the PBOC unified foreign currency interest rate 
policies for both Chinese and foreign financial institutions in China, so that domestic and 
foreign financial institutions are treated fairly with regard to the interest rate policy of 
foreign exchange. 
 
For domestic currency, as interest rate liberalization progressed, the PBOC simplified and 
abandoned 114 categories of interest rates initially under control since 1997. At present, 34 
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categories of interest rates remain subject to the PBOC control. Both lending and deposit 
benchmark rates are set by the central bank, but individual banks are allowed to adjust the 
discrepancy within the boundary set by the PBOC. For domestic currency loans, a band was 
established in 1996, which was gradually widened until the upper limit was lifted in October 
2004 and lower limit on lending rates was abolished for all institutions. Interest rates on 
long-term large-value RMB deposits started to be liberalized in 1999, but on a gradual basis. 
In October 2004, the lower limit on the interest rate of all RMB deposits was lifted but not 
the upper limit. The PBOC intends to eliminate the upper limit for all RMB deposits in the 
near future. At present, lending rate has no upper limit and the lower bound is 90% of the 
benchmark rate. The rates for mortgage loan can be 85%. Deposit rate has the benchmark 
rate as the upper limit and is allowed to float downward5. 
 
The full liberalization of interest rates on other deposit accounts, including checking and 
saving accounts, is expected to take much longer. On the lending side, market-determined 
interest rates on loans will first be introduced in rural areas and then followed by rate 
liberalization in cities. Interbank rate SHIBOR was introduced in 2006 and determined by 
market forces6. Despite interest rate liberalization process has not yet been completed, it 
raise the curtain of competition over interest rate among the banks in China, which helps 
improve the competitiveness of financial institutions and enhance the role of market forces 
in resource allocation.  
 
 
                                                 
5
 The PBOC surprised financial markets by floating up interest rates on Oct 2004 for the first time in more than nine 
years. The benchmark rate for one-year RMB loans was increased by 0.27% from 5.31% to 5.58%, the first increase since 
July 1995. One-year RMB deposit rate was raised by the same magnitude from 1.98% to 2.25%, the first increase since 
July 1993. This was an important step, as it signalled the authority started to move toward more market-oriented. 
6 
SHIBOR is Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate, which is like LIBOR in the UK. 
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2.1.3.3 Strengthened financial regulation and supervision  
 
The third pillar is strengthened financial regulation and supervision, coupled with efforts to 
improve corporate governance and transparency in China’s banks. The China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established in 2003 to supervise the entire banking 
system. The supervision role was previously carried out by the central bank PBOC7. The 
newly created banking supervisor is well positioned to take the challenges in a long march 
toward building a strong banking sector and an effective banking supervisory system in 
China. Basically, the PBOC cannot always strictly and prudentially monitor banks since they 
have multiple objectives such as economic growth, low inflation and financial stability. They 
usually willingly sacrifice prudent lending practices if it would serve another goal, such as 
financing state-owned enterprise which is in danger of financial difficulty or bankruptcy, and 
lending money to local government for priority projects especially infrastructure. In 
hindsight, the creation of the single accountable bureaucracy with the sole mission turned 
out to be a right decision based on the fact that the central bank cannot take care of 
everything.  
 
The newly established CBRC is not a mere split from the central bank but the CBRC is 
determined to develop the right mission, and introduce new supervisory concepts and 
methodologies in building a strong banking sector and supervisory system. It also 
encourages Chinese banks to adopt best international banking practices which involve 
resolving issues related to capital adequacy, non-performing loans and corporate governance. 
In an effort to accomplish this, a set of principles is formulated to assess the result of 
supervisory activities such as maintaining systemic stability, enhancing banks 
                                                 
7
 The central bank had a broad mandate to regulate and supervise the entire financial sector, since its creation in 1984. Now 
each segment of the financial sector, namely, banking, securities and insurance, is regulated and supervised by three 
separate and independent government agencies. Securities regulator and insurance regulator were set up in 1992 and 1998 
respectively (see Figure 2.3). 
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competitiveness and encouraging competition.  
 
There are several improvements made by the CBRC’s effort. First, the five-tier loan 
classification system was enhanced and made fully compulsory for all banks8. It helps the 
Chinese banks to build a real credit culture in which lending decisions are made on the basis 
of the credit worthiness of the borrower and risk analysis, regardless of government policies. 
Second, the capital adequacy ratio is given much emphasis by the CBRC. The compulsory 
requirement of 8% minimum capital adequacy ratio was introduced which was based on 
both Basel I and Basel II. The capital adequacy ratios of over 100 commercial banks now 
exceed 8%. Third, risk-based supervision started to be implemented through the new type 
Risk Assessment System, which not only uses quantitative criteria but also qualitative ones 
for capital, asset quality, management competence, liquidity and profitability. Moreover, the 
CBRC enhance the transparency through the publication of individual bank data, including 
the NPLs. The regulators also make much effort to push banks to adopt good corporate 
governance, through the creation of shareholder boards with outside directors, especially for 
listed banks, which must go through an auditing process as well as the publication of more 
transparent balance sheets and income statements. They also believe that it is necessary and 
essential to introduce comprehensive and well defined accounting rules in line with 
international standards, as well as bankruptcy laws, efficient resolution procedures for 
problem banks, and preferably a deposit insurance system. 
 
2.1.3.4 Summary of recent banking reforms 
 
Following the restructuring, deregulation and liberalization, such as listing of the 
state-owned banks, relaxing restrictions on interest rate and establishing new regulatory 
                                                 
8
 Under the new classification, bank loans are classified as performing (normal and special-mention) and 
non-performing (sub-standard, doubtful and loss) based on their inherent risks. 
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authority, significant changes have taken place in China’s domestic commercial banking 
industry over last ten years. The increase in the number of banks (most of them are city 
commercial banks) result in a decrease in market concentration. The total assets, total 
deposits and total loans of the overall banking sector increased significantly from 2003 to 
2006. The both absolute amount of NPLs and NPLs ratio fell considerably. The profitability 
of the Chinese banking industry also improved substantially. The return on asset (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE) rose from 0.4% to 0.71% and 9.36% to 11.23% respectively. 
Although the reform is still ongoing, our preliminary assessment indicates great 
improvement in the Chinese banking market. 
 
A healthy banking system is necessary for China not only for competition with foreign rivals 
but also vital to sustain its economic growth. What China has accomplished so far in its 
banking reform is impressive. China has witnessed a remarkable achievement in reforming 
its banking industry. The banking reforms have spurred Chinese banks to improve their asset 
quality, corporate governance and risk management. However, Chinese banks still have a 
long way to go to meet international best practices, with many challenges ahead, for 
example, how to eliminate interest rate regulation and introduce real competition, how to 
compensate government-appointed bank officials, and how to establish deposit insurance 
system. The rest of the journey could be very tough and more challenging than expected.  
Still, there is good reason to believe that China will get there eventually, given the fruitful 
progress has shown in the banking reform so far. 
 
2.2 Overall banking system in China 
 
Until 1978, China had a mono-bank financial system. The central bank, People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC) was the only bank, and therefore, in charge of a large number of issues. It not 
only performed functions of a central bank such as the conduct of monetary policy, exchange 
Chapter 2 
25 
 
rate policy and foreign reserve management. Simultaneously, it also engaged in many 
commercial banking operations, like deposit-taking, commercial lending activities and the 
financing of development projects. The introduction of a two-tier banking system in 1979 
which aimed to separate the central bank function from commercial banking business and 
improve resource allocation in domestic economy, was the first milestone in the 
modernization of the Chinese banking system. Since then, a number of significant reforms 
were implemented to redesign and reshape the banking sector in China.  
 
Today, China’s banking sector has become very diverse; it comprises many kinds of deposit 
taking institutions9. According to the China Banking Regulatory Commission’s (CBRC) 
record, at the end of 2006, China’s banking sector comprised a total of 8553 banking 
institutions, made up of total assets RMB 43.95 Trillion (US$ 5.81 Trillion) and total 
employees 2,696,76010. These institutions mainly include four state-owned commercial 
banks (SOCB) (known as the ‘Big Four’), three policy banks, eleven joint stock commercial 
banks (JSCB), 113 city commercial banks (CCB), 8348 rural credit cooperatives (RCC), 43 
urban credit cooperatives (UCC), 1 postal savings bank and 75 foreign banks (see Figure 
2.2).  
 
All the banking institutions are supervised by two regulatory institutions, namely the central 
bank (PBOC) and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), both as well as the 
rest of the financial system are ultimately overseen by the State Council (the cabinet) (see 
Figure 2.3). In the following, we will briefly discuss two regulatory bodies which govern the 
banking sector as well as each type of banks in turn. 
  
                                                 
9
 Non-deposit taking financial institutions in China include: 4 asset management companies, 54 trust companies, 73 
finance companies, 10 financial leasing companies, 2 money brokerage firms and 9 auto financing companies (source: 
CBRC annual report 2006). 
10
Renminbi (RMB) is the official currency of People’s Republic of China, Chinese Yuan (CNY) is primary unit of 
measurement for RMB. 
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Four state-owned banks: Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)  
The italic figures represent the percentage of assets each group in the total banking sector assets. 
Source: CBRC 2006 year book
PBOC 
Central banks 
3 Policy banks 
0.8% 
130 Commercial banks 
92.2% 
8391 Credit cooperatives 
5% 
75 Foreign banks 
2% 
4 State 
owned banks 
75.2% 
11 Joint stock 
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Figure 2.2: The overall structure of Chinese banking system 
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2.2.1 Banking Regulatory authority in China 
 
The central bank People’s Bank of China (PBOC) is currently in charge of the monetary 
policy and the liquidity of the financial system. It aims at promoting economic growth and 
price stability. The PBOC manages the interest rate bands for loans and deposits, since the 
interest rates are not fully liberalized yet, the reserve requirements and other instruments 
affecting banks’ liquidity. The PBOC also monitors and regulates the credit expansion of the 
banking system. In addition, the central bank acts as lender of last resort which provides 
lending facilities for domestic banks. 
 
The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established in April 2003 to take 
over the regulatory and supervisory functions of the banking sector from the PBOC. It aims 
to separate policy making and implementation from supervision, so that the PBOC could 
concentrate on monetary policy and other central bank responsibilities. The objectives of 
this newly created supervision body include protecting consumers and depositors, 
maintaining the stability in the banking system, enhancing banks’ competitiveness, 
encouraging competition, educating the public on the role of finance and eradicating 
financial crime. To this end, it focuses on the strength and soundness of financial institutions, 
capital adequacy issues, and the restructuring of the banking sector. More details about the 
CBRC will be discussed in Section 2.3.3.3.  
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*CBRC: China Banking Regulatory Commission 
*CSRC: China Security Regulatory Commission 
*CIRC: China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
Source: CBRC report 2008  
CBRC CSRC CIRC 
Commercial banks 
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Trust and Investment 
Securities firms 
Exchanges 
 
Fund Management 
Insurance 
Companies 
The State Council 
Figure 2.3: Financial regulatory structure in China 
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2.2.2 Non-bank financial institutions 
 
Before considering each type of banking institutions in China, we take a quick look at 
non-bank financial institutions. There is a number of non-bank financial institutions in the 
Chinese financial system. According to the CBRC, there are five major types of non-banking 
financial institutions; namely, trust companies, finance companies, financial leasing 
companies, auto financing companies and money brokerage firms The main ones are the 
Trust and Investment Companies (TICs), created in the 1980s to support the development of 
the private sector and to provide financing outside the credit quotas imposed to commercial 
banks. Some TICs act as the investment tool of local or provincial governments. Some 
others are intermediaries of international funds (through bond issues or syndicated medium 
and long-term loans) to finance local companies and infrastructure and construction projects. 
Other important non-bank financial institutions are Asset Management Companies (AMCs), 
established in 1999 to receive the non-performing loans (NPLs) from the state owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs) and recover them through different asset resolution techniques. 
Moreover, securities companies have played an important role in the development of the 
stock exchanges since the 1990s. Their ownership has become more diversified with an 
increasing participation of the private sector. Insurance companies, in turn, are basically in 
state hands although most of the newly created companies are joint-stock ones and have 
shifted their focus from market share to economic return. Since China’s WTO entry, foreign 
companies have expressed great interest in the Chinese insurance sector. 
 
Despite increasingly diversified as well as fast increase and expansion of non-bank financial 
institutions, the financial system in China is still bank dominated like Japan and Germany, 
rather than market-orientated financial system in the UK and the US. In the following, each 
type of banks will be discussed in turn. 
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2.2.3 State-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) 
 
The banking market in China is dominated by the four state-owned commercial banks often 
known as ‘Big Four’, which were created in the 1980s. They are originally established as 
specialized banks to take over the banking business from the PBOC, allowing the PBOC to 
focus on regulation and monetary policy. These four specialized state-owned banks are the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank 
of China (BOC) and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). They were initially established to 
grant credit to several key sectors as their names suggest namely industry, business, 
construction and agriculture. The ‘Big Four’ remained as specialized banks until 1994 when 
three policy banks were established to take over the policy-directed lending responsibilities. 
 
After the creation of the policy-lending banks in 1994, the ‘Big Four’ responsibilities shift 
to commercial purposes. Now they function more like market orientated commercial banks. 
The Big Four’s total assets reached RMB 28 trillion in 2006, which account for 70.7% of 
the total banking assets. They dominate the banking activities, by accounting for 67.4% of 
the total deposits and 67.4% of the total loans in the whole market. The remaining banks 
are relatively small, which explains why the degree of concentration is relatively high no 
matter we measured in terms of the share of assets, deposits or loans, although the market 
share of the Big Four has fallen over the last decade from 70.7% of total assets in the 
banking system to 63.3% at the end of 2006 (see Table 2.2). More details about 
concentration in Chinese banking market will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
In spite of the shrinking market share, the presence and influence of the Big Four will 
continue to dominate China’s banking system. However, the dominant leadership may tend 
to lower the efficiency for allocating financial resources and result in distortions in the 
system. Furthermore, the dominant ownership in the banking sector has been considered as 
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Table  2.2: Concentration index in Chinese banking sector during 2001-2006 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total assets 
CR4 0.707 0.669 0.641 0.626 0.636 0.633 
CR10 0.925 0.904 0.889 0.880 0.869 0.868 
HHI 0.146 0.135 0.127 0.121 0.120 0.118 
Total deposits 
CR4 0.674 0.656 0.642 0.649 0.647 0.633 
CR10 0.929 0.913 0.901 0.893 0.881 0.881 
HHI 0.152 0.142 0.137 0.128 0.125 0.121 
Total loans 
CR4 0.674 0.652 0.636 0.618 0.610 0.592 
CR10 0.932 0.903 0.914 0.891 0.886 0.867 
HHI 0.154 0.141 0.135 0.121 0.115 0.113 
Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
 
threat of market failure and tends to erode the credibility of the banking market and the 
effectiveness of the banking supervisory authorities which enforce prudential rules and 
requirements. Until now, the four state-owned commercial banks are still the biggest 
players though their dominance is in gradual decline. Below, each of the four SOCBs will 
be briefly considered. 
 
- The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) is the youngest of the “Big Four” 
banks, and was founded in 1984. The ICBC primarily engages in corporate and retail 
banking throughout China, and has strong profitability. It is the largest bank in China based 
on both tier 1 capital and total assets (see Table 2.3). It is also the biggest lender in the 
banking market. In 2006, the ICBC was simultaneously listed on the Hong Kong Stock  
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Table  2.3: Top 30 Chinese banks by tier 1 capital and assets (US$ million) 2009 
 
Rank Bank Ownership Tier 1 Capital 
 
Assets 
 
Rank 
1 ICBC SOCB 74701 1427685 1 
2 Bank of China SOCB 64961 1017718 4 
3 China Construction Bank SOCB 63113 1105471 2 
4 Agricultural Bank of China SOCB 39998 1026300 3 
5 Bank of Communications JCB 19336 391867 5 
6 China CITIC Bank JCB 13467 173798 8 
7 China Merchants Bank JCB 10457 229976 6 
8 China Minsheng Bank JCB 7507 154267 9 
9 Industrial Bank JCB 6777 149372 10 
10 Shanghai Pudong Bank 
  
JCB 5537 191588 7 
11 Bank of Beijing CCB 4641 68917 15 
12 China Everbright Bank JCB 4200 124638 11 
13 Bank China Huaxia Bank JCB 3865 107049 12 
14 Guangdong Development 
  
JCB 2691 79890 13 
15 Bank of Shanghai CCB 2516 53805 16 
16 Shenzhen Development Bank JCB 2152 69417 14 
17 Shanghai Rural Commercial 
 
CCB 1674 25360 19 
18 Huishang Bank CCB 1574 19212 22 
19 Bank of Jiangsu CCB 1529 33701 17 
20 Nanjing City Commercial 
 
CCB 1513 13711 26 
21 Shenzhen Ping An Bank CCB 1230 21351 21 
22 Bank of Ningbo CCB 1229 15109 24 
23 Beijing Rural Commercial 
 
CCB 1088 33303 18 
24 Tianjin City Commercial 
 
CCB 950 17970 23 
25 Bohai Bank CCB 726 9106 33 
26 Hangzhou City Commercial 
 
CCB 655 14575 25 
27 Dalian City Commercial Bank CCB 632 10473 30 
28 China Zheshang Bank CCB 602 12262 27 
29 Evergrowing bank JCB 600 22093 20 
30 Shengzhen Rural Commercial 
 
CCB 595 9593 31 
Source: The Banker, 2009  
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Table  2.4: Top 10 world bank by market capitalization (US$ billon) 2008 
 
Rank Bank Mkt Cap US$bl 
1 ICBC 277.514 
2 Bank of America 195.933 
3 HSBC Holdings 176.788 
4 China Construction Bank 165.234 
5 Bank of China 165.087 
6 JPMorgan Chase 159.615 
7 Citigroup 140.698 
8 Wells Fargo 112.365 
9 Banco Santander 109.862 
10 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 105.412 
Source: www.bloomberg.com 
 
Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange, raised US$ 21.9 billion, making it the largest 
bank in the world in terms of market capitalization (see Table 2.4). Until 2009, it had 
assets of RMB 11 trillion (US$ 1.6 trillion), with over 18,000 outlets including 106 
overseas branches and agents globally. 
 
- The China Construction Bank (CCB) was originally created in 1954 to administer and 
disburse government funds for construction and infrastructure related projects. Until 1994, 
the CCB had gradually become a full service commercial bank. Its business now consists 
of corporate banking, personal banking, and treasury operations. It maintains a leading 
position in infrastructure loans and residential mortgages. In 2008, it holds about 
two-thirds of residential mortgages in China. The bank has approximately 13,629 domestic 
branches. In addition, it maintains overseas branches in Frankfurt, Hong Kong, 
Johannesburg, New York, Seoul, Singapore, Tokyo, Sydney, and London. The CCB is the 
first SOCB went to public. In October 2005, the CCB was publicly listed on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange. Since then, the CCB start their international expansion journey. It 
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acquired Bank of America (Asia) in 2006, opened branches in New York and London in 
2008, and become a member of Global ATM Alliance. 
 
- The Bank of China (BOC), founded in 1912, is the country’s oldest bank. It originally 
specialized in international financial transactions such as foreign exchange services and 
extending trade credit, but now the BOC is mainly engaged in commercial banking, 
including corporate and retail banking, treasury business and financial institution banking. 
It is the number one foreign exchange lender. It also conducts investment banking and 
insurance activities through its subsidiaries. The BOC is the most international bank of all 
the commercial banks in China. At present, it has in excess of 11,000 domestic branches 
and over 600 overseas branches, and representative offices covering 27 countries and 
regions. In 2006, the BOC held an initial public offering (IPO), both on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange, in which it raised around US$ 22.5 
billion of new equity capital. Recently, the BOC has also made further efforts to attract 
strategic investors from overseas. Foreign shareholders now hold a 20% stake in the BOC.  
 
-The Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) was founded in 1951 to facilitate financial 
operations in the agricultural sector and rural areas. Today, the ABC’s business has 
developed from its original rural credit and settlement to a wide range of financial business 
transactions. The ABC has extensive outlets covering both urban and rural areas of China. 
It has 447,519 employees across 24,452 branches in mainland China, two overseas 
branches in Singapore and Hong Kong, and three representative offices in London, Tokyo, 
and New York. According to information recently released by the ABC, it has become the 
third largest bank in China in terms of total assets, which had reached RMB 6.05 trillion at 
the end of 2007. As the ABC has substantially more NPLs, it is the last SOCB went public 
with a US$ 22.1 billion IPO in 2010 on both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange11. 
                                                 
11
As Agricultural Bank of China used to be a specialised bank which focused on deposit and lending activities in rural 
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2.2.4 Policy lending banks 
 
Three policy-lending banks were created in 1994 to carry out the development policy 
lending previously assigned to the SOCBs and hold about 0.8 percent of the total bank assets. 
These are the Agricultural Development Bank, the China Development Bank and the 
Export-Import Bank of China. Each of these policy banks provides financial services especially 
policy-directed lending for specialised sections. The Agricultural Development Bank of China is 
mainly engaged in the state policy oriented agricultural finance business and extends credit for 
agriculture and agricultural economic development. The China Development Bank is primarily 
responsible for providing loans for capital investment projects and large infrastructure projects, 
with special attention to the poorer, western and central regions. The Export-Import Bank 
grants trade credit, export insurance, and working capital loans for firms involved in 
international trade and investment. Policy-lending banks fund themselves primarily through 
the issuance of bonds, central bank loans, and government deposits. They hardly accept retail 
deposits. Moreover, the policy banks are deliberately exempted from many of the prudential 
controls imposed on Chinese commercial banks, and profitability is not ultimate objective for 
their managers. Therefore, policy banks are not commercial banks in real sense.  
 
2.2.5 Joint stock commercial banks (JSCB) 
 
As discussed above, beside the four state-owned commercial banks, there is a number of 
other types of  commercial banks in the Chinese banking system with a diverse ownership 
structure and geographical scope, namely joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs), city 
                                                                                                                                                    
area, it accumulated a substantial amount of NPLs due to heavy subsidy directed by the government to agriculture related 
industries and large but poor population. 
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commercial banks (CCBs), urban credit cooperatives (UCCs) and rural credit cooperatives 
(RCCs). Part of them has been used as an experiment for the liberalization process of the 
financial system and others are specialized in some market niches. 
 
The joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) were created in late 1980s and initially designed 
to provide specialized product niches, but now offer a full range of financial services and 
operate at the national level. The most distinguishing difference between the JSCBs and 
SOCBs is that JSCBs have a diversified ownership structure (see Table 2.5). They are 
partially owned by local governments, stated owned enterprises, private enterprises or 
foreign companies. Among them, local governments and the state-owned enterprises are the 
key shareholders of these banks.  
 
There are currently 11 banks in this category and they account for 13 percent of the total 
banking assets (see Figure 2.2). All of them are in the top 30 Chinese banks by total assets 
and equity (see Table 2.3). Since Shenzhen Development Bank firstly went public in 1991, 
other six joint stock banks are already listed on stock market, namely Bank of 
Communications, China Minsheng Bank, China CITIC bank, China Everbright Bank, China 
Merchants Bank, and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank.  
 
The JSCBs are allowed to engage in a wide variety of banking services including accepting 
deposits, extending loans, as well as providing foreign exchange and international 
transaction services. The comparative advantages of those joint stock banks are that they are 
more market-oriented, with better governance and management and less government 
intervention. Moreover, joint stock banks provide finance to small state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and private small medium enterprises (SMEs), since the access of fund from large 
state-owned banks is restricted to small firms. Furthermore, JSCBs are specialized in 
particular business area where the state-owned banks have traditionally been weak. For 
example, Minsheng Bank is strong in trade financing; China Merchants Bank  
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Table  2.5: Ownership Structure of the JSCBs (2008) 
 
Bank 
Largest 
shareholder 
Government 
ownership 
Private 
ownership 
Foreign 
ownership 
Bank of 
Communications 
Ministry of 
Finance (21.6%) 
45% 35% 20% 
China Merchants 
Bank 
HKSCC 
(17.88%) 
46.53% 53.47% 0% 
China CITIC Bank 
CITIC Group 
(62%) 
64.18% 15.82% 20% 
China Mingsheng 
Bank 
New Hope 
Investment Co., 
Ltd. (5.9%) 
5.1% 94.9% 0% 
China Everbright 
Bank 
China SAFF 
Investment Ltd. 
(70.88%) 
84.7% 15.3% 0% 
Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank 
Shanghai 
International 
Group (23.57%) 
46.88% 49.34% 3.78% 
Shenzhen 
Development Bank 
New bridge 
Capital (16.7%) 
0.2% 83.1% 16.7% 
Guangdong 
Development Bank 
Citigroup (20%) 
China Grid Corp 
(20%) 
  
  
 
75.26% 0% 24.74% 
Industrial Bank 
The Finance 
Bureau of Fujian 
Province (20.4%) 
46.35% 33.67% 19.98% 
HuaXia Bank 
Shougang 
Corporation 
(10.19%) 
38.87% 47.15% 13.98% 
Evergrowing Bank 
Yantai Blue Sky 
Investment 
   
 
46.19% 36.43% 17.38% 
Source: author’s own calculation based on banks’ annual reports 
*Government ownership includes central government, local governments, and state-owned 
enterprises 
*Private ownership includes institutional investors and individual investors  
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performs well in credit card business; whilst the Industrial Bank has made great advances in 
institutional banking services. Those joint stock banks usually maintain much smaller 
branch networks than state-owned banks, typically confined to the region of origin or to the 
fast-growing coastal area and urban area, although they are generally allowed to operate at 
the national level.  
 
The JSCBs have experienced the fastest expansion compared to other groups in the last few 
years. For example, in 2002 alone, their assets increased by 24%. And until 2006, their assets 
represent 13% of the total banking sector assets. As they were established more recently and 
subject to less central government inference, they generally have less non performing loans, 
better asset quality, greater profitability and higher efficiency than the state-owned banks. As 
the joint-stock commercial banks expanded rapidly, they constitute an important part of China’s 
banking system. 
 
2.2.6 City commercial banks (CCBs) 
 
Another important type of banking institution is the city commercial banks (CCBs). Most of 
the city commercial banks are newly created since the mid-1990s by way of restructuring 
and consolidating urban cooperatives. They were mainly designed to support local 
development, typically lend to local authorities for infrastructure, schools, local SMEs and 
local residents in their municipalities. Hence local governments and local enterprises are the 
main shareholders. There are currently 113 city commercial banks and these banks represent 
4% of the total banking assets. Initially, they were not allowed to operate at the national level 
unlike the JSCBs, which was their major competitive disadvantage. But since 2006, the 
CBRC started to eliminate this geographical restriction in order to promote further 
competition. 
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2.2.7 Urban and rural credit cooperatives (UCCs or RCCs) 
 
In addition, there are 8391 urban and rural cooperatives in total. They were established in the 
1980s as a mechanism to diversify the financial system and to finance projects in areas 
where resources were scarce. They typically attract deposits from small towns or rural areas 
and provide credit to SMEs or farmers. As a compensation for them to operate in poor area, 
they are subsidized from the central bank. Although the number of these institutions is quite 
substantial, their relative size is very small, accounting in total for 5% of the total banking 
assets in 2006. 
 
The number of UCC and RCC collectively has experienced a steady reduction since 1997. 
This is mainly due to their inability to attract deposits and expand lending. Also some UCCs 
were restructured to the city commercial banks. Nowadays, the RCCs are more important 
and numerous than urban ones, after the consolidation of the latter into the CCBs. Today the 
RCCs provide financial services for agricultural production, farmers and village enterprises 
in rural areas, where almost two-thirds of the total Chinese population living there. However, 
the RCCs are the worst performing financial institutions in China, with very poor 
governance and the highest NPL ratios. 
 
2.2.8 Foreign banks 
 
Foreign banks play a positive but at least for now a limited role in the Chinese banking 
system. In 2006, there are 75 licensed foreign banking institutions in China, with 252 
branches and 242 representative offices (see Table 2.6 for lists of major foreign banks in 
China). Foreign banks represent 0.5% in the local currency lending market but take around 
13% in the foreign currency lending business. Their total assets increased from RMB 39.69 
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billion to RMB 92.79 billion at the end of 2006 (see Figure 2.4), and about 2% of the total 
banking assets. If compared to Figure 2.7 later, the growth rate of foreign bank assets is 
faster than that of total banking assets. The foreign bank assets to total assets grow from 
1.24% to 2.06%. 
 
Figure 2.4: Total assets of foreign banks (RMB billion) (2003-2006) 
 
 
Source: CBRC report 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
2003 2004 2005 2006
Chapter 2 
41 
 
Table  2.6: Major foreign banks in China 
 
Asian Europe North America 
ANZ (Australia) Banco Santander (Spain) Bank of America  
Bank of East Asia (HK) BNP Paribas S.A. (France) Bank of Montreal 
 Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
 
Crédit Agricole (France) Bank of Nova Scotia 
 Dah Sing Bank (HK) Commerzbank (Germany) Bank of New York(US) 
  DBS (Singapore) Credit Suisse (Swiss) Citibank  
First Sino Bank (Taiwan) Deutsche Bank (Germany) JPMorgan Chase Bank 
 Hang Seng Bank (HK) Fortis Bank (Belgium) Royal Bank of Canada 
 Mizuho Corporate Bank (Japan) HSBC (UK) Wachovia Bank (US) 
OCBC (Singapore) ING Bank (Netherlands)  
SMBC (Japan) Intesa Sanpaolo Bank (Italy)  
Westpac (Australia) KBC Bank (Belgium)  
Wing Hang Bank (HK) Natixis (France)  
Wing Lung Bank (HK) Norddeutsche Landesbank 
 
 
 Rabobank (Netherlands)  
 Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
 
 
 RBS (UK)  
 Société Générale (France)  
 Standard Chartered Bank 
 
 
 UBS (Swiss)  
 VTB (Russia)  
 WestLB (Germany)  
*ANZ, Commonwealth Bank of Australia and Westpac are Australian banks and for 
convenience have been grouped for Asian banks. 
Source: CBRC report 2008 
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2.3 Main features characterizing the Chinese banking 
sector 
 
In order to better understand the Chinese banking system, in this section, we intend to 
discuss several important features characterizing the banking industry in China. 
 
The first striking feature is the large size of the Chinese banking system not only in relative 
terms but also in absolute ones. At present, banks continue to dominate China’s financial 
landscape as indirect financing remains the main channel of financing for business 
enterprises in China (see Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6).  
 
Figure  2.5: Share of financing channels in China (2008) 
 
 
 
Source: CBRC report 2008 
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Figure  2.6: Heavy reliance on bank financing in China compare to other big economies 
(2006) 
 
 
Source: CBRC report 2006 
 
By the end of 2006, the total assets of China’s banking sector amounted to RMB 43.95 
trillion (US$ 6.28 trillion) (see Figure 2.7) and accounted for 87% of the total assets in the 
entire financial sector. The establishment of the stock market in China was very late in 1991, 
and although the role of capital markets has become more significant nowadays, the size 
remains quite small, with a capitalization of US$ 780 billion for stock market, government 
bond market cap US$ 364 billion and corporate bond market cap US$35 billion by end of 
2006. It is worth noting that derivatives markets have not been established in China yet. 
Because of the incomplete development of capital markets in China, enterprises still heavily 
rely on bank loan as the main source of financing. In 2006, approximately 80% of financing 
is still through banks. Moreover, a legal framework for private equity financing is just 
starting. Therefore, banks play a very special and vital role in the Chinese economy. 
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Figure  2.7: Total assets (RMB billion) of banking system in China (2003-2006) 
 
 
Source: CBRC report 2006 
 
The second feature of the Chinese banking system is that the whole industry is dominated by 
a few very large state-owned commercial banks. The concentration measures such as CR4, 
CR10 and Hirschman Herfindhal index (HHI) based on total assets, deposits, and loans show 
that the Chinese banking market is still highly concentrated, although there was a slight 
decrease in the overall market concentration during the period of 2001-2006 (see Table 2.2).  
 
In particular, the four largest banks have taken up the majority of total assets, deposits, and 
loans, with the four-firm concentration ratios (CR4) amounting to 84.2%, 84.6% and 87.2% 
respectively before the WTO entry in 2001. However, things seem to be starting to change 
after the WTO entry, the state-owned banks have seen their monopoly position weakening 
with a rapid expansion of the joint stock and city commercial banks. The CR4 decreased 
correspondingly to 75.2%, 74.5% and 74.4% for total assets, deposits and loans by the end of 
2006, in spite of the total assets, deposits and loans of the whole banking sector increase (see 
Figure 2.8).  
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
2003 2004 2005 2006
Chapter 2 
45 
 
Figure  2.8: Loans and deposits of Chinese banking market (RMB billion) (2003-2006) 
 
 
Source: CBRC report 2006 
 
The market concentration ratios for the top ten banks (CR10) show a similar trend of 
decrease. Drops in the HHI also indicate less market concentration, a loss of pricing power 
and an increase in market competition among banks. For example, the HHI based on total 
loans decreased the most from 0.19 to 0.13. The HHI also reveals that the Chinese banking 
market was highly concentrated before joining in the WTO, but five years after entry in 2006, 
the market could be classified as moderately concentrated 12 . In addition, although 
competition increased in the banking market, the traditional intermediation business still 
dominated, on average 80% of revenue remains to rely on interest income, and the 
contribution from fee-based income being around 10%, despite the rate of growth rise 
substantially in recent years (see Figure 2.9). 
 
                                                 
12
 The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) separates values of the HHI index into three categories. For HHI values 
below 0.1 (or 1000) the market is considered to be unconcentrated. Values between 0.1 and 0.18 (1000 to 1800) indicate 
that a market is moderately concentrated. Finally, values of the HHI index above 0.18 (1800) indicate high concentration. 
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Figure  2.9: Ratio of fee-based income to net income (2003-2006) 
 
 
Source: CBRC report 2006 
 
The third feature is the very traditional structure of the balance sheet, compared with 
Western banks. First, loans form a large part of the assets and account for 60.8 percent in 
2006, the majority of which is granted to the corporate sector. The recent boom in the 
housing sector has not changed this picture yet; mortgage lending is still less than 15 percent 
of the total loans. Second, almost all liabilities are deposits, with an average share of 80 
percent in 2006. This is even higher in the state-owned commercial banks but much less for 
the joint stock commercial banks, which have used non-interest bearing funding. Retail 
depositors are the main financiers of the banking system since corporate deposits only 
represented one-third of the total deposits. However, large differences exist among different 
types of banks since retail depositors represent 60 percent of the total deposits for 
state-owned commercial banks whereas corporate deposits contribute 65 percent for joint 
stock commercial banks. 
 
The restrictive and biased competition environment in the Chinese banking industry is the 
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fourth feature. Like many transition economies, Chinese banks are characterized by lacking 
independence and having poor corporate governance, which results in very poor asset 
quality, low profitability and inefficiency. The root of these problems is government 
intervention. 
 
Due to massive government involvement in the banking business, the Chinese banks have 
piled up a mountain of bad debts through government-ordered lending to the state-owned 
enterprises and local governments. Despite the improvement of the asset quality in recent 
years, the size of non-performing loans (NPLs) is generally considered the major threat for 
the banking system in China. At the end of 2002, the NPLs of the banking sector, including 
state owned banks, policy banks, joint stock banks and credit cooperatives, amounted to 
RMB 2,532 billion (US$ 373 billion) and the ratio of NPLs to total loans was 19%. The 
NPLs of state-owned commercial banks reached RMB 1,999 billion (US$ 232 billion) and 
the NPL ratio was 20%, an equivalent of 17% of GDP in 2002 (see Table 2.7).  
 
Table  2.7: Reported NPLs in the Chinese banking industry (2002) 
 
 NPLs in USD billion NPLs ratio % of GDP 
State-owned banks 232 20 17 
Joint-stock banks 23 7 2 
Policy banks 19 18 1 
Credit cooperatives 60 30 4 
Banking system total 373 19 28 
Source: Chinese Financial Yearbook 2002 published by National Bureau of Statistics 
 
The NPL ratio was even larger before the Chinese authorities started the bank restructuring 
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program (above 30% in 1997). The asset quality of the joint-stock banks varies. They 
generally have healthier balance sheets than the state owned banks due to different 
ownership structure and less government intervention. The NPLs for joint-stock commercial 
banks was 7% on average in 2002. The underlying reasons for such poor asset quality are not 
only the soft-budget constraints for lending to SOEs, but also a weak credit culture. 
Therefore, proper management and speedy disposition of NPLs is one of the most critical 
tasks of the recent banking reform.  
 
Moreover, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) for most Chinese banks wasbelow regulatory 
requirements (Basel II) before the WTO accession. At the end of 2001, the total capital 
adequacy ratio of the state-owned commercial banks was merely 4.61%, significantly below 
the minimum regulatory requirement level 8%. The same ratio for joint-stock commercial 
banks and city commercial banks were 6.83 % and 6.01% respectively. However, at present, 
most domestic commercial banks meet the CAR requirement, although there is still one fifth 
of banks still cannot meet the standard. 
 
Besides low capital base and poor asset quality, domestic commercial banks in China also 
suffer from poor corporate governance, weak internal controls and a lack of adequate risk 
management skills. Particularly, the SOCBs suffer from all corporate governance weakness. 
As senior management of the state-owned banks are traditionally appointed by government, 
their decisions are heavily influenced by officials. As a result, their ultimate objectives aim 
to serve the government’s decision rather than pursuing economic profit or maximize 
shareholder’s wealth. Fortunately, the JCSBs do not have the same legacy as SOCBs, so that 
their management has a higher commitment to shareholder’s value although they are 
possibly influenced by local governments and state-owned enterprises given their large 
participation in the capital of most of these institutions.  
 
Furthermore, since most domestic banks are not listed and are accountable only to the 
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government (usually the Ministry of Finance), the disclosure requirements are minimal, no 
transparency for depositors, investors and regulators. Thus the present structure of state 
ownership accounts for at least some of their less satisfactory performance. No wonder that 
in the on-going banking reform program for state-owned banks, the government is so 
determined to press ahead with the corporatization and ownership diversification of these 
banks. Although state ownership will continue to dominate (it may take a variety of forms in 
practice), the proportion will be reduced considerably.  
 
As a consequence of government intervention, the substantial amount of NPLs and poor 
capital adequacy ratio actually made most Chinese banks unprofitable. The profitability of 
the banking sector is negligible13. In 2002, the return on average equity (ROAE) and the 
return on average assets (ROAA) for the banking system was 3.05%, and 0.14% respectively, 
which were well below western standards. Low profitability can be mainly explained by the 
low operating income and substantial amounts of provisions and write-offs, stemming from 
the very low asset quality. Later in the thesis, those rates of return are compared to the 
shadow rate of return on equity based on econometric evidence. 
 
The last feature is the poor institutional framework of the banking system in China. This is 
featured by a rather loose regulation and supervision, and the lack of bankruptcy law 
particularly as regards enforcement. The regulatory bodies, as well as the central bank, are 
dependent on the government’s decisions. The lack of enforcement power from the 
supervisory part helps explain very limited improvement in corporate governance. However, 
the newly created CBRC try to change the situation. 
 
                                                 
13
 High level of tax levied on commercial banks is another factor contributes to low profitability of the Chinese banking 
industry. At present, commercial banks are subject to two main forms of taxation. One is Business tax, based on revenue, is 
currently 5% (lowered from 8% since 2002). Another is Income tax, based on profit, and is set at 33% for domestic 
commercial banks. Such heavy tax burden makes it difficult for banks to generate and retain earnings and thus to strengthen 
their capital bases. 
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2.4 Detailed arrangements for opening-up after the 
WTO entry 
 
A crucial milestone in the financial liberalization process was China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. China’s entry into the WTO has attracted worldwide 
attention. China promised to work hard to strictly fulfil the commitments it made for 
accession into the WTO. The commitments generally state that China will eliminate all kinds 
of restrictions on foreign banks, which will be allowed to conduct all the banking businesses 
in China, for both domestic currency (RMB) and foreign currencies, with customers for both 
corporate and residents, and in any place of the country.  
 
However, the approach for openness has been very gradual and cautious. The WTO agreed 
China could take a gradual pace of openness and allowed a five-year transition period 
(2002-2006) for preparation of full openness after the entry. The transition period is the 
major benefit given to developing country. Once the transition period ends, for the first time 
China has to fully open its financial market to foreign competitors after 2006. According to 
the negotiation with the WTO, China set five-year time schedule for gradual opening-up. 
The Table 2.8 lists the banking market opening-up schedule after China’ accession to the 
WTO. 
 
2.4.1 Time schedule for opening-up after WTO entry 
 
Before the WTO entry, foreign banks in China were only allowed to carry out 
foreign-currency transactions and with several restrictions. Following the formal entry into 
the WTO, China immediately cancelled all restrictions on regions and clients for foreign 
banks in handling foreign currency business in China. As a consequence, foreign banks can 
Chapter 2 
51 
 
open foreign exchanges business to both Chinese enterprises and citizens. However, for 
domestic currency business, foreign banks were authorized to offer local currency services 
with geographical restrictions. China gradually abolished regional restrictions on foreign 
banks within the five-year transition period. In particular, China opened domestic currency 
banking business in Shenzhen, Shanghai, Dalian and Tianjin at the time of its entry into the 
WTO. One year following the entry, banking business in Guangzhou, Qingdao, Nanjing and 
Wuhan were opened. Within two years after the accession, it opened Jinan, Fuzhou, 
Chengdu and Chongqing. In three years, the market opening-up were expanded to another 
four cities, namely Kunming, Zhuhai, Beijing and Xiamen. In four years, banking markets in 
Shantou, Ningbo, Shenyang and Xi'an were further opened. Five years after the accession, 
all geographical restrictions imposed on domestic currency business for foreign banks were 
fully eliminated (see Figure 2.10). 
 
Table  2.8: Time schedule for opening-up after the WTO entry 
 
Time Regions Clients 
Foreign currency business 
Entry (2001) All the regions 
Both enterprise and 
residents 
Domestic currency business 
Entry (2001) Shenzhen, Shanghai, Dalian, Tianjin  
In one year (2002) Guangzhou, Qingdao, Nanjing, Wuhan  
In two years (2003) Jinan, Fuzhou, Chengdu, Chongqing Enterprise only 
In three years(2004) Kunming, Zhuhai, Beijing, Xiamen Enterprise only 
In four years (2005) Shantou, Ningbo, Shenyang, Xian Enterprise only 
In five years (2006) All the regions 
Both enterprise and 
residents 
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Figure  2.10: Map of areas opened up for domestic currency business 
 
Source: drawn by author based on Table 2.8 
 
Moreover, China called off restrictions on target clients for domestic currency business step 
by step. In two years after it joined the WTO, China permitted foreign banks to handle RMB 
business for Chinese enterprises and after five years of entry permitted foreign banks to 
provide such services to all Chinese clients, namely both enterprise and residents.  
 
The entry of foreign banks into the long protected Chinese local market has been a gradual 
process, but accelerated by the commitment of China's entry into the WTO in 2001. This is 
an important milestone in the opening of China's financial markets.  
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2.4.2 Challenges faced by Chinese banks after the opening-up 
 
After China's entry into the WTO, the competition as well as cooperation between domestic 
banks and foreign banks has been intensified in the Chinese banking market. As a 
consequence, both opportunities and challenges exist for the Chinese banks after the entry 
into the WTO. The opening of banking market is favourable to improve the structure of 
banking capital, enhance the inflow of international funds and absorb advanced management 
and operation skills from modern and large banks, which will improve the overall banking 
services and eliminate the disparity between China and the international standards. 
Unfavourable factors such as strong competition may cause financial crisis which endanger 
the stability of the financial system and economic security. Particularly, hot money must be 
carefully monitored to prevent it rushing in to threaten the national economy. Therefore, the 
government must bear a sense of urgency, crisis and responsibility to examine the actual 
situation and weaknesses in current banking system so that they can set a goal and explore 
new approaches to ensure a steady healthy development of banking market under the process 
of reform and opening up. 
 
We can foresee that competition in the future will be very intense, foreign banks will 
participate in various services such as foreign and local currency retail business, mortgage, 
corporate lending and credit cards. However, in short run, foreign banks do not serve as a big 
threat to the Chinese domestic banks. Although foreign banks grow very fast, the market 
share they have captured is still very tiny. This is possibly because domestic banks have 
some dominated advantages. Firstly, to some extent, there is implicit hidden protection from 
the Chinese government, especially for big commercial banks. Secondly, domestic banks 
have well-built reputation and brand image. Thirdly, domestic banks have long business 
relationship with domestic enterprises. Last but not least, they have already established large 
number of networking branches spread all over the country. However, foreign banks can 
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compete with domestic banks for the creative service, middle business, expertise and 
management team. In short, the Chinese domestic banks have comparative advantage over 
traditional deposit and loan business, but foreign banks have advantages over the off-balance 
sheet business which is more likely to improve their profitability in the future. 
 
2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter firstly reviews the banking reform process implemented by the Chinese 
government since 1979. In general, the Chinese banking reform process can be subdivided 
into three phases. The first period dated from 1979 to 1989, characterized by institutional 
change from mono-bank system to multi layered system. The second period started from 
1990 until 1996, featured by separation of commercial banking activities from policy 
lending activities and two legislative reforms. And the third period is identified from 1997 
to 2006. China successfully joining the WTO in 2001 set the background for the latest phase 
of reform. We focus on the third period which is the most recent and has the most important 
influences. Three important aspects of the market-oriented reform are discussed, namely, 
restructure of the state-owned banks, reduced government intervention and strengthened 
regulation and supervision. 
 
This chapter then outlines the structure of the Chinese banking system. Currently, the 
Chinese banking sector is comprised of two regulatory institutions (the Peoples’ Bank of 
China and China Banking Regulatory Commission), and three major categories of domestic 
banks, namely: commercial banks (state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial 
banks, and city commercial banks), policy banks, and (urban and rural) credit cooperatives. 
The most notable characteristic of the Chinese banking system is that it is dominated by the 
big four state-owned commercial banks (ICBC, BOC, CCB and ABC) which have 
formidable sizes. But those giants are burdened with a considerable amount of 
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non-performing loans which lead to poor asset quality, low profitability and inefficiency. 
 
Finally, this chapter reveals the detailed arrangement during the five-year transition period 
for financial market opening-up after China’s WTO entry in 2001, and consider both 
opportunities and challenges faced by the domestic commercial banks. 
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Chapter 3: Market competition in the Chinese 
banking industry: an application of the traditional 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The relationship between performance (price or profitability) and market structure (market 
share and concentration) has been intensively investigated in various industries in numerous 
studies, especially in relation to the banking industry. This popularity may due to the 
speciality of the banking market which plays a crucial role in the economy and is subject to 
intense regulations.  
 
Most empirical studies in the bank performance literature find that banks’ profitability is 
positively related to market power (measured by either concentration or market share). 
However, there are two explanations for this universally agreed positive relationship 
between the market structure and performance. The two explanations have resulted in two 
testable hypotheses; one is the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis, 
and another is the efficiency hypothesis. These two competing hypotheses have been subject 
to controversy for many years and the irresolvable debate will continue. 
 
The structure–conduct–performance (SCP) paradigm states that the structure of an industry 
(the degree of concentration) determines firm conduct (collusion and monopolistic pricing) 
which in turn determines firm performance (profitability or rate of return). 
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Early studies advocated the traditional SCP hypothesis which states that banks in a more 
concentrated market can obtain higher profit as collusion is easier and less costly in that 
market. The ability to collude is assumed to be inversely related to the number of firms and 
their market shares in an industry, and thus is positively correlated with concentration. 
Therefore, the bank is able to set prices more favourably (i.e. higher loan rates and lower 
deposit rates) and gain more profit. Successful collusion leads to abnormal profits and a loss 
of social welfare and potential economic growth.  
 
Later, the hypothesis that concentration leads to higher profitability has been challenged by 
an alternative hypothesis, known as the efficiency hypothesis. Studies (Demsetz (1973), 
Peltzamn (1977) and Brozen (1983)) that defend the efficiency hypothesis argued that profit 
differentials are the result of differences in efficiencies among banks. That is, efficiency is 
the underlying driving force for market share and profitability rather than market 
concentration. Banks with superior management or advanced production technologies have 
lower costs and therefore generate higher profits. In other words, greater efficiency of a bank 
allows it to gain a greater market share through price competition or acquisition of less 
efficient banks, and becoming more profitable. Thus, the increase of profits and market share 
is the result of efficiency, not of a higher level of concentration (collusion). The efficiency 
hypothesis however appears to be closely related to an alternative version of the SCP. This 
alternative version, known as the relative market power hypothesis (RMP) will be 
considered in Chapter 6, it treats individual firm market share (instead of whole market 
collusion) as the cause of inefficiency. Therefore the difference between the efficiency 
hypothesis and the RMP hypothesis is whether efficient performance determines high 
market share or vice versa. 
 
In summarizing the basic points of the proponents of the efficiency hypothesis, Smirlock 
(1985) wrote: ‘‘concentration is not a random event but rather the result of superior 
efficiency of leading firms’’. Firms possessing a comparative advantage in production 
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become large and obtain a high market share, and as a consequence, the market becomes 
more concentrated. Therefore, the basic message of efficiency hypothesis is that leading 
firms’ efficiency leads to increased market share thus higher concentration and is positively 
correlated with higher performance. 
 
Although those two competing hypotheses disagree with each other for the reason behind the 
positive relationship between profitability and market structure, they actually do not 
contradict. Indeed, both of them reflect the same relationship between market power and 
profitability. However they differ in the aspect of how market power can be obtained in the 
first place. That is, the traditional SCP hypothesis takes market power as exogenous, which 
is derived from market concentration, whereas, the efficient hypothesis take firm-specific 
efficiency as given, the market power is acquired through enlarged market share by means of 
maintaining or improving such efficiency. 
 
Despite the logic and theory behind the two hypotheses are the same, the empirical 
application is divergent. The two hypotheses suggest different implications for merger and 
antitrust policy as well as regulatory work. If the SCP hypothesis is correct, the increased 
market concentration will enable banks to set prices less favourable to consumer. So antitrust 
policy and regulatory action for preventing accumulation of market power would be 
necessary. However, if the evidence supports the efficiency hypothesis, mergers and 
acquisitions that are motivated by greater efficiency should be encouraged. Thus, advocates 
of the traditional SCP hypothesis believe antitrust and regulatory policy is socially beneficial 
while the efficient structure hypothesis supporters consider it is socially costly. 
 
In this chapter we will test the validity of the SCP hypothesis in Chinese banking market 
during 1997-2006. There are three factors motivate this study. First, as the controversy 
between the two competing hypotheses has not been resolved yet, it is important to find out 
which one is the best explanation for bank performance in Chinese banking industry. Once 
Chapter 3 
59 
 
identifying the driving force behind relationship between the bank performance and market 
structure, it can provide useful policy implications for decision makers. Second, although 
there have been numerous studies relating to both the SCP hypothesis and efficiency 
hypothesis, these studies, however, have been restricted to developed countries, mostly the 
US banking markets and, to a lesser extent, UK and other European banking markets. There 
are only a few papers carried out examination on the structure performance for Asian 
countries. Studies that solely focus on Chinese banking industry are hardly present. Before 
the initiatives of banking reform, the Chinese banking industry was highly concentrated and 
restrictively regulated and protected from foreign competition. So the Chinese banking 
market provides excellent example to investigate the relationship between bank performance 
and market structure. Third, as the debate on the two hypotheses will continue, this study can 
contribute some new evidences in the banking performance literature. 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follow; Section 3.2 briefly explains the SCP 
framework. Section 3.3 analyzes the market structure in Chinese banking industry. Section 
3.4 reviews empirical findings in the SCP literature. Section 3.5 describes the methodology. 
Section 3.6 provides data collection. Section 3.7 presents and discusses the empirical results. 
Finally, we summarize our study and conclude in Section 3.8. 
 
3.2 The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
framework 
 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) is a well-known paradigm in industrial 
economics since the 1960s. The SCP model was originally used by the US government in 
formulating antitrust policy. The model quickly gained popularity and it enjoys widespread 
application in different industries, especially in the banking sector, Please see Figure 3.1 
which provides visual explanation for the general SCP framework. 
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Figure  3.1: The general SCP framework 
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The theoretical basis for using the structure-conduct-performance framework is to analyse 
competition among firms. However it is impossible to observe or measure competition 
directly, so proxies have to be used instead. One of the most commonly used proxies is the 
level of concentration in an industry. Consequently, a number of concentration ratios were 
devised to measure proxies for market competitiveness. For example, the four-firm 
concentration ratio (CR4), measuring the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms 
in the industry, and the eight-firm concentration ratio (CR8), focusing on the top eight firms. 
Other measures include the Herfindhal-Hirschman index (HHI), which looks at the market 
shares of all firms in that industry, or the Lerner index, which considers the differences 
between market price (p) and marginal costs (mc), L=(p-mc)/p; the higher the Lerner index 
is, the less is the competition. The Lerner index can be derived as a transformation of HHI 
and also of the Pazar-Rosse statistic which is covered in detail in Chapter 4. Each of these 
measures uses the relationship between revenues and costs to make inferences about 
competition. 
 
According to economic theory, the degree of competition among firms in a market is 
influenced by the degree of concentration, since a more highly concentrated market structure 
facilitates more effective collusion. According to the ‘collusion hypothesis’, high 
concentration reduced the costs of collusion, resulting in higher rates being charged on 
loans, lower interest paid on deposits, higher fees, and so on. This hypothesis is originally 
tested by estimating measures of bank performance as functions of the market concentration. 
If the estimated regression coefficients on market concentration are statistically significant 
and positive, then the model provides evidence to support the SCP hypothesis. 
 
Although the SCP model is far from ideal for testing market power and performance due to a 
number of weaknesses, such as not incorporating direct measure of efficiency and ignorance 
of firm’s conduct (behaviour), it has survived and still enjoys the continuing popularity in 
industrial organizations for the purposes of competitive analysis. Other newly developed 
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approaches which improve the SCP model such as Panzar-Rosse model and Berger’s test 
will be considered in Chapter 4 and 6. 
 
3.3 Overview of market structure in Chinese banking 
industry 
 
3.3.1 Market structure measurement 
 
Market structure describes the state of a market with respect to competition. Market 
concentration (the number and size distribution of firms), entry barriers and the extent of 
product differentiation are main elements that explain the competition. Among the three 
factors, market concentration is considered as the most important and widely used 
measurement to examine the level of competition in the market. Econometricians usually 
employ concentration measurements to detect the degree of competition and determine the 
market form. The most popular and commonly used proxies for market concentration are the 
concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 
 
The concentration ratio of an industry is used as an indicator of the relative size of firms in 
relation to the industry as a whole. This may also assist in determining the market structure 
of the industry. One commonly used concentration ratio is the three-firm concentration ratio 
CR3, which consists of the market share, as a percentage, of the three largest firms in the 
industry. In general, the n-firm concentration ratio CRn is calculated as the percentage of 
market share (MS) obtained by the n largest firms in the industry where there are N firms in 
the whole industry. The higher the concentration ratio is, the lower the competition in the 
market. 
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Alternative market forms can often be classified by their concentration ratio as listed in 
Table 3.1. 
Table  3.1: Classification of competition form based on concentration ratio 
 
Market form Concentration Ratio 
Low concentration a very low concentration ratio or close to 0 
Medium concentration below 40% 
High concentration above 60% 
Very high concentration with a near 100% 
Source: The economics of industries and firms 
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) indicates the competition among firms in the 
market. It is widely applied in competition law and antitrust to detect and stop harmful 
monopolies. It is defined as the sum of squared the market shares of all the firms within the 
industry. Increases in the Herfindahl index generally indicate a decrease in competition and 
an increase of market power, whereas decreases indicate the opposite. The major benefit of 
the Herfindahl index in relationship to such measures as the concentration ratio is that it 
gives more weight to larger firms, but it requires more information for calculation. 
 
∑
=
=
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2                                                                       [ 3.2] 
A HHI index below 0.1 (or 1,000) indicates an unconcentrated market. 
A HHI index between 0.1 to 0.18 (or 1,000 to 1,800) indicates moderate concentration. 
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A HHI index above 0.18 (above 1,800) indicates high concentration 
Source: USA Department of Justice Categories 
 
In the following section, we look at market share, concentration ratio and HHI in terms of 
total deposits, total loans and total assets, for six main types of commercial banks in China 
over 10 years (1997-2006), namely state-owned banks, joint equity banks, city commercial 
banks, urban co-operatives, rural co-operatives and foreign banks. 
 
3.3.2 Market share in Chinese banking sector 
 
3.3.2.1 Market share based on total deposits 
 
Firstly, we consider the market share for total deposits. As illustrated in Table 3.2 below, the 
ICBC lost the most market share in last ten years by more than 10%. It fell dramatically from 
29.4% in 1997 to 19.32% in 2006. Despite the ICBC suffered considerable loss of market 
share, it still took over the largest part of the deposit market. The share for the CCB also 
decreased, but with only 2.45% loss. By contrast, the BOC nearly doubled its market share 
over the investigation period. However, it still has the least proportion compared to the other 
three banks. The ABC keeps its market share around 15% during the time under 
consideration, with minor fluctuations. 
 
All joint equity banks follow an increasing trend in their market share of deposits. The Bank 
of Communications always hold the largest part of the market within this group, and control 
almost 5% by the end of 2006. The China Merchant Banks obtain the second place and 
possess 2.71% of deposit market share. It is the fastest growing bank; its market share is four 
times as big as ten years before. The China CITIC Bank and The China Mingshen Bank  
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Table  3.2: Market share of total deposits (%) 1997-2006 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 29.40 29.06 28.84 28.61 26.06 24.81 24.09 21.17 20.47 19.32 
Agricultural Bank of China 15.22 15.50 15.77 15.44 15.60 15.52 15.36 14.70 15.55 15.27 
Bank of China 7.98 8.48 8.80 8.73 9.15 9.17 9.49 14.66 14.17 14.08 
China Construction Bank 17.08 17.05 17.14 16.73 16.61 16.08 15.20 14.35 14.52 14.63 
State-owned banks 69.68 70.09 70.55 69.51 67.42 65.58 64.14 64.88 64.71 63.30 
Bank of Communications Co. Ltd 3.66 3.50 3.44 3.57 3.64 3.68 3.82 4.20 4.60 4.92 
China CITIC Bank Co. Ltd 0.93 0.92 0.95 1.14 1.42 1.51 1.64 1.86 1.93 2.32 
China Everbright Bank Co Ltd 0.41 0.46 0.55 1.12 1.36 1.31 1.71 1.29 1.13 1.31 
Hua Xia Bank 0.33 0.39 0.42 0.6 0.75 1.13 0.86 1.1 1.14 1.39 
Guangdong Development Bank 0.65 0.71 0.71 0.87 1.04 1.09 1.26 1.28 1.13 1.27 
Shenzhen Development Bank 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.39 0.61 0.68 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.81 
China Merchants Bank Co Ltd 0.68 0.75 0.92 1.24 1.39 1.93 2.12 2.15 2.28 2.71 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 0.70 0.73 0.74 0.83 1.05 1.46 1.23 1.67 1.85 1.98 
Industrial Bank Co Ltd 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.42 0.61 0.88 1.05 1.27 1.48 1.64 
China Minsheng Banking Corporation 0.16 0.19 0.27 0.45 0.80 1.18 1.46 1.67 1.84 2.13 
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Evergrowing bank 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.16 
Joint equity banks 8.04 8.25 8.66 10.70 12.76 14.93 15.97 17.35 18.27 20.64 
City commercial banks n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.74 6.15 5.62 5.97 6.05 
Urban co-operatives 7.32 7.06 6.76 5.98 6.02 0.65 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.63 
Rural co-operatives 14.34 14.06 13.48 13.22 13.18 12.82 11.63 10.51 10.02 9.56 
Foreign banks 0.51 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.45 0.48 0.51 0.63 0.82 
Source: author’s own estimation based on official figures reported in Bankscope
Chapter 3 
67 
 
expand quickly as well, both of them acquire more than 2% market share. However, even the 
rest of joint equity banks achieve reasonable improvement, their market share is below 2%.  
 
There is little change in total market share for city commercial banks and urban 
co-operatives as a whole; it fluctuated between 6% and 7%. The market share for rural 
co-operatives gradually decreased over time from 14.34% in 1997 to 9.56% in 2006. It 
makes the second largest loss in deposit market just behind the ICBC. The foreign banks 
have the least control in deposits market, but it steadily increased since 2002, even the 
amount is still negligible. 
 
All in all, even there is increase and decrease in market share within the state-owned banks 
group, the total market share of deposits for state-owned banks fairly decreased from 1997 to 
2006. But they still dominate the deposit market with 63.3%. For joint equity banks, each 
bank increase marginally over time, but the aggregate market share experienced substantial 
increase. It rose from just over 8% in 1997 to 20.64% at the end of 2006. On the contrary, the 
rural co-operatives encounter the big loss of its market share, but it is the third largest player 
in the deposit business. The overall market share for city commercial banks and urban 
co-operatives is relatively stable over the previous ten years. The foreign banks got the 
smallest share in deposits market with minor increase over the sample period. 
 
3.3.2.2 Market share based on total loans 
 
Next, we examine the changes of market share in total loans. As shown in Table 3.3, among 
state-owned banks, the market share of total loans for the ICBC decreased the most. It fell 
from 30.93% in 1997 to 17.89% in 2006. Although a reduction of 13.04% in total over the 
ten years, the ICBC still hold the largest market share in loans market. However, the 
difference between the ICBC and the other state-owned banks diminished over time, its  
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Table  3.3: Market share for total loans (%) 1997-2006 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 30.93  29.79  29.68  28.24  26.86  24.87  23.81  19.09  18.26  17.89  
Agricultural Bank of China 15.89  18.76  19.75  17.10  16.73  16.35  15.88  16.06  16.29  16.13  
Bank of China Limited 9.12  8.93  9.31  8.60  8.98  9.20  9.49  13.01  12.55  12.43  
China Construction Bank Corporation 16.67  16.11  14.34  15.46  14.95  14.78  14.43  13.64  13.95  13.37  
State-owned banks 72.61  73.59  73.08  69.40  67.52  65.20  63.61  61.80  61.05  59.82  
Bank of Communications Co.Ltd 2.95  2.95  3.10  3.44  3.43  3.40  3.51  3.97  4.42  4.95  
China CITIC Bank Co. Ltd 0.61  0.63  0.77  1.14  1.33  1.60  1.67  1.84  2.09  2.27  
China Everbright Bank Co. Ltd 0.38  0.41  0.47  1.05  1.42  1.60  1.71  1.50  1.39  1.42  
HuaXia Bank 0.20  0.28  0.34  0.55  0.64  1.13  0.88  1.11  1.33  1.43  
Guangdong Development Bank 0.50  0.57  0.64  0.75  0.96  1.03  1.28  1.33  1.23  1.29  
Shenzhen Development Bank 0.21  0.24  0.27  0.39  0.51  0.70  0.75  0.76  0.87  0.93  
China Merchants Bank CoLtd 0.59 0.63 0.74 1.08 1.15 1.75 2.11 2.15 2.53 2.99 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 0.51 0.57  0.61  0.79  0.92  1.42  1.58  1.90  2.14  2.64  
Industrial Bank CoLtd 0.20  0.21  0.27  0.39  0.75  0.83  1.13  1.25  1.39  1.44  
China Minsheng Banking Corporation 0.08  0.14  0.19  0.42  0.77  1.13  1.45  1.80  2.19  2.76  
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Evergrowing bank 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.15 
Joint equity banks 6.27  6.68  7.45  10.07  11.96  14.66  16.17  17.74  19.72  22.27  
City commercial banks n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.44  5.80  5.80  5.90  6.20  
Urban co-operatives 3.13  2.32  2.05  5.54  5.73  0.59  0.61  0.64  0.65  0.68  
Rural co-operatives 11.87  11.45  11.73  13.17  13.29  12.91  12.75  12.40  10.82  9.35  
Foreign banks 3.69  2.97  2.27  1.82  1.61  1.21  1.06  1.61  1.86  2.13  
Source: author’s own estimation based on official figures reported in Bankscope
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market share is very close to the rest of three at the end of 2006. Following the ICBC, the 
ABC got the second largest market share in loan business. The market share of ABC slightly 
increased over the sample period, even there was a little fluctuation during the period, but 
relatively stable as a whole. Despite the proportion of market share for BOC rose over 3% 
during the period we considered, it control the least in loan market compared to other three. 
The market share for CCB dropped from 16.67% in 1997 to 13.37% in 2006, but 
experienced small fluctuations over the examination period. 
 
Among joint equity banks, the largest market share belongs to the Bank of Communications, 
its market share increased over time and reached nearly 5% at the end of 2006. Followed by 
the China Merchants Bank, it achieved 2.99% in loan market in 2006 but started with only 
0.59%. China Mingshen Bank, China Pudong Development Bank and China CITIC Bank 
obtained over 2% market share in loan business. When we look at growth rate of market 
share, China Mingshen Bank made the fastest progress during ten years, and followed by 
China Merchants Bank. The lowest growth banks are Guangdong Development Bank and 
Shenzhen Development bank. 
 
The market share of city commercial banks and urban co-operatives decreased first and then 
increased to 6.88% in aggregate at the end of 2006. The rural co-operatives’ market share of 
loans fluctuated between 11% and 13%, but decreased to 9.35% in 2006. The market share 
for foreign banks maximized in the beginning of the sample period and stood at 3.69%. But 
it continually declined after Asian financial crisis. From 2004, the market share started to 
rise and reached to 2.13% in 2006.  
 
In sum, the market share of loan for state-owned banks as a whole fell sharply over last ten 
years compared to market share of deposits. It decreased from a total of 72.61% in 1997 to 
59.82% in 2006. Although the “big-four” suffered a dramatic reduction in their market share, 
they still hold the largest proportion of the market. The second largest player is joint equity 
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bank; they make impressive progress in loan business during the sample period. There was a 
considerable increase in aggregate market share. It started with only 6.27% and get hold of 
22.27% at the end. But there were different variations of growth rate for each individual 
bank. Rural co-operatives take the third place in loan market after moderately shrinkage. For 
city commercial banks and urban co-operatives as a whole, they maintain a relatively stable 
market share around 6% after they make remarkable growth in 2000. The market share for 
foreign banks in loan business fell back during Asian financial crisis, and started to climb up 
since 2003. It is believed that they will have sizeable expansion in the future, after 2006 full 
open of financial market. 
 
3.3.2.3 Market share based on total assets 
 
Finally, we explore the variations in market share based on total assets. As we can see from 
Table 3.4, the BOC fell the most in total assets market share, with a total 8% decrease over 
last ten years. The market share for ICBC total assets also dropped considerably from 25.07% 
to 19.64%, but it remain the largest commercial bank in terms of total assets. The market 
share for the rest of the two state-owned banks namely the ABC and the CCB increased 
marginally and stay around 14% but with small variations during the sample period. 
 
Among the joint equity bank, the Bank of Communications occupies the largest part of the 
market and it is also one of the fast growth banks. The China Merchant Bank took the second 
place within this group and hold 2.19% in 2006, which is more than three times as it in 1997. 
The fastest growth bank is the China Mingshen Bank; its market share is ten times as big as 
it in 1997. The rest of the peer banks all experienced increase in their market share but with 
different growth rate. 
 
The market share for city commercial banks and urban co-operatives fell for the pre-entry  
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Table  3.4: Market share for total assets (%) 1997-2006 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 25.07  25.24  24.88  25.16  25.03  23.12  21.77  18.14  19.79  19.64  
Agricultural Bank of China 13.51  15.76  15.99  13.83  14.66  14.54  14.52  14.64  14.81  14.93  
Bank of China Limited 22.47  19.29  18.40  18.32  15.05  14.19  13.05  15.58  14.73  14.52  
China Construction Bank Corporation 13.85  14.99  15.47  16.03  15.96  15.06  14.77  14.26  14.23  14.17  
State-owned banks 74.90  75.28  74.74  73.34  70.70  66.91  64.11  62.62  63.56  63.26  
Bank of Communications Co.Ltd 3.11  3.77  3.78  3.98  3.83  3.75  3.95  4.17  4.42  4.63  
China CITIC Bank Co. Ltd 0.75  1.04  1.11  1.49  1.74  1.64  1.74  1.84  1.90  2.07  
China Everbright Bank Co. Ltd 0.42  0.58  1.18  1.31  1.54  1.60  1.64  1.44  1.22  1.15  
HuaXia Bank 0.26  0.39  0.43  0.60  0.79  0.87  1.03  1.11  1.11  1.14  
Guangdong Development Bank 0.51  0.83  0.86  0.94  1.11  1.07  1.25  1.26  1.07  1.09  
Shenzhen Development Bank 0.21  0.30  0.32  0.43  0.70  0.81  0.80  0.75  0.69  0.71  
China Merchants Bank CoLtd 0.64 1.11 1.19 1.28 1.45 1.74 1.99 2.03 2.15 2.19 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 0.62 0.66  0.73  0.66  1.01  1.07  1.54  1.66  1.78  1.81  
Industrial Bank CoLtd 0.22  0.28  0.35  0.54  0.72  0.87  1.08  1.24  1.47  1.48  
China Minsheng Banking Corporation 0.15  0.20  0.26  0.43  0.81  1.20  1.50  1.62  1.73  1.78  
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Evergrowing bank 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.17 
Joint equity banks 6.95  9.23  10.29  11.75  13.79  14.70  16.62  17.23  17.67  18.22  
City commercial banks n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.63  6.14  6.29  6.29  6.31  
Urban co-operatives 5.02  4.37  4.43  4.30  4.01  0.58  0.62  0.66  0.64  0.58  
Rural co-operatives 10.19  8.91  8.71  8.82  9.34  10.77  11.11  11.32  9.86  9.27  
Foreign banks 3.17  2.21  1.85  1.80  2.17  1.41  1.38  1.88  1.97  2.35  
Source: author’s own estimation based on official figures reported in Bankscope
Chapter 3 
74 
 
period, but smoothly increased during the post-entry period. It rose by about 2% over the 
examination period. No clear trend can be identified for market share of rural co-operatives. 
It fluctuated slightly between 9% and 11% and it is ranked as the third largest financial 
entities based on total assets behind the joint equity banking group. The market share of 
foreign banks maximized in the beginning of the sample period with more than 3%, but it 
decreased due to financial crisis, and started to climb up since 2001 and reached to 2.35% in 
2006. 
 
In short, the total market share of total assets for the state-owned banks as a group 
continually and gradually decreased from 74.9% to 63.26%. It drops by over 11% during the 
full period under consideration. Even the big four come cross the substantial loss of market 
share in total assets, their dominance position is intact. The market share for joint equity 
banks as a whole increased enormously. Its market share tripled over last ten years. Followed 
by the joint equity banks, the rural co-operatives took the third largest market share despite 
there is a small reduction in its market share. The combined market share for city 
commercial banks and urban co-cooperatives has a minor increase after a small decrease in 
early period. The foreign banks obtain the least control over the market, but there is an 
increase trend in recent years after the Asian financial crisis and the WTO entry. 
 
To sum up, the ICBC is the largest commercial bank in China no matter in absolute values or 
relative market share, and also no matter the market share calculated by using which criteria, 
namely total deposits, total loans or total assets. Followed by the ICBC, the ABC is the 
second largest commercial bank in terms of all measures. The CCB and BOC take the third 
and fourth place behind the ABC. As a result, the state-owned banks as a group dominated 
the market in terms of all measures.  
 
However, there is substantial fall in their market share over last ten years, especially for loan 
market and total assets. Their dominance position has been challenged by the rapid 
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expansion of other depository institutions, especially joint equity banks. The large 
proportion of the loss from state-owned banks contributed to the considerable increase in the 
market share for joint equity banks. All the joint equity banks experienced a steady increase 
in deposit, loan and total assets in previous ten years. Their overall market share for total 
loans and total assets tripled and the total deposits more than doubled. However the size of 
market share is distributed unevenly among those banks. For example, the Bank of 
Communications is the fifth largest commercial bank in China and the largest among joint 
equity banks, with a share of 4.63% based on total assets, but the Shenzhen Development 
Bank has only 0.71%, a fraction of what the Bank of Communications controls.  
 
By contrast to the continuing increase for joint equity banks, rural co-operatives has a 
general decreasing tendency over the sample period for its market share in all aspects, but it 
remain the third largest player in the financial markets. For city commercial banks and urban 
co-operatives, there is overall increase in their entire market share, although the market share 
contract in early years. The market share of loans, deposits and total assets for foreign banks 
follow the same trend. Their proportions drop first after Asian financial crisis in 1997, and 
then start to gain back since 2000.  
 
A number of foreign banks has entered the market and quickly expanded their presence on 
the domestic banking market. Foreign banks which have already obtained banking license 
and prepared to enter the market, they are aimed to get a foothold in the market as soon as 
possible. Even foreign banks expanded significantly after the entry of the WTO, but in total 
is still marginal compare to domestic banks. Although they have the smallest share of the 
market in China, their potential growth is formidable, especially after the full openness of 
domestic financial sector in 2006. 
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3.3.3 Concentration ratio 
 
To measure the level of concentration in the Chinese banking industry, we employ CR4 and 
CR8. In other words, we calculate the total market share for the top four and eight largest 
banks in the market. As demonstrated in Table 3.5, the CR4 in terms of all aspects was 
always maintained above 60%; despite it decreased from 70% in the beginning of the sample 
period. The decreasing magnitude for concentration in deposit market is smaller, when we 
compare it with loans and total assets. The CR4 decreased in loan and total assets by 12% 
and 11% respectively, but only 6% for deposit market (see Figure 3.2). This may due to the 
historical reason and size advantage. The big-four has already built up reputation and long 
term business relationship with customers. Moreover, bigger banks have more branches, so 
it is easier for them to attract deposits than smaller banks. Although state-owned banks face 
aggressive competition from other depository institutions, especially from joint equity banks, 
they still have the absolute advantage and majority control over the market. 
 
The CR8 follow almost the same trend as the CR4 (see Figure 3.3). The market is highly 
concentrated and level of concentration is always kept above 70% for the eight largest banks. 
Particularly, the concentration for deposit market sustained over last ten years, with 1% 
decrease. However, the market share based on total assets for top eight banks decreased most, 
nearly 7%. 
 
In short, even after the level of concentration decreasing over time based on all measures, 
China still has significantly high level of market concentration. Chinese banking market is 
dominated by a few large banks, who together share roughly 70% of the market in terms of 
total assets, as suggested by CR4 and CR8. The concentration based on total assets fall the 
most, but for deposit market fell the least. 
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Table  3.5: Concentration ratio and HHI 1997- 2006 
 
CR4 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total deposits 69.68  70.09  70.55  69.51  67.42  65.58  64.15  64.89  64.72  63.30  
Total loans 72.61  73.59  73.08  69.41  67.42  65.20  63.61  61.81  61.04  59.82  
Total assets 74.89  75.28  74.74  73.33  70.70  66.91  64.11  62.62  63.57  63.26  
           CR8 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total deposits 75.39  75.77  76.44  76.61  75.26  74.04  73.50  74.49  74.77  74.33  
Total loans 77.14  78.26  78.21  76.18  74.83  73.61  72.71  71.39  71.63  71.82  
Total assets 79.83  81.85  82.07  81.48  79.36  75.71  73.54  72.21  73.39  73.13  
           HHI 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total deposits 0.173  0.171  0.170  0.165  0.152  0.142  0.137  0.128  0.125  0.121  
Total loans 0.174  0.173  0.172  0.163  0.154  0.141  0.135  0.121  0.115  0.113  
Total assets 0.166  0.160  0.157  0.154  0.146  0.135  0.127  0.120  0.121  0.118  
Source: author’s own estimation based on official figures reported in Bankscope 
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Figure  3.2: Concentration ratio four (CR4) 1997-2006 
 
 
 
Figure  3.3: Concentration ratio eight (CR8) 1997-2006 
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3.3.4 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
 
Last but not the least, we analyse the market concentration by making use of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI in Table 3.5 and Figure 3.4 shows apparent 
decreasing trend in all aspects namely, loan, deposits and total assets. The lasting decreasing 
tendency in concentration may suggest that large banks have less market power and the 
market is more competitive than ten years before. Additionally, by the end of sample period, 
the Chinese banking industry could be characterized as moderately concentrated market, 
which was highly concentrated in the early sample period, based on the classification from 
the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 
Figure  3.4: The HHI index 1997-2006 
 
 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total deposits
Total loans
Total assets
Chapter 3 
80 
 
3.3.5 The reason for the presence of concentration in banking 
industry 
 
After investigating the market structure in Chinese banking industry, we find that the 
banking sector is highly concentrated in China. However, this is not the only case for China. 
Actually the presence of concentration in banking industry exists in every country, no matter 
whether it is developed country or developing country. The only difference is that 
developing countries generally have higher levels of concentration than in developed 
countries, as the financing resource solely comes from banks due to under-developed capital 
market in developing countries, while developed countries has a well-established capital 
market, which serves as an important alternative channel that provides a major source of 
funds in addition to banks. So the bank-oriented economies have higher level of 
concentration than capital market based economies. For example, the concentration level is 
higher in the bank oriented economies of Germany and Japan than in the US and the UK, 
although they are all developed economies. 
 
Now, we pause here to ask a natural question, why banking industry is concentrated or why 
banking market sustain with only a limited number of banks. In the following, we briefly 
explore the main reason behind the inherited concentration of the banking market. 
 
A large number of literatures (see Allen, Santomero, Llewellyn (1985) and Merton (1995)) 
have identified that incomplete and asymmetric information is one of the most important 
factors that determine the market structure of the banking industry. All lenders face 
uncertainty with regard to borrowers’ creditworthiness. They cannot observe borrowers’ 
characteristics and behaviour before and after the lending transaction. The informational 
incompleteness and asymmetries could cause adverse selection and moral hazard problem 
which may distort the order of market competition and market force mechanism. However, 
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the existence of bank or other depository institutions resolve some of the informational 
problems. In the process of lending, financial institutions serve as intermediaries who are 
able to collect information about borrowers’ creditworthiness on behalf of lenders. Based on 
these private information, banks can better distinguish between “good” borrowers and “bad” 
borrowers. And they can screen and monitor borrowers at lower cost because of both scope 
and scale economies. Therefore, the possession of such proprietary information about 
borrowers facilitates them with some degree of market power. In other words, the acquisition 
of these information advantages is already locked in a bank-client relationship. As a result, 
banks can charge higher interest rate on loan, but pay lower rate on deposit, hence earn 
profits from interest rate spread as compensation for cost of information collection and 
analysis process. Moreover, the incomplete and asymmetric information create barriers of 
entry, preventing potential new competitors from entering the market. Although entry 
barriers are relatively high and restrictive, it does not suggest there is no competition in 
banking industry and the banks enjoy quite life. The threat of potential entrants and 
acquisition by other rivals force incumbent banks fight intensively for market share. 
 
3.4 Literature review 
 
There is a large literature designed to provide empirical evidence on how market structure 
influences bank performance. The empirical works conducted in the SCP framework enjoy a 
relatively long history, the earliest study can date back to the 1960’s. Discussion of the 
literature on the SCP studies in banking sector is organized as follows. The first section 
briefly reviews the development of the SCP model over time, based on different 
specifications. The second section considers the studies that empirically apply the method. 
Then we discuss some recent development and methodological issues involved in testing 
relationship between market structure and bank performance. 
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3.4.1 Different specifications 
 
Basically, three methods have been developed in an attempt to test the competitive 
conditions of industries by examining how the underlying structure of an industry is related 
to, and affects the conduct and performance of firms. 
 
3.4.1.1 The first method 
 
The first method is broadly characterized as testing the traditional SCP hypothesis by only 
regressing a measure of bank performance on a measure of market concentration. As Gilbert 
(1984) has provided a full survey paper on previous empirical literatures using this method, 
we do not attempt to review those studies here. In his paper, 44 studies from 1964 to 1982 
which used this method to test the SCP hypothesis (twenty six studies out of forty-four use 
bank profit rates as performance measures) were summarized for the impact of bank 
performance to a market concentration. The paper presented a critical analysis and 
summarized various features of the bank market structure studies. Although the previous 
bank market structure studies do not consistently support or reject the SCP hypothesis that 
market concentration influences bank performance, the prominent early studies provide 
support in favor of the SCP hypothesis. Thirty-two of the forty-four studies Gilbert reviewed 
found that market concentration significantly and positively affected bank performance. 
 
3.4.1.2 The second method 
 
The SCP hypothesis which states the positive association between market concentration and 
performance has been challenged by the efficiency hypothesis. The basic foundation of the 
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efficiency hypothesis is that market concentration is not the cause of a firm’s superior 
performance. Instead, efficiency hypothesis finds that the positive direction of concentration 
and higher performance is the result of a firm’s superior efficiency. It is argued that the 
higher profits enjoyed by large firms in a concentrated market are the result of economies of 
scale and the consequences of superior efficiency in larger firms. If a firm enjoys a higher 
degree of efficiency (in terms of cost and technology) than its competitors, the firm can 
easily capture a larger market share by lowering its price and earning economic profits. Thus, 
the driving force behind the process of gaining a large market share, and in turn higher 
concentration, is the efficiency of the firm. Equally, the most efficient firms will gain market 
share and earn economic profits. As the rise of the efficiency hypothesis, the innovation of 
the second method has been developed by adding one more independent variable, market 
share, as a proxy for efficiency. As mentioned before, the inclusion of market share variable 
in the SCP paradigm actually test relative market power hypothesis according to Berger’s 
classification. 
 
3.4.1.3 The third method 
 
To take the effects of efficiency directly into account, more recent studies have regressed the 
profitability on concentration, market share and direct measure of efficiency (X-efficiency 
and scale-efficiency) rather than use of market share as proxy. Berger (1995) first developed 
this method that incorporated the direct measures of both market structure and efficiency 
into one model. This helps distinguish among four hypotheses, namely the structure conduct 
performance (SCP), relative market power (RMP), X-efficiency hypothesis (ESX) and Scale 
efficiency hypothesis (ESS). The empirical literature use this Berger’s methodology will be 
reviewed in Chapter 6 later, where we conduct similar analysis in the context of Chinese 
banking market. 
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3.4.2 Review of literature on SCP 
 
In this section, we only focus on the empirical literatures that adopted the second 
method.This approach which tests the two competing hypotheses: the SCP hypothesis and 
efficiency hypothesis, has been applied extensively in different industries under various 
economic environment. In the banking sector, the SCP framework has been widely used to 
evaluate the possible link between market concentration and profits but the conclusions 
drawn from such studies have been mixed. Most studies focus on the US banking market 
found that greater concentration does not lead to higher profits and favour the efficiency 
hypothesis. While others shed light on banking industry in other countries mainly European 
countries supported the traditional SCP hypothesis.  
 
Smirlock (1985) investigated the interrelationship between profits, market share and 
concentration for over 2700 unit state banks in the US between 1973 and 1978. He regresses 
the profit rate on market share, concentration, interaction of the two and a set of additional 
control variables. The results of his analysis suggest that there is no positive relationship 
between concentration and profitability, once the link between market share and profitability 
is controlled. Thus his paper provides the evidence supporting the efficiency hypothesis and 
asserts that market concentration is not necessary a signal of collusive behaviour but rather 
the superior efficiency of the leading firm.  
 
Following Smirlock (1985), Evanoff and Fortier (1988) employed a similar model (but 
exclude the interaction term) to test more than 6300 unit banks located in 30 states of the US 
in 1984. They find support for the efficient structure hypothesis and limited support for the 
traditional SCP hypothesis. This implies that the competing hypotheses may actually be 
complementary theories. Their findings add support to the efficiency hypothesis and propose 
possible future research is necessary to determine the source of the efficiency. 
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However, Lloyd-Williams and Molyneux (1994) present a similar analysis, and find support 
for the traditional SCP hypothesis with respect to the Spanish banking industry for the period 
1968-1988. The empirical results suggest that concentration in the Spanish banking market 
has lowered the cost of collusion between firms and resulted in higher than normal profits for 
all market participants. This results contrast markedly with those works on the US banking 
industry which has generally more favourable to the efficiency hypothesis. 
 
Molyneux and Forbes (1995) firstly apply this type of study for the whole European banking 
market. Their results strongly support the traditional SCP hypothesis as an explanation for 
the performance of European banks. 
 
The paper by Katib (1998) tested the validity of the SCP framework in the Malaysian 
banking market. The empirical investigation uses five different measures of concentration to 
represent market structure (i.e. CR1, CR2, CR3, CR5, and HHI). The tests on a sample of 20 
commercial banks over the period from 1989 to 1996 strongly reject the efficiency 
hypothesis. The empirical findings suggest that market concentration determines 
profitability in the Malaysian banking industry. 
 
Tu and Chen (2000) conduct empirical tests of the three hypotheses, namely traditional SCP 
hypothesis, the efficiency hypothesis and “quiet life” hypothesis in the context of Taiwan’s 
banking market over the period from 1986 to 1999. They examine whether market structure 
and firm performance in this industry differ in the periods before and after the liberalization 
policy (revision of the Banking Act) in 1991. Prior to 1991, their results do not support either 
the SCP or the efficiency hypothesis for Taiwan’s banking industry. It implies the presence 
of a regulation-induced quiet life type of market structure for this period. The results for the 
period after 1991 tend to support the competing efficiency hypothesis. 
 
Bos (2004) investigated the existence of market power in the Dutch banking market by 
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employing three tests, namely traditional SCP model, a simple Cournot model and the 
modified SCP with efficiency measure. The empirical tests provide evidence in favour of the 
SCP hypothesis. The results suggest that we cannot reject the existence of market power in 
Dutch banking sector, although its impact on performance is small. 
 
Athanasoglou et al (2005) examine the relationship between profitability and market 
structure for banking industry in the South Eastern European over the period 1998~2002. 
They model the profitability as a function of set of bank-specific, industry-related and 
macroeconomic determinants. A key result is that the effect of concentration is positive, 
which provides evidence in support of the SCP hypothesis.  
 
Athanasoglou et al (2008) re-examine the SCP framework to a panel of Greek banks 
covering period 1985-2001. They include macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability 
in addition to bank specific and industry specific variables in the empirical model. However, 
no evidence is found in support of the SCP hypothesis, as the effect of concentration is 
insignificant. 
 
Samad (2008) perform similar analysis in Bangladesh banking industry for the period 
1999-2002. The results of this study support the efficiency hypothesis as an explanation for 
bank performance in Bangladesh. 
 
Table 3.6 below summarize the empirical literatures we have reviewed. 
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Table  3.6: Summary of empirical literature using SCP approach 
 
Authors Country SCP Efficiency 
Smirlock (1985) US  Yes 
Evanoff and Fortier (1988) US  Yes  
Lloyd-Williams and Molyneux (1994) Spain Yes   
Molyneux and Forbes (1995) European Yes  
Katib (1998) Malaysia Yes  
Tu and Chen (2000) Taiwan  Yes 
Bos (2004) Netherlands Yes  
Athanasoglou et al (2005) SEE Yes  
Athanasoglou et al (2008) Greek   
Samad (2008) Bangladesh  Yes 
 
3.5 Methodology 
 
This section provides a discussion on the model specification and the various measures of 
performance and concentration used. In addition, control variables utilised for this empirical 
test are also discussed. 
 
3.5.1 Empirical specification in the SCP literature 
 
The traditional SCP and efficiency hypothesis can be tested by estimating the following 
equation (Weiss (1974), Simirlock (1985) and Lloyd-Williams et al. (1994)): 
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ititnititit ZMSCONp εβββα ++++= ∑21                                     [ 3.3] 
 
where p is performance measurement (ROE or ROA), CON is a measure of market structure 
(usually a concentration measure), MS is market share of individual banks,  Z is a vector 
of control variables which affect bank’s performance and  itε is the stochastic error term. 
 
The equation (3.3) provides the straightforward distinguish between two hypotheses. The 
traditional SCP hypothesis is favoured if 01 >β and 02 =β ; which implies that market 
share does not affect firm’s profitability and the profitability is the result of concentrated 
market. On the other hand, the efficiency hypothesis can be verified by finding 01 =β and 
02 >β , which implies that more efficient firms with larger market share can earn higher 
profits than their rivals. Thus, 01 >β and 02 =β supports SCP and  01 =β  and 02 >β
supports efficiency hypothesis. 
 
3.5.2 Empirical specification of SCP used in this study 
 
The complete equation we use to empirically test the two hypotheses for Chinese 
commercial banks is shown below: 
 
ititit
itititittititit
OWNOWNTROETLLLP
TDTLTATLTAETACONMSROEROA
εββββ
ββββββα
+++++
++++++=
21)/()/(
)/()/()/()(
10987
654321
                                      
                                                                  [ 3.4] 
ROA=return on assets=net income/total assets 
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ROE=return on equity=net income/total equity 
MS=market share of ith banks based on total assets 
CON= ∑= 2iMSHHI  
TA=total assets 
E/TA=total equity/total assets 
TL/TA= total loans/total assets 
TL/TD=total loans/total deposits 
LLP/TL=loan loss provisions/total loans 
OE/TR=total operating expense/total revenue 
OWN1=ownership dummy for state owned banks 
OWN2=ownership dummy for joint equity banks 
 itε = error term 
 
3.5.3 Fixed effect and random effect model 
Our empirical model (Eq. 3.4) will be estimated by the fixed effect and random effect model. 
In this section, we will explain these two common panel date estimation methods. The panel 
data which data sets combine both time series and cross sections can be estimated by Fixed 
Effect model or Random Effect model. 
 yit = Xit′ β + εit 
εit = vit + ui                                            [3.5] 
                                               
In the Fixed Effects model, FEM, the uiare treated as n constants specific to each unit of 
observation. The Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator gives the fixed effect 
and β�FE is always consistent but not efficient. 
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yit = αi + Xit′ β + vit                                     [3.6] 
 
In the Random Effects model, REM, the ui are treated as independently distributed 
random variables with ui~iid(µ,σu2). The Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) 
estimator gives the random effect, and β�RE is consistent and efficient if E(ui|xit) = 0. 
 yit = Xit′ β + (vit + ui)                                 [3.7] 
 
To test whether the REM is better than the FEM, we carry out Hausman test: 
 H0: βFE� − βRE� = 0 H1: βFE� − βRE� ≠ 0 
 
If Hausman test rejects H0: FEM remains consistent but REM is inconsistent, so prefer 
FEM. If rejects H1: FEM and REM are both consistent and REM is efficient so prefer 
REM. 
 
3.6 Variables specification and data collection 
 
3.6.1 Performance measurement 
For performance measurement there is a wide range of proxies used in the literature. The 
SCP studies generally can be divided into two groups according to the measure of 
performance. The first group use price as proxy for bank’s performance. Different rates of 
interest of certain banking products and services are commonly used. While another group 
use profitability measure the performance. No agreement has been achieved to which 
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measures are superior. 
 
Most of the earlier studies of the SCP framework in banking have focused on the use of 
prices as performance measures. These price variables are usually ratio of interest on loans 
to total loans and ratio of interest on deposits to total deposits. Other price measures 
employed to evaluate performance are service charges on demand deposits, interest on time 
and savings deposits, interest on certificate of deposits and interest on time savings. 
 
The more recent studies have opted to use profits as the performance measure. Using profit 
rates will alleviate the problem of wage control since information on prices and costs are 
embodied in data on profits. Furthermore, individual prices of particular products or services 
can be quite misleading, particularly in the banking industry. As noted by Molyneux and 
Forbes (1995), banking is a multiproduct business and banks are often involved in cross 
subsidization among products and services. Therefore, profitability figures are generally 
viewed as more appropriate as gains and losses of all products and services are integrated 
into one single value. Hence, in our study, bank profit is utilized as performance measure. 
 
In the literature, bank profitability is typically measured by the return on assets (ROA) 
and/or the return on equity (ROE). ROA is the most popular profitability measurement, 
which reflects the ability of bank generating profits from total assets. However, this proxy 
has been criticized that, as suggested by Heggestad (1979) and Tu and Chen (2000), assets in 
most financial statements lack adjustments reflecting their reasonable market values. Further, 
large proportion of real assets including in total assets is not relevant for profit generation 
process, so it is better to use ROE, which shows the return to shareholders on their equity and 
it is the most closely to what owners seek to maximize. However, banks with lower leverage 
(higher equity) will generally report higher ROA but lower ROE. Since an analysis of ROE 
disregards the risks associated with high leverage and financial leverage is often determined 
by regulation, the ROE is not an appropriate measure for profits, as argued by Athanasoglou 
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et al (2008). Due to ROA and ROE having their own benefits and drawbacks, here, we use 
both ROA and ROE as profit measure. Moreover, in order to avoid negative ROA or ROE 
figures in some years, we use (1+ROA) and (1+ROE). 
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is chosen as a measure of market concentration, and 
specific firm market share (MS) is employed to capture firm efficiency. Both market 
structure measures are explained in Section 3.3. 
 
3.6.2 Bank specific control variables 
 
A number of control variables are included to account for firm specific characteristics such 
as size, risk, cost, and ownership. For comparison reasons, we employ the most popular 
control variables. 
 
Bank size measured by total assets (TA) is generally used to capture potential economies or 
diseconomies of scale in the banking sector. This variable controls for cost differences and 
product and risk diversification according to the size of the institution. If there are significant 
economies of scale, this could lead to a positive relationship between size and bank 
profitability (see Akhavein et al. 1997; Bourke, 1989; Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; 
Bikker and Hu, 2002; Goddard et al., 2004). Other researchers, however, conclude that few 
cost savings can be achieved by increasing the size of a banking firm, especially as markets 
develop (Berger et al., 1987; Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Miller and Noulas, 1997; 
Athanasoglou et al., 2005). Eichengreen and Gibson (2001), suggest that the effect of a 
growing bank’s size on profitability may be positive up to a certain limit. Beyond this point 
the effect of size could be negative due to bureaucratic and other reasons. In addition, the 
negative relationship may be derived from the fact that larger banks can better diversify their 
risks; the increased diversification implies less risk and less profits. Hence, the 
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size-profitability relationship may be expected to be negative or positive. In our model, we 
use banks’ total assets to capture the possible relationship between bank size and 
profitability. 
 
Since performance measure is not risk adjusted, we employ four variables to account for 
banks’ various risks, such as solvency risk, business risk, liquidity risk and credit risk. 
 
Equity capital is one of the most important factors contributing towards the profitability of 
commercial banks. In our empirical regression, the ratio of equity to asset (E/TA) is included 
which measures the capitalization and proxy solvency risk. Even though the equity capital 
has been demonstrated to be important in explaining the performance of financial 
institutions, its impact on bank profitability is ambiguous. This depends on whether equity is 
held for prudential reason or regulatory reason. If equity is held to absorb losses (prudent 
behaviour), equity is chosen optimally to address the issue of risk because equity is the full 
loss absorbing component of the balance sheet. Therefore if a bank chooses to increase 
equity it will do so to minimise risk and then should enable it to be more profitable. Hence 
we would expect a positive relationship. However, if equity is imposed at a higher level by 
regulatory policy and if this raises the cost of capital to banks then we expect a negative 
relationship with profitability.  
 
The ratio of loans to total assets (TL/TA) and loans to deposits (TL/TD) are also considered 
as important determinants of bank profitability, as interest earned from loan is the major 
source of revenue for bank. The loan market is risky and has a greater expected return than 
other bank assets, such as government securities. Thus, we would expect a positive 
relationship between TL/TA ratio and profitability, the higher the loans ratios, the higher the 
rate of return the banks is expected to earn. However we would expect a negative 
relationship between TL/TD and profitability, because the higher ratio of loans to deposits, 
the greater costs associated with raising fund and risks associated with loan defaults. 
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Changes in asset quality may reflect changes in the health of a bank’s loan portfolio, which 
may affect the performance of the financial institution. Duca and McLaughlin (1990) 
conclude that variations in bank profitability are largely attributable to variations in asset 
quality, since increased exposure to credit risk is normally associated with decreased firm 
profitability. We use the percentage of loan loss provisions to total loans (LLP/TL) as a 
measure of asset quality. A higher ratio may be associated with more risk and as a results a 
lower profit. 
 
The operating expenses to total revenue ratio (OE/TR) is included to account for cost 
differences among banks. The literature argues that reduced operating expenses improve the 
efficiency and hence raise the profitability of a financial institution, implying a negative 
relationship between an operating expenses ratio and profitability (Bourke, 1989). However, 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) observed a positive relationship, suggesting that high profits 
earned by firms may be appropriated in the form of higher payroll expenditures paid to more 
productive human capital (i.e. experienced managers and expertise).  
 
In addition, to account for the different types of bank ownership in our sample, dummy 
variables are included in the model to test whether the ownership status of a bank is related 
to its profitability. The relationship between ownership and profitability is examined through 
the inclusion of two binary dummy variables, namely OWN1 for state-owned banks and 
OWN2 for joint equity banks. In other words, the reference group is city commercial banks. 
OWN1 equals to one if the bank is state owned, otherwise zero. OWN2 equals to 1 if bank 
belongs to joint equity ownership. The coefficients on both OWN1 and OWN2 should be 
negative because stated-owned banks and joint-equity banks are less profitable than city 
commercial banks due to burden of large amount of non-performing loans. Especially 
state-owned banks are far less profitable than city commercial banks. 
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Table  3.7: List of variables specification included in the estimation 
 
Variables  Specification  
Dependent variable  
ROA or ROE Return on asset or Return on equity 
Independent variable  
CON HHI  
MS Market share 
TA Total assets 
E/TA Equity/total assets 
TL/TA Total loans/total assets 
TL/TD Total loans/total deposits 
LLP/TL Loan loss provisions/total loans 
OE/TR Operating expenses/total revenue 
OWN1 Ownership dummy for state owned banks 
OWN2 Ownership dummy for joint equity banks 
 
3.6.3 Data collection 
 
In our empirical study, we collect annual accounting data for Chinese domestic commercial 
banks over 10 years from 1997 to 2006. Table 3.8 presents all the commercial banks 
included in our sample. The data were mainly obtained from Bankscope database and the 
Almanac of China’s finance and banking, which contains annual information on the balance 
sheet and income statements of all major banks operating in China. All the monetary 
variables are adjusted by using GDP deflator. The inflation adjusted monetary variables are 
denoted in the domestic currency which is RMB and quoted in millions. Table 3.9 provides 
summary statistics of the variables included in our estimation. 
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Table  3.8: Lists of domestic commercial banks included in the sample 
 
Bank name Listing status  Years of data available 
State-owned banks (4) 
  
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China  (ICBC) listed 10 
China Construction Bank Corporation (CCB) listed 10 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) listed 10 
Bank of China Limited (BOC) listed 10 
Joint equity banks (11) 
  
Bank of Communications Co. Ltd listed  10 
China Merchants Bank Co Ltd listed  10 
China Minsheng Banking Corporation listed  10 
China CITIC Bank Corporation listed  10 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank listed  10 
Industrial Bank Co Ltd listed  10 
China Everbright Bank Co Ltd listed  10 
Hua Xia Bank listed  10 
Guangdong Development Bank 
 
10 
Shenzhen Development Bank  listed  10 
Evergrowing Bank Co Ltd 
 
10 
City commercial banks(36) 
  
Bank of Beijing Co Ltd listed  9 
Bank of Shanghai listed 10 
Ping An Bank 
 
6 
Bank of Tianjin 
 
9 
Huishang Bank Co Ltd 
 
4 
Bank of Dalian 
 
6 
Bank of Nanjing listed  10 
Chapter 3 
97 
 
Bank of Hangzhou Co Ltd 
 
6 
Bank of Ningbo listed  7 
Shenzhen Rural Commercial Bank Co Ltd 
 
9 
Dongguan City Commercial Bank  
 
8 
Harbin Bank 
 
4 
Xi'an City Commercial Bank 
 
7 
Bank of Chengdu Co Ltd 
 
5 
China Zheshang Bank Co Ltd 
 
3 
Changsha City Commercial Bank Co., Ltd 
 
5 
Bank of Chongqing 
 
8 
Jinan City Commercial Bank 
 
6 
Xiamen City Commercial Bank 
 
8 
Fudian Bank Co Ltd 
 
3 
Hankou Bank 
 
6 
Bank of Qingdao Co Ltd 
 
6 
Nanchang City Commercial Bank 
 
5 
Fuzhou City Commercial Bank 
 
4 
Bank of Wenzhou Co Ltd 
 
7 
Yantai Bank Co Ltd 
 
5 
Jinzhou City Commercial Bank 
 
4 
Bank of Ningxia Co Ltd 
 
3 
Commercial Bank Co Ltd of Luoyang 
 
3 
Shaoxing City Commercial Bank Co Ltd 
 
4 
Qishang Bank. 
 
5 
Laishang Bank Co Ltd 
 
3 
Dongying City Commercial Bank 
 
3 
Panzhihua City Commercial Bank Co Ltd 
 
3 
Shijiazhuang City Commercial Bank 
 
3 
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Yangzhou City Commercial Bank Ltd 
 
3 
Nantong City Commercial Bank Co Ltd 
 
6 
Wuxi City Commercial Bank 
 
7 
Zibo City Commercial Bank 
 
5 
Jiujiang City Commercial bank 
 
3 
Total (55) Total (16) Total (371) 
*Collected data on the four state-owned banks, the eleven joint equity banks are available for 
the full sample period. As most city commercial banks are established in recent years, so the 
data is only available for them in later sample period.  
 
Table  3.9: Summary statistics of variables 
 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MS 371 0.036 0.071 0.005 0.196 
HHI 371 0.146 0.023 0.118 0.166 
TA 371 659655 1306902 6222 7509489 
E/TA 371 0.045 0.029 0.117 0.313 
TL/TA 371 0.526 0.085 0.277 0.712 
TL/TD 371 0.645 0.123 0.320 1.068 
LLP/TL 371 0.009 0.007 0.002 0.075 
OE/TR 371 0.356 0.113 0.069 0.626 
ROA 371 0.005 0.458 -0.007 0.039 
ROE 371 0.085 16.421 -0.139 0.123 
 
As we can see from Table 3.9, large dispersions exist among various banks with regard to 
regression variables. Those summary statistics reflect several underlying features of the 
banking sector in China. The most noticeable is the significant size difference. The total 
assets of the largest bank included in our sample is formidable and is far more larger than the 
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smallest one, indicated by the difference between minimum and maximum value. The 
second characteristic is that domestic commercial banks have largely insufficient equity 
capital, revealed by the average low equity to total assets ratio. The average capitalization 
ratio is only 4.5% for our sample banks, which is below the minimum requirement 8%. 
Another aspect is that the traditional business remains the major activity for Chinese 
commercial banks, as shown by the large proportion of loans to total deposits. It also implies 
that revenue from loan interest is the major source of income for domestic commercial banks 
in China. Finally, Chinese commercial banks are featured by low profitability, with 0.5% and 
8.5% for ROA and ROE respectively. 
 
3.7 Empirical results 
 
The regression results for the sample of Chinese commercial banks between 1997 and 2006 
are shown in Table 3.10 below. The table contains the estimated parameters and t-statistics 
obtained from regression of Eq. (3.4), using ROA and ROE respectively, as the independent 
variable. The preferred estimation model is the fixed effect model, suggested by the 
Hausman test. The estimated equations seem to fit the panel data reasonably well, as 
indicated by the R-squared values 0.511 and 0.239 for ROA and ROE respectively (previous 
studies normally report R square between 0.5 and 0.2). Other SCP studies (see Gilbert 
(1984), Goddard et al (2001)) reported even lower values around 0.1. The regression with 
ROA as profitability measure is statistically preferred over the model with ROE, due to 
considerable higher R-squared value. Athanasoglou et al (2008) also found that the 
estimations based on ROE produce inferior results for Greece. 
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Table  3.10: The SCP estimation results (The panel fixed effect estimation) 
 
Variables ROA ROE 
MS 0.874 (1.09) 1.190 (0.23) 
HHI -5.995 (-7.75)*** -11.176 (-2.42)** 
TA 0.008 (2.06)** -0.0017 (-0.75) 
E/TA 0.027 (4.11)*** 0.0866 (2.17)** 
TL/TA 0.264 (0.82) 2.405 (1.26) 
TL/TD -0.664 (-3.18)*** -2.807 (-2.25)** 
LLP/TL -12.015 (-5.56)*** -2.602 (-2.02)** 
OE/TR -1.122 (-7.3)*** -1.849 (-2.01)** 
OWN1 -0.264 (-1.55) -4.389 (-0.43) 
OWN2 -0.129 (-3.10)*** -2.158 (-1.87)* 
   
R-square 0.511 0.239 
F-statistics 27.49*** 19.72*** 
***, **, * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
 
The table shows that during our sample period, the coefficient on MS is insignificant when 
either ROA or ROE is used as profitability measures, while the coefficient on the HHI is 
highly significant for both dependent variables. But the sign of the parameter on HHI is 
negative which is inconsistent with the SCP hypothesis. So the results from our sample do 
reject both the SCP hypothesis and the efficiency hypothesis. Athanasoglou et al (2008) 
conducted similar analysis in Greek banking industry and found same result for this negative 
relationship, although the effect is relatively insignificant. This outcome is also in 
accordance with other recent studies (Berger (1995)), which claim that concentration is 
usually negatively related to profitability once other effects are controlled for in the 
profitability equation. 
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In theory, as suggested by industrial economists, firms are supposed to be more profitable in 
highly concentrated market than those in less concentrated one. But our results imply that 
banks are less profitable in moderately concentrated banking sector in China. We may 
explore three possible reasons to explain this negative relationship.  
 
First, the reason behind this negative relationship is that the big four state-owned banks 
accumulated the most assets, loans and deposits, thus control the substantial part of the 
market. But the state-owned banks are burdened with mountains of non-performing loans 
result from policy-directed loans to state-owned enterprises during the 1990s. Before the 
state-owned banks went public, the ultimate aim of state-owned banks was not profit 
maximization. As a result, lower profitability exists in such high level of concentrated 
market. Second, the quiet life hypothesis may provide alternative explanation for the 
negative relationship between market concentration and bank profitability. This hypothesis 
suggests that banks located in highly concentrated markets may choose to trade off some of 
their monopolistic profits for a reduction in risk by choosing safer profits. In other words, 
banks in highly concentrated market may prefer to reduce the variance of their profits rather 
than increasing the profit itself. The regulation may also offer another alternative 
explanation, which protect the public interest and prevent monopoly profits from collusive 
behaviour. 
 
Turning to other explanatory variables, the regression results for control variables are 
considered below. The effect of bank-specific variables is generally in line with our 
expectations. 
 
The estimated equation when ROA is the dependent variable shows that the effect of bank 
size on profitability is positive and statistically significant, while the relationship is negative 
and insignificant for ROE as dependent variables. The significant positive relationship 
implies that large banks present economies of scale in Chinese banking sector. The larger the 
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amount of assets for a bank, the greater advantages bank have, such as more branches and 
more experienced employees. This enables them to attract more customers and provide more 
services, so they can make more profits. Moreover, there may be “too big to fail” effect. If 
the size of the bank is too large, generally there is some implicit assumption that the 
government will not allow bankruptcy for large banks. Therefore, bank clients are more 
confident for larger banks than small banks, and large banks can generate more profits. 
(Because the failure of large banks has serious impact on the national economy. Moreover, 
the collapse of one large bank may cause public panic and bank run for other banks due to 
possible domino effects. ) 
 
The positive and highly significant coefficient on the ratio of equity to total assets variable 
suggests that Chinese banks hold equity capital for prudential reasons, because with a sound 
capital position bank is able to pursue business opportunities more effectively and has more 
time and flexibility to deal with problems arising from unexpected losses, thus achieving 
increased profitability. It also implies that through stronger capitalization, Chinese banks can 
reduce the expected costs of financial distress and credibly transmit the expectation of better 
performance.  
 
The parameters on the variable (TL/TA) are positive but insignificant in both regressions. 
The insignificant effect of loans on bank profitability may be explained by the substantial 
proportion of non-performing loans. 
 
As shown in Table 3.10, the coefficients on the TL/TD in both regressions are consistent 
with our expectation and are significant. The higher the amount of loans as percentage of 
deposits, the greater costs associated with raising funds and risks associated with loan 
defaults, thus banks earn lower ROA and ROE. So the profitability and the proportion of 
loans to deposits are negatively related in Chinese banking market. 
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The variable (LLP/TL) is negatively and significantly related to bank profitability, showing 
that the commercial banks in China should focus more on the credibility assessment, loan 
monitor, and risk management, which has proved problematic in the recent past. Serious bad 
loans problems have arisen from policy-oriented loans and the failure of banks to recognise 
those impaired assets and create reserves for writing-off these assets. Thus, limiting the 
government intervention and improving the transparency of the financial systems is quite 
essential, which will assist banks to evaluate credit risk more effectively and avoid problems 
associated with hazardous exposure. 
 
The operating expenses appear to be an important determinant of profitability. This variable 
presents a negative and significant effect on banks profitability. This implies a lack of 
competence in expenses management for Chinese banks, since banks pass part of increased 
cost to customers and the remaining part to profits, possibly due to the fact that competition 
does not allow them to “overcharge”. Clearly, efficient cost management is a prerequisite for 
the improved profitability of the Chinese banking system. 
 
Regarding the ownership variable, the coefficients in two regressions are negative, but only 
OWN2 is significant. Our findings show that city commercial banks perform better than 
state-owned banks and joint equity banks in terms of both ROA and ROE. Moreover, the 
joint equity banks operate more profitably than state-owned banks, when we compare the 
magnitude of parameters for those two dummies. This finding is not surprising in light of 
previous research regarding transition economies (see Bonin et al., 2005).  
 
In sum, as the parameter on HHI is negative despite significant, and the coefficient on 
efficiency proxy MS is insignificant, our empirical results clearly reject the SCP hypothesis 
and efficiency hypothesis in the context of Chinese banking market during 1997~2006. With 
regard to control variables, except the ratio of loan to total assets, all the variables are found 
that they are significant factors for explaining bank performance in the Chinese banking 
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market.  
3.8 Conclusion 
 
A substantial body of empirical research has failed to resolve the ‘collusion versus 
efficiency’ debate conclusively. According to the ‘collusion hypothesis’, high concentration 
reduced the costs of collusion, resulting in higher rates being charged on loans, lower 
interest paid on deposits, higher fees, and so on. The alternative ‘efficiency hypotheses’ 
explained the relatively high profitability of banks operating in concentrated markets by a 
tendency for larger banks to operate more efficiently than their smaller counterparts. 
Therefore it is debatable whether the high profits earned by large banks are a consequence 
of their operating in concentrated markets and adopting collusive price-setting practices, or 
of superior production and management techniques (higher efficiency) that reduce costs, 
resulting in high profitability. 
 
Although there are a large number of studies investigate market structure, conduct and 
performance in the banking sector for a number of countries, there is hardly such a study that 
sheds light on China. Thus our study aims to evaluate domestic commercial banks in China 
under the structure-conduct-performance framework. And provide new evidence to this 
literature.  
 
In this chapter, we test the validity of these two continuing debate hypotheses in Chinese 
banking market over the period from 1997 to 2006. Our empirical results reject both the 
traditional SCP hypothesis and the efficiency hypothesis as explanation for the bank 
performance in Chinese banking industry. It appears that each of these models is insufficient 
to understand bank market behaviour, because they fail to give clear econometric results. It 
is necessary therefore to expand the range of models that can be used to understand the 
banking market in China. In the next chapter, the study examines a more rigorous and well 
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developed test of market power based on the new empirical industrial organization literature 
and due to Panzar and Rosse (1987). On a subsequent chapter the study later uses the 
encompassing reduced form model of Berger (1995) to clarify the underlying competitive 
relationships that the SCP and narrow efficiency hypothesis have failed to reveal.
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Chapter 4: Market competition in the Chinese 
banking industry: an application of the new 
empirical industrial organization (NEIO) 
Panzar-Rosse approach 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As in other industries, the degree of competition in the financial sector can matter for a 
number of reasons, such as the efficiency and profitability of the production of financial 
services, the quality of financial products, and the degree of innovation in the sector. In 
particular, due to the special role played by banks, the competition in banking markets 
closely relates to the economic stability and growth (Claessens and Laeven 2004). Thus, 
market competition in the banking industry has been and will always be one of the most 
discussed topics in economy for researchers, investors and regulators. Especially, as 
incomplete development of capital market in developing countries, banks play an even 
more crucial role in their economies, such as China.  
 
There is active debate on the impact of competition on financial stability and fragility, 
as economic theory provides conflicting predictions about the relationship between the 
competition and banking system stability and fragility (Canoy et al 2001, Berger et al 
2009, Liu et al 2010). The competition-stability view suggests that a more competitive 
banking sector is more prone to financial crises than a less competitive banking sector. 
Because the less competitive banking systems have market power to generate high 
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profits which can provide a “buffer” against adverse shocks and thus reducing the 
probability of systemic banking crisis. Moreover, the supervision of a few banks is more 
effective than many banks. However, the opposing view competition-fragility argues 
that a less competitive banking structure enhances bank fragility. The market power in 
less competitive banking market could induce banks to engage in risky activities, which 
increase the system fragility and thus enhance the probability of financial crisis.  
Therefore, the competition in banking market has very important policy implications. 
 
The Chinese banking industry has gone through a series of significant changes after the 
first introduction of economic reform in 1979. Perhaps, the banking reform is one of the 
last but most fundamental aspects in China’s economic reform. Having achieved 
tremendous progress in restructuring the industrial sector14, the government has moved 
decisively to address the difficulties in the banking sector. The creation of a new banking 
supervisory agency and going-public of state-owned banks have achieved major 
breakthroughs in the banking sector reform, which have been discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Since China was successful in joining in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, 
the strength of the financial liberalization program has intensified, and the pace has also 
speeded up to increase the efficiency and competitiveness of domestic banks in order to 
compete with foreign banks. As a consequence, changes in the nature of the market 
structure and increased competition in China’s banking industry are expected. Hence, it is 
worth to investigate the degree of competition and assess the contestability in Chinese 
banking industry. Moreover, to evaluate whether the banking reform aiming to improve 
the competition is effective, we compare the level of competition in the banking market 
                                                 
14
 As State-owned enterprises (SOEs) stand as the pillar of the national economy especially in socialist system, 
Chinese government set SOEs as the first primary target to reform since the introduction of economic reform in 1979. 
The main objective is to establish the modern corporate system and closing down non-performing enterprises. The 
SOEs were transformed from state-run to state-owned by letting SOEs taking responsibilities for their own profits and 
losses, and permitting independent production and management. 
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before and after the WTO entry. Furthermore, despite a great number of investigations 
devoted to market competition in banking sector, the emerging countries still are largely 
ignored. Thus another purpose of this study is to contribute to the existing literatures 
concerning this issue and to cast some light on China, one of the fast growing world 
economies. 
 
Two major types of empirical methodologies have been applied for assessing the 
competition in banking markets. One is the traditional structural approach, based on the 
theory of Structure Conduct Performance (SCP). Another is the non-structural models 
that were developed in the context of the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) 
approach15.  
 
Market concentration indicators such as the N-firms concentration ratio and the 
Herfindhal Hirschman index (HHI) are commonly employed in the traditional structural 
approach SCP studies. Although the market concentration indicators offer some insight 
into competitive conditions in market, they say little about the underlying behaviour of 
market participants. Therefore, a relatively new methodology (non-structural approach) 
is employed to systematically examine the nature of competition due to both theoretical 
and empirical drawbacks of the traditional methods16. In particular, the Panzar-Rosse 
methodology is preferred for our study. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one 
previous study that adopted the Panzar-Rosse approach to assess the competitive 
conditions in the Chinese banking system. Yuan (2006) employed this method to analyse 
the competition condition for domestic commercial banks in China for the period of 
1992-2002. Our study differs from Yuan’s study with respect to the estimation period, 
                                                 
15
 Two tests are widely used. One is mark-up test by Bresnahan (1989), and another is H statistic by Panzar-Rosse 
(1977). 
16 
Bresnahan (1989) gives a comprehensive survey of econometric methodologies for measuring the degree of 
competition. Shaffer (1994) and (2002) provided a detailed analysis of comparison between structural and 
non-structural models. 
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improved model specification, and larger sample of banks.  
 
The main objective of this chapter is to extend the previous literature by employing the 
Panzar-Rosse model to empirically estimate the competitive bank behaviour in China 
between 1997 and 2006, which has seen fruitful progress in banking reform and 
experienced the most rapidly growing economy among other countries. We find out that 
Chinese banking sector is characterized by monopolistic competition in such a highly 
concentrated market rather than monopoly. Moreover, by dividing the full sample into 
two sub-samples, we show that the recent reforms are effective in improving the level of 
competition in the Chinese banking industry, as there is significant increase in the 
Panzar-Rosse H statistic in post-WTO period compared with that in pre-entry period. 
However, competition in Chinese banking sector is still weak compared to results from 
other empirical studies; hence, more fundamental institutional changes are required 
before China can reap the full benefits of increasing competition following the entry of 
WTO. 
 
The rest of chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains the Panzar-Rosse 
approach. Section 4.3 reviews previous empirical works on banking market competition 
by using the Panzar-Rosse technique. Section 4.4 describes data collection and presents 
our empirical methodology. Section 4.5 reports and discusses the empirical results and 
Section 4.6 summaries the findings and draws conclusion. 
 
4.2 The Panzar-Rosse approach 
 
The Panzar-Rosse approach is an econometric methodology to quantitatively assess the 
competitive conditions of the market. The empirical test was developed by Panzar and 
Rosse (1987) to distinguish between monopoly, monopolistic competition and perfect 
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competition. The idea behind the Panzar-Rosse test is that banks will price differently in 
response to changes in input prices or any other exogenous economic shock. The ability 
of pricing depends on the degree of market power it can control and the market structure it 
operates within. In turn, changes in pricing strategy will finally lead to changes in revenue. 
Therefore, variation in revenues can reflect the market structure in which they operate17. 
In other words, whether banks exercise market power can be measured by the extent to 
which changes in input prices are reflected into revenues earned by bank itself. So for 
examining the level of market competition, we can simply analyze how bank’s revenue 
responds to changes in input prices. 
 
The Panzar-Rosse competition test is derived from a reduced form revenue equation at 
firm level under certain assumptions, like long run equilibrium condition, profit 
maximization, banks face homogeneous production function, banks are treated as single 
product firms (De Bandt and Davis, 2000), and higher input prices are not associated 
with higher quality services that generate higher revenues (Molyneux et al., 1996). 
 
The reduced form revenue equation can be derived in the following18: 
 
If we have technology T,  
T (x,y)={x, y : x can make y}                                                [4.1] 
p (x)={y: y ∈ T (x,y)}                                                        [4.2] 
 
Then we can choose y to maximize revenue,  
𝑅(𝑥, 𝑝) = max  {𝑝𝑝:𝑝 ∈ 𝑝(𝑥)}                                               [4.3] 
This is the structural form that revenue depends on inputs x and output prices p. 
                                                 
17
 Two reasons for using revenue instead of profit are i)revenue data is more easily available and more transparent 
than profit data and ii) exogenous shock is modelled as a vertical shift in the average cost curve, the full response can 
be inferred from the revenue data alone. 
18
For details of full derivation, please see Lau (1982), Shaffer (1982), Panzar and Rosse (1987). 
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We choose x to minimize costs given input prices w and exogenous variables z and output 
y: 
𝑐 (𝑝,𝑤, 𝑧) = min{𝑤 𝑥: 𝑥 𝑝 ∈ 𝑇(𝑥,𝑝, 𝑧)𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑧}                             [4.4] 
 
Now allow for market power: p=p(y), we can maximize profit: 
𝜋 (𝑤, 𝑧) = max{ 𝑝(𝑝)𝑝 − 𝑤𝑥: 𝑥,𝑝 ∈ 𝑇(𝑥,𝑝, 𝑧)}                             [4.5] 
 
Then we can re-arranged it, 
𝑅(𝑤, 𝑧) = 𝜋(𝑤, 𝑧) + 𝑐(𝑝�,𝑤, 𝑧), where 𝑝� is in the long run equilibrium       [4.6] 
 
So our reduced form of revenue is a function of input prices w and exogenous variables z. 
 
Then the reduced form revenue equation can be written as in Equation [4.7] below, which 
generally states that at market equilibrium bank i earn its revenue R is a function of a set 
of input prices w and a vector of exogenous variables z which affect its revenue.  
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The market power is measured by the extent to which a change in factor input prices 
( iw∂ ) is reflected in the change in revenues ( iR∂ ) earned by bank i. The Panzar-Rosse 
method assesses the market competition by computation of H statistic which is calculated 
as the sum of the elasticities of the bank revenue with respect to the bank’s input factors, 
∑
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i i
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. Then, the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic can be written as ∑
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The Panzar-Rosse H statistic represents the percentage variation of the revenues resulting 
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from one percent aggregate change in the price of input factors used by the bank. The 
economic interpretation of the H statistic is as follows. 
 
If banks operate as a monopoly in the market, then the H statistic is non-positive (less 
than or equal to zero). This is because monopolist’s revenue will respond in the opposite 
direction to the change in input prices, as an increase in input prices leads to increase in 
marginal costs, thus reducing equilibrium output and revenue. Panzar and Rosse (1987) 
further showed that the H statistic is also negative when the structure is a perfectly 
collusive oligopoly or a conjectural variations short run oligopoly. 
 
The H statistic is equal to one when the market structure is characterized as perfectly 
competitive. Under this condition, a proportional shift in all input prices will increase 
marginal and average costs by the same proportion, without changing the equilibrium 
output produced by banks. In order to survive the competition, banks will be forced to 
increase prices until they cover the increased costs. During this adjustment process, the 
inefficient banks might be acquired by efficient ones or be eventually driven out of the 
market by competition; the reduction in the number of banks in the industry will reduce 
the supply of the industry, thereby leading to a rise in output price and revenue by the 
same amount as costs. H statistic is also unity for a sales-maximizing firm that is subject 
to breakeven constraint as well as a natural monopoly operating in a perfectly contestable 
market.  
 
For the situation of monopolistic competition, the H statistic lies between zero and unity. 
In this case, banks behave like monopolists, but the market entry or exit of other banks 
with imperfect rival products make them cannot generate abnormal profits as monopoly. 
Hence, revenue will increase less than proportionally to changes in input prices. 
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Table  4.1: Interpretations of H statistic 
 
Estimated value Interpretations 
Competition test 
H≤0 
Monopoly, perfectly colluding oligopoly, 
conjectural variations short run oligopoly 
0<H<1 
Monopolistic competition 
H is a decreasing function of monopoly 
power. 
H=1 
Perfect competition, natural monopoly in 
perfectly contestable market, sales 
maximizing firm subject to a breakeven 
constraint 
Equilibrium test  
E<0 Disequilibrium 
E=0 Equilibrium 
Source: summarized from previous literatures. 
 
In conclusion, both the magnitude and sign of the H statistic can be informative. Vesala 
(1995) proved that when H statistic is non-positive, it is a decreasing function of the 
demand elasticity, that is, a smaller absolute value of H statistic is associated with less 
monopoly power. However, when H statistic is positive, it is an increasing function of 
the demand elasticity, that is, the higher H statistic, the less is the market power. Bikker 
and Haaf (2002) also state that when the value of H statistic is between 0 and 1, it 
generally increases with the competitiveness of the market. In other words, higher value 
of H statistic indicates stronger competition than lower values. In empirical application, 
the rejection of H≤0 excludes the monopoly model, if we also reject the hypothesis of 
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H=1, which rules out the perfect competition model, that means we are in favour of the 
only model left, which could be consistent with monopolistic competition. The different 
interpretations of H statistic from the literatures are summarized in the Table 4.1. 
 
As mentioned before, there are various assumptions need to be satisfied when we apply 
the Panzar-Rosse methodology. One of the critical conditions is that the H statistic is only 
viable when the market is in the long run equilibrium. This condition can be tested by the 
assumption that if market is in equilibrium, the rate of return (profit) should not be 
significantly correlated with input prices. This is because in long run equilibrium profit is 
given by the structure of the market and is independent of short run random shocks. As a 
result, the equilibrium test can be performed by estimating the same model used in 
competition test but use bank rate of return rather than revenue for dependent variable 
(Equation (4.8)). Then we calculate the sum of the elasticises of the bank return with 
respect to the bank’s input factors, which denoted by E statistic. A finding of E=0 would 
confirm the equilibrium condition, otherwise indicate disequilibrium. One thing should 
be noticed here, the equilibrium does not mean that competitive conditions are not 
allowed to change, but take a gradual approach as argued by De Bandt and Davis (1999). 
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4.3 Literature review 
 
The Panzar-Rosse methodology has been widely applied by a large number of works to 
empirically analyse the degree of competition and market structure in banking sectors for 
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both single country and cross country studies. The early research largely focused on 
single country study for a small number of developed countries, mainly the US and 
western European countries. The other parts of the world have rarely been investigated. 
Data problems might be one of the most important limitations for the study of developing 
country and cross-country comparisons, since little bank level data were available except 
for those main developed countries. However, recent well-established database allow for 
better and comprehensive empirical work. Consequently, in later years, a growing body 
of literatures adopted cross country studies and an increasing attention is given to 
developing countries. Especially, transition economies from Central and Eastern Europe 
have received lots of emphasis due to the expansion of the European Union. Equally, an 
increasing number of works also raised enormous interests on other emerging regions 
besides Europe such as Latin America, Arabic area and Asian countries.  
 
The empirical studies are different in many aspects, such as country sample, time period, 
regression variables and estimation methods, so theoretically speaking, it is impossible to 
compare the results from different papers. The most discussed issue subject to debate is 
the selection of dependent variables. Different specifications of dependent variables in 
the Panzar-Rosse model are presented in the banking literature. The choice of the 
dependent variable in estimating the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic has varied between 
unscaled and scaled revenue in empirical studies. Previous studies have used a scaled 
dependent variable i.e. bank revenue divided by total assets (Molyneux et al, 1994; 
Hondroyiannis et al, 1999; Bikker and Haaf, 2000; Hempell, 2002) with the reason that 
scaling helps to remove firm level differences as well as provides for a better 
approximation. Other papers argued that the use of a scaled dependent variable could be 
interpreted as a lending rate or “price” and therefore can change the nature of the 
Panzar-Rosse model from being a revenue equation to being a price equation (Vesala, 
1995; De Bandt and Davis, 2000; Bikker et al, 2006). Bikker et al (2006) further 
theoretically and empirically proved that misspecification of using scaled variable and 
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scaling factor would bias the H statistic towards one. 
 
Besides the controversy about the use of scaled and unscaled revenue, the choice between 
interest revenue and total revenue also varies in the literature. Traditional approaches in 
this literature have used interest income alone as dependent variable, which is consistent 
with the intermediation approach, as financial intermediation is the core business in 
banking revenue. In the current study, total income is considered instead. As banks 
operate in a more competitive environment for survival, the distinction between interest 
and non-interest income becomes less relevant, competition being equally vigorous for 
both. Cross subsidization and accounting differences across countries are additional 
arguments suggesting it is better to have a comprehensive view of bank revenues. 
 
Table 4.2 presents a brief summary of the previous literatures using the Panzar-Rosse 
methodology to assess the competitive condition in different banking markets.  
Literatures are divided into three groups based on different specifications for dependent 
variable, namely scaled revenue, unscaled revenue and mixture use of both. 
 
Table  4.2: Brief summary of literatures using the Panzar-Rosse method 
 
Authors Countries Period Result 
Dependent variable: Unscaled revenue 
Shaffer (1982) US 1979 MC 
Shaffer (2002) US 1984-99 MC 
Shaffer (2004) US 1984-94 MC 
Nathan & Neave 
(1989) 
Canada 1982-84 MC(1982 PC) 
Molyneux et al. 
(1996) 
Japan 1986,88 M 1986, MC 1988 
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Vesala (1995) Finland 1985-92 MC(1989-90 PC) 
Gischer and Stiele 
(2004) 
Germany 1993-02 MC 
Coccorese (2004) Italy 1997-99 MC 
Chan et al. (2006) 
New Zealand and 
Australia 
1996-05 
MC: NZ 
M: Australia 
Gunalp and Celik 
(2006) 
Turkey 1990-00 MC 
Yuan (2006) China 1996-00 MC 
De Bandt & Davis 
(2000) 
Germany, France, Italy 1992-96 
Large banks MC in all 
Small banks M (MC 
Italy) 
Murjan & Ruza 
(2002) 
9 Arab Middle Eastern 1993-97 MC 
Dependent variable: scaled revenue 
Hondroyiannis 
etal.(1999) 
Greece 1993-95 MC 
Hempell (2002) Germany 1993-98 MC 
Matthews et al (2007) UK 1980-04 MC 
Rozas (2007) Spain 1986-05 MC 
Ducan (2005) Jamaica 1989-02 MC 
Majid andSufian 
(2006) 
Malaysia 1998-05 MC 
Molyneux et al. 
(1994) 
5 European countries 1986-89 MC (Italy M) 
Bikker & Groeneveld 
(2000) 
15 European countries 1989-96 MC 
Bikker & Haaf (2002) 23 developed countries 1988-98 MC 
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Yildirim&Philippatos 
(2002) 
14 Central and Eastern 
Europe countries 
1993-00 
MC (M for the FYR of 
Macedonia & Slovakia) 
Casu and 
Girardone(2006) 
EU 15 countries 1997-03 MC 
Staikouras et al. 
(2006) 
EU 25 countries 1998-02 MC 
Mamatzakis et al. 
(2005) 
7 South Eastern European 
countries 
1988-92 MC 
Al-Muharrami et al 
(2006) 
6 Arab GCC countries 1993-00 
MC: Qatar, Bahrain, 
Oman 
PC: Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia UAE 
Claessens & 
Laeven(2004) 
50 countries 1994-01 MC 
Dependent variable: both scaled and unscaled revenue 
Buchs & 
Mathisen(2005) 
Ghana 1998-03 MC 
Trivieri (2007) Italy 1996-00 MC 
Gelos & Roldos 
(2004) 
8 European & Latin 
emerging countries 
1994-99 
MC (Argentina & 
Hungary PC) 
Bikker et al. (2006) 101 countries 1989-04 
M: 28% 
MC:34% 
PC:38% 
* M: monopoly, MC: monopolistic competition, PC: perfect competition 
 
However, the Panzar-Rosse’s H statistic for monopolistic competition has been 
imprecisely interpreted in the literature, which classify the monopolistic competition if H 
statistic is found between 0 and 1. However, in Panzar-Rosse’s (1987) original paper, they 
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claim that monopolistic competition requires H ≤ 1. This suggests that market with any 
value of H statistic under the unity can be classified as monopolistic competition; if we 
find H=1 exactly this is compatible with perfect competition with undifferentiated 
products, alternatively if there are differentiated products, H=1 is also compatible with 
strongly competitive monopolistic competition. Finally if H<0, this finding is compatible 
with the long run equilibrium properties for monopoly. In other words, monopolistic 
competition embraces both perfect competition and monopoly, they are just two special 
cases of monopolistic competition. Thus, in any empirical application, rejecting the 
hypothesis of H ≤ 1  implies the rejection of all three models. The different 
interpretation of H statistic between previous literature and Panzar-Rosse are illustrated 
in the Figure 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
Literature interpretation: 
 H ≤ 0: Monopoly 0 < 𝐻 < 1: Monopolistic Competition H = 1: Perfect Competition 
 
Figure  4.1: Literature interpretation of H statistic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
−∞ 0 1 
Monopoly Monopolistic 
Competition 
Perfect 
Competition 
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Panzar-Rosse’s interpretation: 
 H ≤ 0: Monopoly H ≤ 1: Monopolistic Competition H = 1: Perfect Competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perfect competition undifferentiated products  
Competition with differentiated products  
−∞ 0 1 
Monopoly 
Monopolistic 
Competition 
Figure 4.2: Panzar-Rosse’s interpretation of H statistic 
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4.4 Methodology and data 
 
4.4.1 Empirical model specification 
 
4.4.1.1 Competition test 
 
In order to apply the Panzar-Rosse methodology to the Chinese banks, the following 
equation is estimated in our empirical study, which the bank revenue is explained by three 
main input factor prices, three bank specific control variables and time trend. Those 
variables follow the similar definitions used in previous studies. 
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where the subscript i denotes bank i, the subscript t denotes year t. 
R=bank revenue, ( ititititititit TATRTAIRTRIRR /,/,,= ) 
IR=interest revenue, interest income from making loans 
TR=total revenue, calculated as interest income plus other operating income, such as fee 
income, commission income and other non-interest income 
TA=total assets 
PF=price of fund, the ratio of interest expense to total deposits 
PL=price of labor, the ratio of personnel expense to total number of employees 
PK=price of capital, the ratio of other operating expense to fixed assets 
TL=total loans 
E=equity capital 
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LLP=loan loss provisions 
T=time trend 
itε is the error term. 
 
The Panzar-Rosse H statistic is calculated as the sum of coefficients of three input price 
variables: 321 ˆˆˆ βββ ++=H  
 
As we discussed in Section 4.3, the specification for dependent variable differs in the 
choice between unscaled revenue (the absolute level of revenue) and scaled revenue (the 
ratio of revenue to total asset), as well as varies in using total revenue or interest revenue. 
As the four alternatives are commonly used in empirical models, and there is no 
consensus on the single best proxy for bank revenue, we employ all four different 
specifications ( ititititititit TATRTAIRTRIRR /,/,,= ) for endogenous variable in our 
empirical competition test model to see whether these four specifications give different 
results for our sample. 
 
For the independent variables, there seems to be common agreement on the inputs used 
by banking firms, namely deposits, labor and physical capital, which are in line with the 
intermediation approach19. There are great similarities concerning the choice of proxy for 
input factor price variables. We follow the similar definitions used in previous work for 
the three input factors prices: the ratio of interest expense to total deposits as proxy for 
price of funds (PF), the proxy for price of labor (PL) is the ratio of personnel expense to 
total number of employees and the ratio of other operating expense to fixed assets is used 
as proxy for capital price (PK). The expected signs of the coefficients for input variables 
hold conflicting theories, so we do not have a priori expectations. 
                                                 
19
The inputs are determined according to intermediation approach where banks are viewed as financial intermediaries 
providing financial services rather than producers of loan and deposit accounts suggested by production approach. 
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In addition to the three main input prices, different bank specific variables are also 
included in our empirical test. The choices of additional control variables vary according 
to authors’ preference and consideration. Basically, choices of bank specific variables are 
intended to catch differences in risk, size and business mix. In our study, three additional 
explanatory variables are incorporated to control for differences in risks and costs, which 
may affect bank’s revenue. The first one is the ratio of total loans to total assets (TL/TA); 
this is concerned about the risk associated with loans made by banks. The expected sign 
of coefficient should be positive. Since the more loans bank can make, the more interest 
income bank can earn, so the more revenue they can generate. The second bank specific 
variable is the ratio of equity to total assets (E/TA) which considers the leverage effect 
and known as solvency risk. The coefficient is expected to be negative, because more 
equity means more reserve required, so less money can be loaned out, leading to lower 
revenue. However, in Gunalp and Celik’s (2006) paper, they pointed out that the 
relationship between capital adequacy ratio and the income generation ability of banks is 
not very straightforward and strong.  
 
The third additional variable is the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans (LLP/TL). As 
explained in Chapter 2, a substantial amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) were 
accumulated by Chinese banks due to previous government policy directed loans. Except 
one-off disposal of problem loans from government capital injection; banks make use of 
the provision of loan loss reserves to write off bad loans by themselves. So the NPL is 
another major factor that affects banks revenue. The expected sign of this variable should 
be negative, because more loan loss provision required to write-off the bad loans, less 
revenue bank can obtain. Finally, a time dummy is included, which takes into account 
yearly macro effects and technology change. 
 
The test equations are specified in log-linear functional form which helps computation of 
elasticity and improves the regression’s goodness of fit. The panel data are estimated by 
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the fixed effect method, as Hausman test suggested the fixed effect panel regression 
appears to be more appropriate than the random effect estimation.  
 
4.4.1.2 Equilibrium test 
 
As we explained above in Section 4.2, since the Panzar-Rosse model is only valid when 
the market is in long run equilibrium, we need test this condition before conducting the 
competition test. The following equations are estimated for the equilibrium test: 
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321
ˆˆˆ βββ ++=E  
 
The long-run equilibrium test is performed by re-estimating the reduced form revenue 
equation in the competitive test, but using bank return (i.e. ROA and ROE) as dependent 
variable instead of revenue measures, where ROA is the return on asset and ROE is the 
return on equity. The use of both ROA and ROE reflects usage common in the literature. 
ROA is the most commonly used measure of relative profitability in general industry 
studies, but ROE is also widely used in the banking sector because of the key leverage 
properties of equity capital. 
 
The equilibrium test is carried out by testing whether E statistic is equal to zero or not, 
which is defined as the sum of coefficients on three input variables. E=0 indicates the 
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market is in equilibrium, otherwise disequilibrium. The intuition behind this test is based 
on the assumption that in equilibrium, returns on assets should be significantly 
uncorrelated with input prices. 
 
4.4.2 Data collection 
 
In our empirical study, we collect annual accounting data for domestic commercial banks 
in mainland China (i.e., excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) over 10 years from 
1997 to 2006, giving 371 observations in total. Table 4.3 provides some summary 
statistics of the variables included in our estimation.  
 
Table  4.3: Summary of descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 371 0.005 0.458 -0.007 0.039 
ROE 371 0.085 16.421 -0.139 0.123 
IR 371 24575 63544 41 726170 
IR/TA 371 0.040 0.016 0.017 0.136 
TR 371 28910 41679 49 781435 
TR/TA 371 0.035 0.016 0.016 0.193 
PF 371 0.027 0.023 0.006 0.227 
PL 371 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.010 
PK 371 0.697 0.403 0.151 2.684 
TL/TA 371 0.526 0.085 0.277 0.712 
E/TA 371 0.045 0.029 0.117 0.313 
LLP/TL 371 0.009 0.007 0.002 0.075 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data 
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The data are mainly obtained from Bankscope database and the Almanac of China’s 
finance and banking, which contains annual information on the balance sheet and income 
statements of all major banks operating in China. Individual bank annual report used as 
complementary sources for checking any missing values. Although our sample of 
Chinese banks is much smaller than the total number of banks in China, the banks 
included in our sample hold approximately 90% assets of the whole banking sector. 
Therefore, it is believed that our sample is a good representation of the overall Chinese 
banking industry. All the monetary variables are adjusted by using GDP deflator. The 
inflation adjusted monetary variables are denoted in the domestic currency RMB and 
quoted in millions.  
 
4.5  Empirical Results 
 
4.5.1 Empirical results from full sample (1997-2006) 
 
The estimated results using the entire panel data (1997-2006) for different specifications 
of the dependent variable are presented in the Table 4.4 below. 
 
Firstly, a critical assumption of the Panzar-Rosse methodology is that the competition test 
of H statistic must be undertaken under the condition of long-run equilibrium. The Table 
4.4 reports the results for the equilibrium test. The values of E statistic are insignificantly 
different from zero for both ROA and ROE. Therefore, we do not reject the null 
hypothesis of long run equilibrium. The hypothesis of equilibrium (E=0) is confirmed for 
our sample means that our sample data satisfy the long run equilibrium condition and thus 
the Panzar-Rosse H statistic can be meaningfully interpreted.  
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Table  4.4: Estimation results of equilibrium test and competition test for 1997-2006 
 
Equilibrium test 
ROA E=0.360 (0.820) 
ROE E=0.180 (0.490) 
Competition test 
 Unscaled revenue Scaled revenue 
 IR TR IR/TA TR/TA 
PF 
0.647*** 0.635*** 0.588*** 0.567*** 
(16.19) (13.8) (22.40) (14.46) 
PL 
0.180*** 0.192*** 0.155*** 0.173*** 
(2.63) (2.71) (3.50) (2.82) 
PK 
-0.170 -0.173 -0.175 -0.178 
(-1.21) (-1.01) (-0.92) (-1.26) 
TL/TA 
0.454*** 0.435*** 0.396*** 0.376*** 
(7.09) (5.93) (5.20) (3.28) 
E/TA 
-0.105** -0.077** -0.061* -0.048* 
(-2.11) (-1.94) (1.84) (1.87) 
LLP/TL 
-0.150** -0.138** -0.018 -0.012 
(-2.41) (-2.45) (-1.29) (-1.64) 
T 
0.127*** 0.113*** 0.108*** 0.104*** 
(28.78) (23.92) (3.83) (6.50) 
R-square 0.787 0.814 0.724 0.748 
H 0.657 0.654 0.570 0.562 
H=0 
0.657*** 0.654*** 0.570*** 0.518*** 
(5.71) (3.58) (11.98) (6.66) 
H=1 
-0.343*** -0.346*** -0.430*** -0.482*** 
(-5.19) (-6.08) (-5.9) (-6.23) 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
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With regard to competition test, the first two columns of the table report the estimations 
for unscaled revenue as endogenous variable. The other two columns give the results 
using scaled revenue as dependent variable. Moreover, differences in estimated 
parameters between interest revenue and total revenue can be compared as well.  The 
first and the third column list the estimated figures when interest revenue is used, the 
regression results with total revenue are shown in the second and forth column. It is worth 
noticing that alternative specifications generally report similar estimated parameters. The 
only difference between the choices of scaled or unscaled revenue and interest revenue or 
total revenue is the magnitude and significance level of the estimated parameters when 
we compare estimation results for different pairs of specifications.  
 
As we can see from the table, the estimated parameters for the price of funds (PF) are 
always positive and highly significant for all specifications of the dependent variable. It is 
consistent with most studies which found positive relationship between bank revenue and 
price of funds. This significant positive relationship suggests that the higher the price of 
funds, the larger the bank revenue, other things being equal. The intuition behind this is 
very clear: more interest expenses paid by banks reflect more deposits they absorbed, 
taking more deposits facilitate bank make more loans, thus earn more revenue. Moreover, 
the price of funds contributes the most to the explanation of bank revenue among the 
three input factors, which is hardly surprising given the fact that interest expense is the 
main factor in the function of bank revenue. Especially, in China, the traditional business 
remain the dominant composition of the total revenue, as the off balance sheet activity is 
relatively tiny. 
 
Furthermore, we notice that the size of coefficients on the price of fund is larger for 
interest revenue than total revenue. This reflects that cost of funds contribute more to 
interest revenue than total revenue, as total revenue include both core business and off 
balance sheet activities such as fee-based services and other operating revenues. The 
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same case was also found in Italy by Coccorese (2004) and Trivieri (2007) as well as 
Mamatzakis et al. (2005) in Southern Eastern Europe.  
 
The parameters for the price of labor (PL) are always positive and highly significant in 
four alternative specifications. The positive relationship between the price of labor and 
bank revenue suggests that higher labor cost can help bank generate more revenue. The 
higher labor cost reflects better quality staff employed by bank, thus more experienced 
expertise provide higher quality and more specialized services enable bank earn more 
revenue.  
 
In the case of price of capital (PK), the parameters are always negative but the effect on 
both the unscaled revenue and scaled revenue appears to be negligible compared to other 
two input prices, as the level of parameters is minimal and it is statistically insignificant in 
all specifications. These results are consistent with previous studies, which found that the 
impact of the capital factor input price varied by countries and it was the least important 
component of the H statistic (Molyneux et al. (1996), Bikker and Haaf, (2002), Coccorese 
(2004) and Matthews et al. (2007)). In particular, Shaffer (2004) re-estimated the model 
by excluding the factor of physical capital when he found out insignificant effect from the 
price of capital, and similar results were reported when the factor was excluded. This 
actually is consistent with the fact that fixed asset investments for banks often take up a 
very small portion of total asset and the poor quality of capital expenses and fixed assets 
data. Therefore, the price of capital may not contribute to the explanatory power of the 
bank revenue, as the major source of revenue is from deposit and loan. 
 
After discussion of the three input prices, we turn to consider the parameters on three 
bank specific variables. The results show that the ratio of total loans to total assets 
(TL/TA) have the expected positive sign and are highly significant at 1% for both 
unscaled and scaled revenue as dependent variable. This significant positive effect 
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indicates that higher fraction of loans to total assets generate greater income. This is 
because more loans bank can make, more interest income bank can earn, so more revenue 
they can generate. An alternative explanation based on risk and return can also be 
provided. The great uncertainty for the possibility of default make bank loan risky; the 
more loans reflect more risks associated with banks, so higher revenue should be 
compensated for the higher risk bear by bank. This result is consistent with the findings 
reported by Mamatzakis et al (2005), Gunalp and Celik (2006) and Trivieri (2007). 
 
The estimated coefficient of the equity to total assets ratio (E/TA) is reported with the 
expected negative sign for all specifications. It is moderately significant at 5% only when 
we use unscaled revenue as the dependent variable and become marginally significant at 
10% for scaled variables. Gunalp and Celik (2006) also found significant negative 
relationship with the absolute level of revenue in Turkey. The negative sign reflects that 
higher ratio of equity to total asset generate less revenue. This is because more equity 
bank reserve, less fund they can lend out, thus smaller leverage effect reduces the bank 
revenue it can earn. It can be noted that the equity ratio variable (E/TA) has a regression 
coefficients sign that differ depending on whether revenue (as here) or ROA and ROE 
(profitability in Chapter 3) are used as dependent variable.  
 
The coefficients on the ratio of loan loss provision to total loans (LLP/TL) are always 
negative but only moderately significant at 5% for unscaled revenue. When scaled 
revenue is used as dependent variable, the effect on bank revenue become insignificant. 
The parameter has an expected negative sign which suggests that more provisions make 
for possible loan loss, the less revenue bank can earn. The same resulted are reported by 
Mamatzakis et al.(2005), Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) and Matthews et al. (2007). 
 
Finally, the coefficients on time trend are always positive and statistically significant for 
all specifications. This suggests technical progress in the revenue generating business in 
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the sample.  
 
The value of R square generally indicates the good fit of our models. For example, in the 
case of models with unscaled revenue, the estimated regression equations explain 78.7% 
of the variability in the interest revenue and 81.4% in the total revenue equation. The 
higher R square for total revenue (no matter scaled or unscaled) suggests that equation 
with total revenue add more explanatory power and better fit the model, thus confirm its 
appropriateness of inclusion. Moreover, the R square is higher for unscaled bank revenue 
when we compare with scaled revenue. This seems to indicate that my sample data can 
better explain the change in absolute level of revenue than the ratio of revenue to total 
asset. Broadly speaking, although there are some variations in R squares for models with 
different specifications, our regressions generally explain well for all the specifications. 
 
After discussing the parameters on each variable, now we move to consider the core 
element of this research, the estimated values of the Panzar-Rosse H statistic. The 
computation of the H statistic is the sum of parameters on three input prices, which is 
reported in Table 4.4. Generally speaking, the values of H statistics are qualitatively 
similar but only differ in the magnitude for alternative specifications used for bank 
revenue. As shown in Table 4.4, the estimated values of the H statistic are significantly 
different from both zero and unity. Therefore, the hypotheses of banks enjoy monopoly 
power and compete perfectly are clearly rejected. Thus the results lead us to conclude that 
Chinese commercial banks operate under the condition of monopolistic competition 
during our estimation period (1997-2006), which is the most common type of market 
structure found in other countries by the previous empirical literature. Our conclusion is 
in line with the result reported by Yuan (2006) who also employed the Panzar-Rosse 
method to analyse the competition condition for commercial banks in China for the 
period of 1992-2002.  
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Moreover, regressions with the unscaled variables give higher value of H statistic than 
scaled ones. Except the magnitude difference in the H statistic, there is little qualitative 
difference between the choice of scaled and unscaled dependent variables. Furthermore, 
the estimated values of H statistic are higher with interest revenue than total revenue. This 
suggests a higher degree of competition in traditional business. The same situation was 
also presented in papers by Mamatzakis et al. (2005), Gunalp and Celik (2006) and 
Trivieri (2007). It is consistent with the fact that traditional business is the core activities 
for commercial banks in China, every bank fights for deposits and loans. Although there 
is substantial increase in fee-based revenue, the traditional business maintains the 
dominated position for banks in China, as the revenue from off-balance sheet activities 
contribute less than 10% to the total revenue. 
 
In sum, all estimated parameters have the expected sign and are generally significant 
except the price of capital. Although there are several variations in estimated parameters 
with respect to size and the level of significance when we look at different specifications, 
all the alternative specifications generally give similar estimated values of H statistic 
which lead to the same conclusion: the Chinese banking market is characterized by 
monopolistic competition during the period of 1997-2006.  
 
4.5.2 Empirical results from two sub-samples 
 
In order to test whether the current banking reform is effective on improving the market 
competition, we divide the whole sample into two sub-samples. This division is 
motivated by the entry of WTO in 2001. The first sample is between 1997–2001 (known 
as pre-entry period) and the second period from 2002 tills the end of 2006 (known as 
post-entry period). The empirical results of the tests for both sub-periods are given in the 
following Table 4.5 and 4.6.  
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Table  4.5: Estimation results of equilibrium test and competition test for 1997-2001 
 
Equilibrium test 
ROA E=0.036 (1.11) 
ROE E=0.080 (1.14) 
Competition test 
 Unscaled revenue Scaled revenue 
 IR TR IR/TA TR/TA 
PF 
0.639*** 0.635*** 0.622*** 0.616*** 
(9.22) (3.72) (13.06) (3.25) 
PL 
-0.139*** -0.136*** -0.132*** -0.122*** 
(-2.81) (-2.63) (-3.33) (-2.72) 
PK 
-0.037 -0.080 -0.043 -0.085 
(-0.48) (-1.03) (-0.36) (-0.42) 
TL/TA 
0.612*** 0.619*** 0.604*** 0.590*** 
(3.52) (4.21) (2.96) (3.34) 
E/TA 
-0.196*** -0.180*** -0.160*** -0.138*** 
(-5.34) (-2.79) (-2.61) (3.07) 
LLP/TL 
-0.013 -0.017 -0.020 -0.010 
(-0.41) (-0.38) (-1.21) (-0.33) 
T 
0.127*** 0.151*** 0.129*** 0.147*** 
(7.93) (3.92) (3.14) (5.27) 
R2 0.706 0.661 0.685 0.624 
H 0.463 0.419 0.447 0.409 
H=0 
0.453*** 0.416*** 0.477*** 0.409*** 
(3.14) (3.58) (8.69) (6.66) 
H=1 
-0.547*** -0.584*** -0.523*** -0.591*** 
(-3.04) (-4.64) (-5.20) (-6.23) 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
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Table  4.6: Estimation results of equilibrium test and competition test for 2002-2006 
 
Equilibrium test 
ROA E=0.035 (0.86) 
ROE E=0.079 (0.84) 
Competition test 
 Unscaled revenue Scaled revenue 
 IR TR IR/TA TR/TA 
PF 
0.437*** 0.426*** 0.417*** 0.404*** 
(7.71) (5.41) (8.66) (5.73) 
PL 
0.210*** 0.212*** 0.214*** 0.226*** 
(2.46) (2.92) (3.99) (5.27) 
PK 
-0.060 -0.070 -0.040 -0.050 
(-1.56) (-1.35) (-1.41) (-1.15) 
TL/TA 
0.452*** 0.466*** 0.463*** 0.470*** 
(4.61) (3.34) (6.34) (4.92) 
E/TA 
-0.045*** -0.050*** -0.041*** -0.048*** 
(-2.89) (-3.46) (-2.20) (-3.15) 
LLP/TL 
-0.120 -0.104 -0.123 -0.130 
(-1.30) (-0.44) (-1.31) (-0.21) 
T 
0.117*** 0.119*** 0.135*** 0.137*** 
(24.28) (26.78) (5.34) (6.63) 
R2 0.884 0.891 0.715 0.678 
H 0.587 0.568 0.591 0.580 
H=0 
0.587*** 0.563*** 0.512*** 0.510*** 
(5.60) (4.51) (7.10) (5.94) 
H=1 
-0.413*** -0.437*** -0.488*** -0.490*** 
(-4.51) (-6.53) (-6.64) (-10.07) 
The values in parentheses are t-statistics 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1% 
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In general, the estimation results from the two sub-samples depict similar pictures to 
those from the full period; but except some of the parameter estimates have changed their 
signs, and significance levels.  
 
The parameters on the price of funds (PF) are always positive and highly significant in all 
specifications for both sub-periods. When we compare the magnitude of the parameters 
between two periods, we find that banks increasingly reduce their reliance on traditional 
business, as indicated by the lower level of coefficients in post entry period contributed to 
the revenue when compare with pre entry period. This may be due to the intensive 
competition in the deposit and loan market and substantial growth in off balance sheet 
services.  
 
The parameters of the price of labor (PL) are negative in the pre entry period, but become 
positive in the post entry period. The sign of the coefficient for the price of labour can be 
justified for both directions. The negative parameters suggest that higher labor cost 
causes decrease in bank revenue. This can be explained as personnel expenses are 
regarded as cost to bank, hence more cost means less revenue, other things being equal. 
This negative relationship implies that cutting personnel expense is one way to save cost 
and increase revenue. Gunalp and Celik (2006) and Matthews et al. (2007) also report 
negative signs on price of labor in Turkey and UK respectively. The change of sign in 
price of labor suggests that the quality of employees become more important after the 
entry into the WTO. The value of human resources is not bank’s cost any more but bank’s 
precious assets. If domestic banks want to compete with foreign rivals and maintain the 
growth in fee-based activities, they should put more emphasis on staff quality, as higher 
employee expense lead to higher bank revenue. 
 
The effect of price of capital (PK) on bank revenue remains negative and insignificant for 
all specifications in two sub-samples.  
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In the case of three bank specific variables, two sub-samples generally provide consistent 
estimations with that from the full period sample. 
 
Finally, the Panzar-Rosse H statistic is significantly different from zero and one in both 
sub-samples. Thus we can conclude that commercial banks in China are operated in the 
monopolistic competition in the two separate periods. The computation of the H-statistic 
is reported around 0.4 in the pre entry period and increase to approximately 0.5 in the post 
entry period. As mentioned in before, the value of the H-statistic is an increasing function 
of the competitiveness level that means the higher value of H statistic indicates more 
competition. Thus according to our results, we find out that there is an increasing in the 
competitiveness in the Chinese banking market after the WTO entry in 2001. It supports 
that the recent banking reform is effective and successfully improve the market 
competition in Chinese banking industry. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Over last ten years, the Chinese banking industry has gone through dramatic changes, 
especially, after China successfully joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. 
In order to fulfill the commitment of the entry into the WTO and enable domestic banks to 
compete with foreign banks, the pace of banking reform has been accelerated and the 
strength of financial liberalization program has been intensified following the WTO entry. 
A series of reforms have been carried out for domestic commercial banks, in particular 
more emphasis placed on the state-owned banks. During the period covered by our study, 
the state-owned banks have seen their monopoly position weakening with the rapid 
expansion of the joint equity banks and city commercial banks, indicated by a similar 
decrease trend in both CR4 and HHI, despite the state-owned banks still dominate the 
banking sector in China. This issue raised an important question that whether the 
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decreased concentration in the Chinese banking sector lead to an increase in competition. 
In other words, we would like to find out that whether the recent reform is effective to 
make Chinese banking market more competitive.  
 
Our study assesses the competitive condition in the Chinese banking industry by using 
the Panzar-Rosse methodology. As there is much debate about the choice between the use 
of scaled and unscaled revenue as dependent variable, both of them are employed in our 
model. Moreover, in order to take into account the growing trend of the off-balance sheet 
revenue, total revenue is also included in addition to interest revenue as proxy for bank 
revenue. Hence four different specifications in total for dependent variable are used in our 
regression equations. 
 
In the empirical estimation for the whole sample period, all the parameters have expected 
signs and are significant in general. The estimation results show that all the alternative 
specifications give similar values of the Panzar-Rosse H statistic with only minor 
variation in the magnitude. The values of H statistic are all highly significant different 
from both zero and unity. The hypothesis of monopoly and perfect competition are 
strongly rejected, thus the Chinese banking market is characterized by monopolistic 
competition. This type of competition is consistent with the findings of the previous study 
investigated by Yuan (2006) as well as findings of most previous studies performed for 
other countries. This suggests that Chinese banking industry is moderately competitive, 
even the market is still moderately concentrated, and competition seems to have increased 
post WTO entry.  
 
By dividing the whole sample into the two sub-samples, we find out that the level of 
competitiveness in the Chinese banking market increased after the WTO entry in 2001. It 
supports that the recent banking reform is effective and successfully improved the market 
competition in Chinese banking industry. Moreover, by comparing the estimated 
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parameters from the two sub-periods, we observe that domestic commercial banks 
increasingly reduce their reliance on traditional business. Furthermore, the employee 
quality becomes a more important factor in generating bank revenue.  
 
Although a substantial fall in the CR4 and HHI as well as significant increase in the H 
statistic indicate great improvement in the market competition for Chinese banks, the 
level of competition is much lower than other countries, which have H statistics range 
from 0.6 to 0.8 (Claessens and Laeven (2004)), compared to average figure of 0.6 in 
Chinese banking market. This implies that there is still much room for improvement of 
competition condition in Chinese banking sector. This sort of conclusion may help policy 
makers and regulators in making more efforts for improving efficiency of the banking 
system by further liberalizing and creating a more suitable environment for competition. 
We also believe that our study could have general application to emerging countries 
whose financial system undergoes structural changes. The finding of this study, however 
need to be interpreted cautiously given the full market liberalization process of the 
Chinese banking system is an ongoing process, not fully completed yet. 
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Chapter 5: SROE and cost efficiency in the Chinese 
commercial banks during 1997-2006 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The production theory in economics includes the concept of optimization, which states 
producers aim to maximize their feasible outputs given the production technology in place and 
levels of input resources. They also attempt to minimize the production costs under current 
technology and input prices they face, as well as to maximize profits, given the technology and 
output and input prices. However, not all producers are successful in achieving the optimization. 
Some producers fail to maximize output expansion given the resources they have or minimize 
the input utilization given the output level they set to produce. To study producers’ behaviour of 
failure of optimization, a theory of efficiency has been developed. 
 
During the last two decades, the banking sector has become one of the most extensively 
investigated industries in efficiency literature. This is not only because of its vital importance in 
economics but also due to the rapid change in banking operation, competition and regulatory 
structure all over the world. 
 
Banks act as financial intermediaries and play a critical role in economic stability and growth, 
such as risk diversification, capital mobilization and resource allocation. Bank efficiency is one 
of the most important competitive advantages in global intensive competition. Also it becomes 
critically important in enhancing banks’ core competency. Thus bank managers, investors and 
regulators are increasingly concerned about how efficiently banks transform their expensive 
inputs (such as deposits, capital and labour) into various financial products and services (such 
as loans, mortgage, investment and fee-based service), especially in a rapidly changing 
financial market worldwide.  
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Moreover, events like large waves of inter-country and cross border mergers and acquisition in 
the US and the European Union, along with banking reforms such as deregulation, and the 
privatization process in developing countries, trigger economists’ interest to evaluate the 
performance of financial institutions on purpose to assess the effectiveness of government 
policy, such as deregulation and privatization on efficiency, and address research issues such as 
effects of mergers, non-performing loans, market structure, employment of different 
methodology on efficiency, and also improve managerial performance by identifying the most 
efficient producers and their driven contributing factors.  
 
Although bank efficiency has been heavily investigated by researchers, the vast majority of 
work concentrates on banks in developed countries such as the US and the European Union, no 
matter whether a parametric or non-parametric method is adopted. Compared to the large 
volume of the US and European studies, the number of banking efficiency studies in developing 
countries is relatively small. In Berger and Humphrey’s (1997) excellent international survey 
paper, they review 130 X-efficiency studies from 21 countries and various types of financial 
institutions. They observed that there is an enormous imbalance of the focus in the efficiency 
literature. They reported that about 95% in general of the studies on banking efficiency focus on 
the banks in developed countries and in particular the US banks attracted most attention (about 
70%). Their paper indicated possible directions for future research; suggest that more work is 
needed in measuring and comparing the efficiency of banks and other financial institutions 
from different countries, especially developing countries. Inspired by Berger and Humphrey 
(1997), this is one of the motivations for this study, which carries out analysis of bank efficiency 
in one of the most fast growing economy China. Therefore, this literature gap brings the 
intuitive motivation for this study. 
 
During the last few decades, there were continuous legal, structural and institutional changes in 
the Chinese banking sector. A series of banking reforms was introduced to establish a modern 
western style banking system and promote financial market development and stability. 
Especially after the WTO entry in 2001, under the pressure of full openness to foreign banks, 
the pace and strength of recapitalization and liberalization process has been accelerated and 
intensified. With these reforms, all four state-owned banks were listed, a new regulatory agency 
was established, interest and foreign exchange rates were freed, and new financial products and 
institutions were permitted. Competition dramatically increased as a result of the expansion of 
the joint equity banks, new entry of city commercial banks, deregulation of interest rates, and 
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the removal of both geographic and business barriers to foreign banks. The changing nature of 
competition resulting from recent banking reform suggests that there should be some potential 
impacts on the efficiency of banks in China. Because in order to survive in this increasingly 
competitive environment, banks have to enhance their core competency, improving the 
efficiency is a sustainable and vital way to achieve this.  
 
The key objective of this chapter is to investigate the level of efficiency in the Chinese banking 
industry from 1997 to 2006, as well as changes over the ten years time. We also compare the 
efficiency for different groups of banks based on ownership. A particular interest is focused on 
the effect of recapitalization on the shadow return on equity.  
 
Previous study on efficiency in the Chinese banking industry is insufficient to match its 
importance in the global financial market context. There have been only a few studies on the 
Chinese banking efficiency and results are inconsistent. The main incentive behind carrying out 
this empirical study is to help fill literature gap and add the latest evidence in the empirical 
literature on bank efficiency in China. Our paper differs from other Chinese banking efficiency 
papers in several aspects. First, our efficiency scores are estimated from six different models 
under the stochastic frontier approach, namely the fixed effect model, random effect model, Pitt 
and Lee (1981) model, Battese and Coelli (1992) model, Battese and Coelli (1995) model and 
conditional mean conditional variance model. The reason for this is that measured efficiency 
sometimes differs according to the model used, and the aim is to find a consistent set of results. 
Second, the number of banks included in this study exceeds the sample size adopted in other 
empirical studies investigating the efficiency of Chinese banks. Additionally, the time period 
covered by our study is more recent, thus shedding some light on the latest efficiency level of 
commercial banks in China.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 briefly explains and illustrates 
different concepts of efficiency. Section 5.3 reviews previous studies of bank efficiency, which 
place emphasis on cross country comparison and empirical studies focus on Chinese banks. 
Section 5.4 explains the methodology and models employed in our study. Section 5.5 describes 
the issues on variables selection and data collection. In Section 5.6, empirical results are 
presented and discussed. Section 5.7 concludes this chapter. 
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5.2 Different concepts of efficiency 
 
Each individual study on measuring efficiency differs from another in so many different 
dimensions. Efficiency scores often vary substantially across studies mainly due to different 
efficiency concepts as well as different measurement methods used in the studies. In this 
section, we begin by discussing the efficiency concepts and then explain the different 
methodologies in the next section. 
 
For measuring efficiency, a fundamental question that must first be solved is to determine 
which type of efficiency to estimate. As a firm may be technically efficient, but they may 
possibly be allocatively inefficient in the sense of their failure to allocate their inputs in a 
cost-minimizing manner, given the input prices they face. This may contribute further to cost 
inefficiency as the failure to minimize expenditures in output production. Furthermore, even if 
some producers are cost efficient, not all of them can be profit efficient because of 
misallocation of outputs in a revenue-maximizing manner, given the output prices, which will 
result in failure to maximize profits. Here, we will discuss three most popular concepts which 
have been widely examined in the empirical studies, namely, X-efficiency (cost efficiency and 
profit efficiency), technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Each concept may provide 
different information value and insights about firm efficiency.  
 
The X-efficiency was initiated by Leibenstein (1966) and is usually known as managerial 
efficiency or overall economic efficiency. There is no standard definition for X-efficiency, but it 
generally refers to the ability of firm to select the input and/or output levels and combination of 
the two to optimize an economic goal, such as cost minimization or profit maximization.  
 
The X efficiency derived from the cost function is known as cost efficiency. Cost efficiency 
gives a measure of how close a bank’s cost is to what a best practice bank’s cost would be for 
producing the same output bundle under the same conditions. That is, it measures how close is 
the bank’s cost to the minimum cost determined by the best practice banks in the sample. It is 
derived from estimating a cost function in which total cost (TC) is regressed as a function of 
outputs (y), price of inputs (w), environmental variables (z), random noise (v) and inefficiency 
(u), written in log terms as: 
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uvzwyfTC ++= ),,(lnln                                                 [5.1] 
 
Cost efficiency is calculated as the ratio of the minimum costs that could have been spent to 
produce a given output bundle to the actual costs spent, and theoretically it falls between zero 
and unity, and equals one for a best practice bank within the observed data. If a cost efficiency 
ratio 0.8 would indicate that the bank is 20% less efficient in terms of costs relative to the best 
practice bank operating under the same condition. 
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minCˆ =the predicted minimum costs used by the best practice bank 
iCˆ =the estimated actual costs of each specific bank 
minuˆ =the minimum of the iuˆ  across all banks in the sample 
iuˆ =the estimated actual cost inefficiency of a specific bank 
 
Alternatively, X efficiency can also be derived from profit function and known as profit 
efficiency which measures how close a bank is to produce the maximum possible profit.Two 
kinds of profit efficiency measures exist in the literature. One is the standard profit efficiency 
and the other is the alternative profit efficiency.  
 
Standard profit efficiency measures how close a bank is to achieve the maximum profit given a 
certain level of input prices and output prices. The standard profit function, written in log terms, 
is 
 
uvzwpf −+=+ ),,(ln)ln( θp                                            
[5.3]
 
 
where π is the profits of banks measured as revenues minus costs; θ is added as a constant to 
ensure the natural log is taken on a positive number; p and w are the vectors of output prices and 
input prices, respectively, while v and u are random noise and inefficiency.  
 
Standard profit efficiency is measured as ratio of actual profits to the maximum possible profits 
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earned by the best practice bank in the sample. A standard efficiency ratio of 0.8 indicates that 
the bank is losing 20% of its profits that could be achieved because of excessive cost used or 
insufficient revenue raised. 
 
profitefficiencyX − =
maxˆ
ˆ
p
p
                                                 [5.4]
 
 
where pˆ is estimated actual profits, maxpˆ is maximum estimated profits generated by the best 
practice bank in the sample 
 
The alternative profit efficiency measures how close a bank is to achieve maximum profit at a 
given output level rather than output prices in standard profit efficiency concept. The 
alternative profit function written in log terms is 
 
uvzwyf −+=+ ),,(ln)ln( θp                                          
[5.5]
 
 
which is identical to standard profit function except that y replaces p in the function. The 
alternative profit efficiency is also measured as ratio of actual profit to the possible maximum 
profit earned by the best practice. 
 
The main difference between standard and alternative profit model is that the alternative profit 
model applies more easily to cases where market power may be present. Because standard 
profit model assumes perfect competition, i.e. firms are price takers, while alternative profit 
model permits imperfect competition, i.e. firms can be price makers. 
 
As argued by Berger and Mester (1997), profit efficiency provides a better measure than cost 
efficiency when evaluating banks’ overall performance. Cost efficiency accounts for errors only 
on input side while profit efficiency takes accounts of errors not only on input side but also on 
output side. Cost efficiency is based on economic objective of cost minimization that requires 
bank manager to focus on reducing operating costs. However profit efficiency is based on a 
more accepted economic objective of profit maximization under which bank managers need to 
pay an equal amount attention to raise marginal revenue as to reduce marginal cost. Moreover, 
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unlike cost efficiency, profit efficiency can be negative.  
 
No matter whether cost efficiency or profit efficiency is adopted, they all suffer a limitation 
which is that the efficiency is a relative measure against the best practice bank within the 
sample. The best practice bank itself may not be efficient when compared to banks outside the 
sample.  
 
We have discussed that X-efficiency can be estimated from both cost and profit perspective 
based on cost and profit function. Next we will take a look at the decomposition of X-efficiency. 
No doubt, Farrell (1957) firstly proposed the efficiency decomposition. Based upon his work, 
cost efficiency can be decomposed into two separate components, namely technical and 
allocative efficiency.  
 
Technical efficiency refers to the ability to avoid waste by maximizing outputs for a given set of 
inputs or minimizing inputs for a given set of outputs. Allocative efficiency refers to the ability 
to combine inputs and outputs in optimal proportions given prevailing prices, so it is also 
known as price efficiency. Therefore X-efficiency is a multifaceted concept with several 
meanings depending on which perspective to look at it. It is worthwhile briefly explaining each 
component. 
 
Farrell (1957) illustrated his idea using a simple example involving firms that use two inputs 
(x1 and x2) to produce a single output (y). If the isoquant of the benchmark efficient firm is 
known, the efficiency of any firm can be calculated by comparing observed and optimum cost, 
subject to the appropriate constraints on quantities and prices.  
 
Farrell’s decomposition of efficiency can be illustrated in the following graph. In Figure 5.1 the 
isoquant is represented by SS´, which plots the minimum combinations of two inputs (x1 and 
x2) needed to produce a unit of output y. Every combination along the isoquant (like point Q 
and Q’) is considered as technically efficient while any point above or to the right of it defines a 
technical inefficient producer since it can contract the use of inputs without reducing the output 
level. Iso cost line AA’, the slope of which equals the ratio of two input prices, measures the 
minimum cost to secure unit output. 
 
If a firm uses quantities of two inputs defined by P to produce the output, the firm is regarded as 
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technically inefficient. The technical efficiency (TE) of the firm operating at P is measured by 
the ratio OQ/OP. A value of one in this ratio means that the firm is technically efficient, 
otherwise technically inefficient.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) 
 
If the input price ratio is also known, the allocative efficiency may also be calculated. The 
allocative efficiency of the firm operating at P is the ratio OR/OQ, where RQ represents the 
reduction of the production costs that would occurs at the allocatively (and technically) 
efficient point Q´, instead of the allocatively inefficient point Q. In other words, Q’ represents 
both technical and allocative efficient point, Q only represents technical efficiency. 
 
Finally, the overall efficiency or X-efficiency is the ratio OR/OP. Mathematically we can derive 
that the X efficiency is the product of both technical efficiency and allocative efficiency, shown 
in the following: 
 
OR/OP= (OQ/OP)*(OR/OQ) or X efficiency=TE*AE 
 
Therefore, economic efficiency is a broader concept and requires firm to be technically efficient 
as well as allocatively efficient. It is quite possible that some firms are relatively technical 
efficient but cost inefficient, depending upon managers’ abilities to use the production 
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 Figure 5.1: X-efficiency decomposition: Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
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technology and their abilities to control the prices. Therefore, the use of different efficiency 
concepts may give significantly different efficiency scores and rankings, even under the same 
approach.  
 
Another key contribution of Farrell is that he built up an efficient frontier which is a benchmark 
to measure the relative performance of productive units. This underlying idea has been widely 
spread by other researchers from then, known as frontier analysis 
 
In our study, we examine the efficiency from the cost perspective, because at current stage of 
development, Chinese commercial banks are more concerned about cost minimization rather 
than profit maximization. Moreover, it is a more commonly specified and accepted efficiency 
concept in the literature, so it can enable us to make possible comparison under the same 
concept. 
 
5.3 Brief review of the efficiency literature 
 
There exists a copious number of methodological and empirical literatures concerning about 
developing and improving methods of efficiency measurement, and estimating and comparing 
the level of efficiency in different industries and cross countries. In the following, we will first 
briefly describe various methodological approaches on efficiency estimation. Then we will 
highlight recent empirical researches involved cross country studies on bank efficiency. Finally, 
we will summarize research findings focusing on the Chinese banking efficiency. 
 
5.3.1 Methodological studies on efficiency measurement 
 
We have mentioned that efficiency scores vary across studies mainly due to two reasons, 
namely different concepts and estimation methods. We have explained different efficiency 
concepts in previous section. In this section, various approaches used to measure the efficiency 
will be discussed. Generally speaking, there are two broad approaches employed in the 
literature to estimate efficiency, namely the traditional non-frontier approach and frontier 
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approach.  
 
Earlier, non-frontier methods such as financial ratio analysis were used to measure the bank 
performance as proxy for efficiency. However, this approach suffers a lot of drawbacks. For 
example, there is no consensus on the benchmark ratios which level of the ratio is the best (the 
most efficient). Moreover, financial ratios taken from balance sheet only give a snapshot view, 
so it is a short run measure and may be inappropriate for describing the actual level of efficiency 
for a bank in the long run (Oral and Yolalan, 1990). Furthermore, financial ratios provide only a 
restricted and incomplete picture and fail to account for the interactions between the different 
factors which affect efficiency (Mukherjee et al. 2002). Besides, financial ratios do not enable 
carrying out any statistical test. In addition, these ratios cannot identify sources of bank 
efficiency such as technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Therefore, non-frontier method 
is not an accurate and appropriate way to measure efficiency. As a result, frontier analysis 
becomes the most commonly used technique to measure efficiency. 
 
The history of theoretical developments in frontier analysis of producers’ performance went 
back to the pioneer work of Michael Farrell, who was the first to measure economic efficiency. 
Farrell (1957) also introduced a method to decompose the overall efficiency into its technical 
and allocative components. His work influenced the development of data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) by Charnes et al. (1978) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) by Aigner et al. (1977) 
and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). The DEA and SFA are by now well-established and 
widely used as non-parametric and parametric efficiency measurement techniques in the 
literature of efficiency measurement. The main difference between non-parametric and 
parametric approach is that non-parametric models based on linear programming while 
parametric estimations by specifying econometric functions. 
 
Since the pioneer paper of Farrell (1957) that introduced a frontier method to measure firms’ 
economic efficiency, there have been numerous efficiency studies in financial institutions and 
mostly banks. Some studies focused on empirical application and tried to inform government 
policies by assessing the effect of deregulation, loan quality, risk factor, market structure and 
mergers and acquisitions on firms’ performance as well as report to managers by identifying the 
“best” and “worst” practice. While others concentrated on improving the frontier methodology 
to obtain consistent and more accurate efficiency estimates. 
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Early attempt to measure efficiency based on the frontier analysis mainly focus on economies 
of scale and economies of scope, implicitly assuming that banks were approximately equally 
X-efficient. Economies of scale arise if average production costs decline as output increases. 
Economies of scope exist if two or more products can be jointly produced with lower cost than 
independent production. In short, economies of scale are associated with firm size, while 
economies of scope are related to the joint production of more than two products. Studies of 
economies of scale and economies of scope in banking include Berger (1987), Clark (1988), 
Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Berger and Humphrey (1991). 
 
Later studies give more emphasis on X-efficiency which involves superior management and 
technology resources. The frontier models estimating X-efficiency can further be divided into 
non parametric methods and parametric methods. Nonparametric efficiency is calculated by 
employing linear mathematical programming techniques; whereas parametric efficiency is 
derived from a particular function such as Cobb–Douglas production function, cost function, 
revenue function or distance function. Comprehensive methodological surveys exist in Bauer 
(1990), Greene (1993), Lovell (1993), and Charnes et al. (1994). 
 
The most common parametric estimation technique is the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) 
which was originated by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977). The fundamental benefit of the 
SFA is that it allows for idiosyncratic error20. In the SFA, the inefficiency and idiosyncratic 
error term are disentangled by making different assumptions about their distributions. The 
inefficiency term is assumed to follow an asymmetric distribution, such as half-normal and 
truncated half normal, while the idiosyncratic error term is assumed to follow a symmetric 
distribution, usually the standard normal distribution. The main disadvantage of the parametric 
methods is that they have to impose particular structure on (i) the shape of the frontier by 
specifying a functional form for the relationship among inputs outputs and other influential 
factors, such as Cobb-Douglas production function and translog cost function, and (ii) the 
specification of the error component distributions. Recent Fourier-Flexible specification 
improves the cost function by adding more flexibility, even though it still not solves the entire 
problem and has the cost of making economic interpretations obscure. 
 
                                                 
20
 Idiosyncratic error here refers to measurement error, sampling error and specification error, i.e. v in the cost or profit 
function. Both idiosyncratic error v and inefficiency u are components of random error. 
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The most familiar nonparametric technique is the data envelopment analysis (DEA). The DEA 
is a linear programming technique developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). It was 
originally designed to measure efficiency in public sector and non-profit entities where typical 
economic behavioral assumptions, like cost minimization or profit maximization may not apply, 
such as police force, healthcare and education. Sherman and Gold (1985) were the first to apply 
the DEA to banking industry which is reviewed in Berger (1997). Since the first use of the DEA 
by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), there has been a large number of papers which have 
applied and extended this methodology. For example, Lovell (1993) and Seiford (1996) offered 
extensive reviews of this literature, and Cook and Seiford (2009) presented recent 
methodological development.  
 
As Berger and Humphrey (1997) summarized, the primary advantage of the non-parametric 
techniques is that they do not require the specification of a particular functional form for the 
cost or production function for the inefficiency. So it imposes very little structure on the shape 
of the efficient frontier. It also makes no prior assumption regarding the form of the distribution 
of inefficiencies across observations. The key drawback of the nonparametric techniques is that 
they usually do not incorporate idiosyncratic error and attribute all the difference to the 
inefficiency. This may overstate the true level of inefficiency and mislead the conclusion, if the 
difference is due to measurement errors, luck or exclusion of important regressors. 
 
For this reason, the parametric approach is usually found to compute higher efficiency values 
than the non-parametric approach. However, Resti (1997) found little difference between those 
techniques. Other papers compared efficiency estimates using two approaches, the results were 
mixed. Nevertheless, as two broad category approaches based on different estimation 
techniques and different data requirement, it is not necessarily comparable. Parametric methods 
employ statistical regression, while non-parametric methods utilize linear programming. 
 
As the non-parametric and parametric methods have their own advantages and disadvantages, 
there is no consensus about the single best estimation methodology for efficiency measurement. 
The recent developments of frontier analysis aim to improve the efficiency estimates mainly 
focus on two aspects. One is to provide a statistical foundation for the non-parametric methods 
and developing a stochastic version of the DEA by incorporation of error term. The other is to 
relax the functional form and assumptions in the SFA (Berger, 1997). 
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5.3.2 Empirical studies on banking efficiency: international 
comparison 
 
There has been a considerable body of literatures empirically investigating the efficiency of 
financial institutions, by using non-parametric or/and parametric frontier models. The first 
extensive survey of efficiency studies in financial institutions was provided by Berger et al. 
(1993), in which the authors mainly reviewed scale and scope efficiencies in banking, along 
with discussions of mergers, efficiencies in governmental financial institutions and insurance 
companies, and determinants of efficiency for financial institution. It was clear that up to that 
date, the banking efficiency literature was dominated by studies of scale and scope efficiencies 
rather than X-efficiencies. The second and most exhaustive empirical survey was provided by 
Berger and Humphrey (1997).They provided an excellent and comprehensive survey of 130 
X-efficiency studies from 21 countries and various types of financial institutions.They critically 
reviewed and discussed various frontier efficiency methods with improvement suggestions. 
This paper also outlined potential directions for future research such as improvement of frontier 
efficiency techniques and research issues of providing more evidence in developing country 
and cross-country comparison and determinants of efficiency estimates. 
 
As most of the studies on banking efficiency reviewed in this paper focused on single country, 
here we do not repeat to review those studies surveyed by Berger and Humphrey (1997).We 
focus on more recent papers on examining bank efficiency, particularly those studies engage in 
cross country comparison. Maybe inspired by suggestion of Berger and Humphrey (1997) who 
propose that more research is needed in measuring and comparing the efficiency of banks in 
different countries, we find that the majority of early studies focus on individual countries, but a 
growing number of studies examine cross-country samples in recent years. In the survey by 
Berger and Humphrey (1997), there were only three cross country studies. But Pasiouras (2008) 
claimed that they identify 38 cross-country studies and half of them being published after year 
2003. Therefore, in the following, we review recent evidence from international comparison on 
banking efficiency. For interests of previous banking efficiency in individual country, please 
see survey paper of Berger and Humphrey (1997), Goddard et al (2001), Berger (2007), Hughes 
and Mester (2010), Fethi and Pasiouras (2010). 
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Before we summarize the studies that compare efficiency levels among different countries, one 
thing should be always bear in mind when we consider cross-country studies. Theoretically 
speaking, if a country-specific frontier is estimated, it is truly non-comparable for different 
countries with their efficiency scores, as different countries have different frontiers and each 
country’s efficiency is compared separately to its own frontier which is different from other 
countries. Even when a common frontier is estimated, it is still quite difficult to compare 
efficiency levels internationally, because it is challenging to control for very different economic 
environments which banks operate in different countries, such as regulation, political regime, 
taxation system, accounting standards, and quality of products and services. In addition, as 
efficiency is continuously changing, different sample periods and different stages of 
development yield different efficiency levels. So the cautious and careful interpretation is 
needed when we make comparison cross different countries, especially from different regions.  
 
Although conclusion and inference drawn from international comparison is limited, it can help 
depict a general picture and provide some valuable information. In particular, bank operations 
across international boundary increasingly become a common trend as a result of increasing 
financial globalization and intensive competition. For example, banks in the nations with the 
most efficient institutions would acquire institutions in the nations with the least efficient 
organizations. In the following, we focus on recent empirical studies providing international 
comparison of bank efficiency using a common frontier.  
 
Numerous empirical studies evaluate the differences in bank efficiency among different nations, 
by measuring the efficiency of each bank relative to a common best practice frontier. Most of 
these studies compare efficiency of banks within the European Union. This is possibly because 
data in those countries is easily obtainable. And also relatively fewer control variables are 
needed for comparison within the EU, as banks compete under similar economic environment. 
There are some studies compare the EU members with other industrialized countries mainly the 
US. A few latest works also include banks from developing countries in Eastern Europe as a 
result of the recent expansion of the EU.  
 
Early cross-country studies initially start common frontier comparison between the EU 
members and the US, as well as within the EU. But the efficiency estimates appear to show 
mixed or even conflicting results. There is no consensus achieved for which country is the most 
efficient, and which is the least. For example, Allen and Rai (1995) estimated the X-efficiency 
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for banks in 15 developed countries and found average inefficiency measures were greatest in 
France, Italy, the U.K. and the U.S.  Financial institutions in Japan, Germany, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Canada were, on average, the most efficient in the world. However, results 
obtained by Pastor et al. (1997) indicated that efficiency was low in Italy and high in Denmark, 
Spain, Germany, and France. Interestingly, Maudos et al (1999) found Portugal and the UK 
were the least cost efficient countries, but their position in the ranking changed completely in 
terms of profit efficiency, where they were the most efficient. 
 
A possible partial explanation for mixed results suggested by Berger et al (2007) is that 
econometric analyses do not control well for the differences in economic environments across 
nations. Different results may primarily reflect differences in the economic environment rather 
than differences in efficiencies. Recent studies (Dietsch (2001), Lozano-Vivas et al (2002), 
Maudos et al (2002), Pasiouras (2008)) improve earlier researches by incorporating better and 
more comprehensive control variables for different economic environment. Those include 
country specific variables measuring market structure, regulation and macroeconomic 
condition. The effects of those environmental variables on efficiency are also examined to 
assess the direction and magnitude of each environmental factor on explaining differences in 
measured efficiency among countries. 
 
By incorporating additional environmental variables, a number of studies offer a European 
cross-country comparison of bank efficiency, mainly on the EU 15 (Cavallo and Rossi (2002), 
Vivas et al. (2002), Casu and Molyneux (2003), Casu and Girardone (2006)). However, there is 
still no consensus achieved regarding the most efficient and the least efficient country in the EU. 
And Casu and Molyneux (2003) reported that the efficiency gap among countries grew even 
wider and country-specific factors are still important determinants in explaining differences in 
bank efficiency levels across Europe. 
 
As a result of the EU enlargement process, some recent studies concentrate on the comparison 
of transition countries within the Eastern Europe as well as between the Eastern and Western 
Europe (Fries and Taci (2004), Bonin et al (2005), Rossi et al (2005), Yildirim and Philippatos 
(2007)). Similarly, no agreement is obtained concerning about efficiency rankings among 
Eastern European countries. Weill (2004) compared the cost efficiency of banks from Western 
European countries with Eastern European countries. He observed that Western banks are more 
cost-efficient than Eastern banks. The results also reveal that there exists a gap in bank 
Chapter 5 
 154 
efficiency between Eastern and Western European countries.  
 
Comparisons of studies concentrating on one particular geographical area would not really be 
considered international; Maudos and Pastor (2001) extended the efficiency cross-country 
comparison by including European countries as well as Japan and the US. The results obtained 
generally indicate that banks in the US are the most efficient, Japanese banks are the least, and 
European banks stand in the middle. More recent empirical evidence from Bos and Kolari 
(2003) is consistent with Maudos and Pastor (2001) findings. The estimated results suggest that 
the US banks are both profit and cost efficient than European banks in general.  
 
To our best knowledge, Pasiouras (2007) provided the most comprehensive international 
comparison, in terms of geographical coverage. The paper estimates bank efficiency in 95 
countries. The results show the most efficient region appears to be Asia Pacific, while the least 
efficient region is Latin America and Caribbean. 
 
5.3.3 Empirical studies on banking efficiency in China 
 
After reviewing these cross country studies, it is not surprising that we can observe that like 
single country studies, the majority of international comparisons on bank efficiency give more 
emphasis on developed countries, which is not truly international. Although in recent years, 
there is increase in the number of works including emerging countries, China is still neglected. 
So next, we summarize some findings of researches focusing on banking efficiency in China. 
 
Before the beginning of this century, there are few papers written in English on the efficiency of 
banks in China. But after the WTO entry and the listing of the state owned banks, Chinese 
banks start to attract worldwide attention and bank efficiency in China has become a popular 
area of research in recent years. But there still quite limited papers employed frontier analysis 
for investigating bank efficiency in Chinese banking sector, even relatively smaller number of 
papers compare with other developing countries, such as India and Turkey. To our best 
knowledge, there are seven published papers on examining bank efficiency in mainland China21, 
                                                 
21
 A number of studies in Chinese banking efficiency have been published in Chinese scholarly journals, but to date there have 
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including Chen et al (2005), Matthews et al (2006), Fu and Heffernan (2007), Kumbhakar and 
Wang (2007), Berger et al (2007), Ariff and Can (2008) and Shen et al (2009). In the following, 
each study will be reviewed in turn. 
 
Chen et al (2005) using non parametric DEA approach examined the cost, technical and 
allocative efficiency of 43 Chinese banks over the period 1993 to 2000. Their results show that 
technical efficiency (around 70%~80%) consistently dominates the allocative efficiency 
(around 50%~60%) of Chinese banks. Moreover, they investigated efficiency based on size 
difference and found that the large banks and smaller banks are more cost efficient than medium 
sized banks. In addition, the financial deregulation in 1995 was found to improve cost 
efficiency levels including both technical and allocative efficiency. 
 
However, by using parametric SFA approach (input distance function is employed), 
Kumbhakar and Wang (2005) found completely different results from Chen et al (2005). By 
examining technical efficiency of 14 national banks over the period 1993–2002, their results 
indicate that larger banks tend to be less efficient. In particular, the large four banks (0.47) are 
less efficient than the medium banks (0.9). Both studies also appear to have contradictory 
implications regarding the effects of deregulation. Kumbhakar and Wang (2005) found no 
evidence to support the view that deregulation improved efficiency significantly. In addition, 
they examined the role of bank characteristics and environmental factors in explaining 
technical efficiency and reported that private ownership in joint-equity banks was found to 
improve technical efficiency. Similarly, a higher capital adequacy ratio was associated with 
higher efficiency 
 
Matthews et al (2006) employed a non-parametric approach using the bootstrap technique to 
estimate cost efficiency for the 4 state owned banks and 11 joint-stock banks over the period 
1997-2004. They claimed that a protected banking market in China not only encourages weak 
management and X-inefficiency but also public ownership and state directed lending encourage 
moral hazard and bureaucratic rent seeking. Thus they decomposed cost efficiency into 
X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency. They found that a significant cause of bank 
inefficiency in China was ‘rent seeking’ behavior rather than X-inefficiency. The paper also 
                                                                                                                                                        
been only a few studies that are available to non-Chinese readers. 
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found evidence of declining trend in both types of inefficiency and suggested that reduced 
inefficiency was due to the competitive threat of entry of foreign banks into the Chinese market, 
which lead to improved management and result in higher technical efficiency and lower cost- 
inefficiency. In addition, X- inefficiency is significantly higher for the state-owned banks 
(36.4%) than joint stock banks (31.3%). 
 
By employing the stochastic frontier approach, Fu and Heffernan (2007) investigate cost 
efficiency of 4 state-owned and 10 joint stock banks in China's banking sector over the period 
1985–2002. Their results show that cost efficiency in China's banking sector ranged between 41% 
and 52%. On average, the joint-stock banks are found to be more cost efficient than the 
state-owned commercial banks, which is consistent with results obtained by Kumbhakar and 
Wang (2005) using the same parametric approach. The improvement in efficiency suggests that 
deregulation has a positive impact on bank efficiency in China. 
 
More recently, Berger et al (2007) analyzed both profit and cost efficiency of banks in China 
over 1994-2003 with different majority and minority foreign ownership structures. The results 
report the mean profit and cost efficiency level are 0.476 and 0.897 respectively. The key 
findings are that the Big Four state-owned banks are the least efficient, and that minority 
foreign ownership of other banks is associated with significantly improved efficiency. These 
findings suggest that minority foreign ownership of the Big Four and other reforms that allow 
foreign banks to play larger roles will likely improve the performance of the Chinese banking 
sector, with positive effects on economic growth. 
 
Following Berger’s et al (2007) study, Ariff and Can (2008) also investigated both profit and 
cost efficiency over similar time period but using non parametric approach. Consistent with 
Berger’s (2007) finding, their cost efficiency (0.798) is well above the profit efficiency (0.505). 
Their findings are also consistent with prior evidence from Berger et al (2007) on ownership 
and efficiency: the joint-stock banks on average appear to be more cost and profit efficient than 
the state-owned banks.  
 
The latest work carried out by Shen et al (2009) which compare cost efficiency of ten major 
Asian banking industries from 1998 to 2005 by using the SFA. Based on their findings, overall 
cost efficiency level of Chinese banks is around 0.586 and ranks in the fifth place, suggesting 
that Chinese banks need further development of the banking system if they are to compete 
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strongly against foreign banks. 
 
To sum up, there is not only little research evidence on the Chinese banking sector’s  efficiency, 
but also the few existing studies have limited and mixed results on the relative efficiency among 
different groups based on ownership and size as well as on the effects of regulatory reforms. 
Even their results are inconsistent; they provide preliminary and valuable information on banks 
efficiency in China. Although previous studies have not achieved agreement on the level of 
efficiency, most of findings support that huge wastes exist in operation of Chinese banks and 
they are largely inefficient compared to western banks and still very low efficiency among 
developing countries. Table 5.1 summarizes the empirical literature we reviewed on Chinese 
banking efficiency. 
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Table  5.1: Reviewed studies on Chinese banking efficiency 
 
Authors 
No. of 
banks 
Period Inputs Outputs Methods Results Size/ownership Regulation 
Chen et al 
(2005) 
43 1993-00 
deposits, 
fixed 
asset 
loans, 
deposits, 
non-interest 
income 
DEA 
TE:70%~80% 
AE:50%~60% 
Large and small banks more 
efficient than medium banks 
Positive 
effect 
Kumbhakar and 
Wang (2005) 
14 1993~02 
labour, 
fixed 
asset, 
deposits 
loans, other 
earning assets 
SFA TE:78.94% 
Larger banks are less efficient 
than medium banks 
No effect 
Matthews et al 
(2006) 
15 1997~04 
labour, 
fixed 
asset, 
deposits 
loans, other 
earning 
assets, other 
operating 
income 
DEA 
X-eff: 92.9% 
Rent 
seeking:91.4% 
Joint  banks are more 
efficient than state-owned 
banks 
Positive 
effect 
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Fu and 
Heffernan 
(2007) 
14 1985~02 
labour, 
fixed 
asset, 
deposits 
loans, 
deposits, 
non-interest 
income, 
investments 
SFA X-eff:41%~52% 
Joint-stock banks are more 
X-efficient than state-owned 
banks 
Negative 
effect 
Ariff and Can 
(2008) 
28 1995-04 
labour, 
fixed 
asset, 
deposits 
loans, 
investment 
DEA 
Profit eff:50.5% 
Cost eff: 79.8% 
Joint stock banks are more 
efficient than state-owned 
banks 
na 
Berger et al 
(2009) 
38 1994~03 
fixed 
asset, 
deposits 
loans, 
deposits, 
liquid asset, 
other earning 
assets 
SFA 
Profit eff:47.6% 
Cost eff: 89.7% 
State-owned banks are the 
least efficient 
Positive 
effect 
Shen et al 
(2009) 
48 1998-2005 
Fund, 
labour, 
fixed 
assets 
Loans, other 
earning 
assets, 
non-interest 
income 
SFA Cost eff: 58.6% 
Joint stock banks are more 
efficient than state-owned 
banks. 
na 
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5.4 Methodology 
 
5.4.1 Discussion of the SFA and functional form 
 
As discussed in Section 5.3.1, there is no single best estimation method; each of those 
approaches has its individual strengths and weaknesses. Despite there is no consensus on the 
“best” frontier method, we favour the stochastic frontier approach because of its virtue of 
allowing random noises that are outside control of firms and comprising measurement error, 
specification error and sampling error.  
 
The Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) was originally developed by Aigner et al. (1977). 
After the stochastic frontier approach was first proposed, it has been widely used in the 
efficiency literature. The main advantage of this approach is the allowance for inefficiency, and 
also take into account the fact that random shocks outside the control of producers. By forming 
a composed error term, they separate the error term from the inefficiency by using different 
distribution assumption. Therefore, inefficiency would not be contaminated by the random 
noise that should not be considered as inefficiency. Although the stochastic frontier approach is 
criticized for imposing a strict functional form that presuppose the shape of an unknown 
frontier, I think the risk of misspecifying the true frontier is less than the risk of completely 
ignoring it. Moreover, the risk of misspecification could be controllable by running statistical 
and econometric test on the model, the use of explanatory variables and test on theoretical 
properties of the presumed functional form. Therefore, the SFA is employed in this empirical 
study. 
 
However, the main difficulty in implementing the parametric methods is to specify a certain 
functional form. The existing efficiency literature has witnessed the utilization of more flexible 
functional forms developed from the previously prevailing Cobb-Douglas functional form to 
widely employed translog function and more recently developed the Fourier flexible function. 
 
Translog functional form is one of the most widely used functional forms in the empirical 
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literature on bank efficiency. In line with most of the bank efficiency literature, we adopt a 
translog functional form rather than a more flexible form such as the Fourier-Flexible (FF) 
specification. There are three reasons motivated our choice.  
 
Firstly, for consistency, as most of the efficiency studies in banking employ translog cost 
function, following the same functional form enable us making comparison, even the result is 
not truly comparable. Secondly, the FF specification requires more degrees of freedom, but the 
number of observations available in our study is limited. Thirdly, Berger and Mester (1997) 
argue that the improvement obtained through the use of the FF specification is insignificant 
from an econometric viewpoint. The average improvement in goodness of fit is relatively small, 
indicating both functional forms yield basically the same measure of efficiency. Moreover, 
Wheelock and Wilson (1995) point out that although the FF specification increases the 
flexibility, it raises several problems, such as how many terms should be included is appropriate 
for estimation. Besides, Altunbas and Chakravarty (2001) indicate the predictive ability of the 
FF form is worse than the translog form. Finally, the FF form has no simple economic 
interpretation for the estimated coefficients. As a result, the translog cost function is preferred 
due to the data limitation and the fact that difficult coefficient interpretation and little 
improvement in empirical use of the FF specification. 
 
5.4.2 The Stochastic Frontier Approach 
 
To explain the SFA, the typical theoretical cost frontier model for panel data can be written as: 
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        [ 5.6] 
 
where itTCln stands for total costs for firm i (i=1…N) at time t (t=1…T), mityln  and jitwln
represents the mth (m=1…M) output and the input price for the jth (j=1…J) input for firm i at 
time t, respectively. itu ≥ 0 represents cost inefficiency while itv ~ iid (0, 
2
vσ ) stands for the 
random errors that are beyond the control of firms. 
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If cost efficiency is time-invariant, the fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) model can be 
adopted and Equation (5.6) will be modified as 
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         [ 5.7] 
 
Under FE estimation, iu is treated as fixed, it becomes the bank specific intercept to be 
estimated with mβ and jγ . The Equation (5.7) then can be modified as 
 
itjit
j
j
m
mitmiit vwyTC +++= ∑∑ lnlnln 0 γβα
                            
    [ 5.8] 
where ii u+= 00 αα . 
 
However, the FE model suffers a drawback that the estimates are not efficient. The problem 
could be solved with random effect (RE) model, although it requires strong assumption that iu
is uncorrelated with the regressors. The RE model can be written as 
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where )( iuE  is the mean of cost inefficiency 
 
So far, no distributional assumption is made on inefficiency term u, and the FE model is 
estimated by the least square dummy variable (LSDV) method and the RE model is estimated 
by the feasible generalised least square (FGLS). If such distributional assumption is tenable, the 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) can be used to estimate the efficiency. Pitt and Lee 
(P&L) (1981) made the following normal and half-normal distributional assumption on the 
error components in panel data stochastic frontier model. The distributional assumptions are: 
 
(i) itv ~ iid N (0, 
2
vσ ) 
(ii) iu ~ iid 
+N (0, 2uσ ) 
(iii) iu and itv are distributed independently of each other, and of the regressors 
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However, it is inappropriate and unrealistic to assume cost inefficiency to be time-invariant in a 
long time period, especially in this rapidly changing financial market. The longer is the time 
period the more desirable it is to relax this time-invariant assumption. Therefore, this desire 
leads to the development of time-varying panel data models in which efficiency is allowed to 
change over time. In the literature, a number of studies have adopted Battese and Coelli (1992) 
model, which try to relax the assumption of time-invariant inefficiency by introducing the 
additional term iit uTtu ))(exp( −−= η  into the model. The inefficiency is said to decrease if
η >0 and increase ifη <0, or remain the same if η =0 which returns to the time-invariant model. 
 
Although the Battese and Coelli (1992) model resolve the time invariant problem, it creates 
another problem that the specific structure iit uTtu ))(exp( −−= η artificially imposed by the 
model make inefficiency always increase or decrease. Later, Battese and Coelli (1995) 
modified previous model by not only relaxing the specific structure of time effect imposed on 
inefficiency, but also incorporating more variables that can affect inefficiency. Battese and 
Coelli (1995) model specifies that inefficiency is a function of any variables z may influence it
)( itit zhu = .  
 
Moreover, Battese and Coelli (1995) model is also known as one-stage estimation. Because this 
model enables us to evaluate the level of inefficiency and access factors which affect 
inefficiency at the same time. The one stage estimation is preferred over the two stage 
estimation. In the two stage estimation, we compute inefficiency as usual first, and then run a 
separate regression for those factors may influence inefficiency obtained from the first stage. 
The two stage estimation method receives critics because it suffers the drawback that it assumes 
variables not included in the first stage are uncorrelated with composite error term. But in the 
second stage, we regress some of the variables on one of the composite error term- inefficiency 
and assume they may correlate with it. So there is obvious built-in conflict within the two stage 
estimation. 
 
Furthermore, as Battese and Coelli (1995) only considered the factors that may affect the mean 
of inefficiency, other researchers proposed that those factors may also affect the variance of 
inefficiency. Consequently, Battese and Coelli (1995) model has been further improved by 
specifying the same function of a set of variables on both mean and variance, which is known as 
conditional mean conditional variance (CMCV) model. )()( itit zhuE = and )()( itit zhuVar =  
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5.4.3 Empirical model specification 
 
In this study, the translog cost functional form with equity as a fixed input and permitting weak 
disposability of the production technology is adopted and can be written as 
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where total costs of bank itTCln  (i=1,...,N) observed for t times, are given as a function of 
three outputs mityln  ( m =1,...,3) , three input prices jitwln  (j =1,...,3), time t and control 
variable 0ln z .  
 
All variables in the above equation are expressed in natural logs. Following the intermediation 
approach (see next section), we use three basic inputs, which are funds, labor and capital, and 
three outputs, measured as loans, other earning assets and non-interest income. The outputs and 
inputs are defined and discussed in detail in Section 5.5 later. A time trend included in the 
analysis intend to capture technological change in the period examined. Equity capital is 
included to account for risk since equity capital may influence the probability of banks’ failure. 
Also, a bank’s capital level will directly affect costs by providing an alternative funding source. 
The reason for only considering equity capital as control variable is that we are particularly 
interested in the recapitalization effect on the shadow return on equity as recapitalization is one 
the most important reform carried out in the recent banking reform. Other factors affect bank 
efficiency will be included in the additional functions that affect mean and/or variance of 
inefficiency in B&C 95 model and CMCV model. All the variables will be defined and 
discussed later in Section 5.5. The standard assumption: half-normal and normal distributions 
on the inefficiency and random error are imposed, since these are the most common 
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assumptions in the efficiency literature. 
 
To ensure cost efficiency estimates are truly estimated from the cost function, following 
properties of cost function suggested by McFadden (1978) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) 
should be satisfied: 
(i) non-decreasing in y, as 0
ln
ln
≥
∂
∂
mit
it
y
TC  
(ii) non-decreasing in w, as 0
ln
ln
≥
∂
∂
jit
it
w
TC
 
(iii) homogenous of degree one in w 
(iv) concave in w 
 
By imposing property (iii), the cost function for estimation can be modified as: 
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To ensure the symmetry condition (i.e. the property of the continuity of the cost function), 
following restrictions nmmn ββ = and kjjk γγ = are imposed. Monotonicity properties (i) and (ii) 
are checked by calculating the elasticities of output 
mit
it
m y
TCey
ln
ln
∂
∂
= and elasticities of input 
price
jit
it
j w
TCew
ln
ln
∂
∂
= . Concavity condition (iv) of cost function in input prices w is satisfied 
when the Hessian matrix of cost function with respect to input prices w is negative 
semi-definite. It is derived as TssswH +−Γ= ˆ)( , where Γ  is the matrix of second order 
coefficients of input prices in the cost function. s is the column matrix of share equations 
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jjititj ewwTCs =∂∂= ln/ln  (the Shephard’s lemma) and Tj
T sss ],...,[ 1= .  sˆ  is the 
diagonal matrix with the share js  on the main diagonal. 
 
As explained in section 5.4.2, Equation 5.11 will be estimated under six models for 
methodological cross check, comparison and consistency. This is because that efficiency results 
are sensitive to the composed error specification used; this is particularly true for panel data 
stochastic frontier studies. Therefore by comparing six composed error specifications, the 
consistency of the regression results can be compared across different specifications and the 
arbitrary choice of one possibly distorted specification can be avoided. 
 
Table  5.2: Summary of estimated models 
 
Model 
Estimation 
method 
Data 
type 
Time  
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Error component distribution 
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More specifically, when we estimate the B&C 95 model and CMCV model, the inefficiency 
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term u, is assumed to be half-normally distributed with its mean (and variance) dependent on 
exogenous variables (z) including size, ownership dummy and equity capital ratio22. In the case 
of size, we use total assets as a measure for bank size. For ownership dummy, we classify our 
full sample of banks into two categories, namely state-owned banks and non state-owned banks. 
The equity capital ratio is calculated by the ratio of total equity to total assets. 
 
The Battese and Coelli (1995) model on inefficiency distribution: 
 
),( ~ 2uitit Niidu σµ
+ with 0≥itu  and                                        [5.12] 
 
 
The conditional mean conditional variance model on inefficiency distribution: 
 
),( ~ 2uitit Niidu σµ
+ with 0≥itu  and                    
           [5.13] 
 
5.4.4 Methodology development on SROE 
 
We develop a model of banking system activity that takes account of the equity capital 
requirements that must be met by banks and especially how increased capital requirements may 
impose additional costs on the efficient allocation of resources. The starting point is the 
definition of the production technology in terms of the input requirement set for a sample of 
multi-product firms producing R outputs from K inputs: 
 
( ) { }RK RRt time at   make cantI ++ ∈∈= yxyxxy, ,,:                            [5.14] 
 
We assume that this production technology has the properties of convexity, and weak 
                                                 
22
 Several other factors have been included in trial estimation, such as equity, loan loss provision, loan loss provision ratio, 
because of insignificance and lower likelihood ratio, we exclude them from presentation. 
ratioEquity dummy Ownershipassets Total 321 δδδαµ +++=it
ratioEquity dummy Ownershipassets Total 321 δδδαµ +++=it
ratioEquity dummy Ownershipassets Total 321
2 δδδασ +++=u
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disposability. It is the weak disposability assumption that is critical to our analysis. Formally 
this is represented as: 
 
( ) ( ) 1 allnot but  somefor  00 ≥∈⇒∈ ll t,It,I yxyx                            [5.15] 
 
If the efficient boundary of the input requirement set is represented by a transformation function:
( ) 0=t,F yx, then weak disposability implies that the first derivatives, kk xFF ∂∂≡ , 
rr yFF ∂∂≡ are not restricted in sign. This will permit the model to accommodate both positive 
and negative shadow prices in the dual cost function. The parametric frontier dual cost function 
that we will use is based on K  variable inputs: ( )Kx,,x 1=x  with input prices: 
( )Kw,,w 1=w and R outputs: ( )Ry,,y 1=y , and an additional input which may be a fixed 
input in the short run but is variable in the long run; for clarity, we symbolise this particular 
input as 0z ,with input price: 0w . The interpretation of this fixed input will be critical in the 
analysis of a banking industry sample since it captures the importance of the level of equity 
capital. Following the arguments in Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001), we write the long run 
cost function, with all inputs including 0z treated as variable, in the form: 
 
( ) ( ){ }Izzwtwc
z
∈+′= yx,xwwy,
x
,:min,, 000,0 0
                           [5.16] 
 
The short run cost function on the other hand, with input 0z  treated as fixed, is: 
 
( ) ( ){ }Izzwzwtzc ∈+′=+ yx,xwwy,
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,:min,, 000000                      [5.17] 
 
The envelope theorem confirms that long run total cost defines the envelope of short run total 
cost: 
 
( ) ( ){ }0000 ,,min,,
0
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z
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Therefore the envelope theorem implies that for any slight deviation of the level of the fixed 
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input above or below the optimal level, ( )t,w,*z*z 00 wy,= , there will be no reduction in total 
cost and the long run total cost function is tangential to the short run total cost function: 
 
( ) ( ) 0000 *zwt,*z,ct,w,c += wy,wy,                           [5.19] 
 
Consequently, the following derivative result holds in the neighbourhood of the optimal level of 
the fixed input: 
 
( ) ( )[ ] 00000 0 wzt,*z,czt,w,c +∂∂==∂∂ wy,wy,                     [5.20] 
 
Rearranging this last result gives the critical interpretation of the shadow price of the fixed 
input: 
 
( )[ ] 000 wzt,*z,c =∂∂− wy,                                 [5.21] 
 
This form of the envelope theorem is particularly useful when, in addition to an input being 
fixed, there is no explicit information on its price. The negative of the derivative of the variable 
cost function with respect to this fixed input is the input’s shadow price. So far we have 
assumed that the short run constraint on the firm is to maintain a level of the fixed input; 
however the constraint may take the form of a pre-determined ratio of the input to one (or more) 
outputs: e.g. ( )[ ]mm y*zminyz 00 ≥ . The derivation of the cost function is unchanged 
irrespective of whether the constraint is written in terms of the level of the fixed input or in 
terms of the ratio to an output form, but in an econometric estimation there may be a different 
specification depending on whether, in moving to the long run equilibrium, the firms adjust the 
level of the fixed input or its ratio to one or more outputs. 
 
There are two implications that are particularly important in the analysis of banking systems, 
and these concern the measurement of the shadow price away from equilibrium and the 
measurement of returns to scale. The fixed input in our model of the banking system technology 
is the level of equity capital, held for both prudential and regulatory reasons. The analysis above 
confirms that close to equilibrium the negative of the derivative of short run total cost with 
respect to the level of equity capital is a measure of the shadow price of equity; when the cost 
function is expressed in log form we interpret the negative of the log derivative as the shadow 
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return on equity. Consequently, by including equity capital as a fixed input in the cost function 
we are able to examine several possible outcomes. Banks which are over-leveraged or reliant on 
debt and under-use equity capital can be expected to show a relatively high shadow return on 
equity (negative elasticity with a relatively high absolute value), while banks which are less 
leveraged are likely to show cost elasticity with respect to equity that is lower in absolute value. 
Banks which are far from long run cost minimising equilibrium, for example because they are 
undergoing major re-capitalization with current equity capital levels well above the long run 
equilibrium, i.e. ( )twzz ,,* 00 wy,> may be expected to show a very low possibly severely 
negative shadow return on equity in the recovery phase from financial crisis. Negative values of 
the shadow input price or return on the fixed input would arise if, for example, the firm was 
operating in the uneconomic region of the production function23.  
 
5.5 Variables selection and data collection 
 
No matter what kind of frontier analysis technique is used and no matter what kind of models or 
functions is adopted, obtaining accurate and reliable efficiency estimates heavily relies on the 
quality of data and variables used in the regression. In the following, we will discuss our 
variables selection and data collection.  
 
5.5.1 Issues on input and output variables 
 
‘Reliable’ efficiency estimation requires appropriate definitions regarding the measurement of 
input, output and input price variables. Therefore, to estimate efficiency, we should first 
determine what constitutes banks inputs and outputs. No general consensus exists concerning 
the precise definition of what banks produce or how one can measure banks’ products.  
 
In literature on the theory of banking, there are two main competing approaches to measure the 
                                                 
23
 The translog specification used in this paper was developed in order to allow operation in the uneconomic region of the 
technology, see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
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outputs provided by banks. One is the production approach and another is the intermediation 
approach. Other approaches such as dual approach and value-added method have been 
discussed by Berger (1997) and Lozano-Vivas (1997). 
Under the production approach, banks are treated as firms which employ capital and labor to 
produce services for both deposit and loan account holders. From this point, the output should 
be accounted as the amount of documents and transactions processed in a given period. 
Unfortunately, such transaction data is typically proprietary and inaccessible. Moreover, the 
production approach indicates only physical inputs are needed to perform transaction and 
process documents, so physical inputs such as labor and fixed assets should be included. And 
the total costs under this approach are expenses spent on labor and fixed assets, but interest 
expense is not included. 
 
Under the intermediation approach, banks are regarded as financial intermediaries between 
borrowers and depositors rather than producers of loan and deposit account services. Funds are 
essential to conduct financial intermediation function. Under this treatment,the value of loans 
and investments is the appropriate measure of bank output, while deposits and costs involving 
in the production process such as capital, labour should be measured as inputs. Consequently, 
the operating costs and interest expense are measured as the total costs. 
 
Until today, there is no agreement on the standard definition and measurement of banks’ inputs 
and outputs. As argued in Berger and Humphrey (1997), neither production approach nor 
intermediation approach successfully covers the dual roles of banks as: (i) performing 
transactions and processing documents for customers; (ii) intermediating funds between 
depositors and borrowers. Nevertheless, each of the approaches has some advantages. Berger 
and Humphrey (1997) pointed out that, although there is no ‘perfect approach’, the 
intermediation approach may be superior for evaluating the efficiency at the bank level as it 
reflects the nature of the bank, and what the bank really does, while the production approach is 
more appropriate for measuring at branch level as branches primarily perform transactions and 
process customer documents and branch managers typically have little influence over bank 
funding and investment decisions.  
 
As we aim to evaluate efficiency for entire banks, following many previous studies on banking 
efficiency we adopt the intermediation approach in this study. In addition, our database lacks 
the necessary data for implementation of the production approach, as outputs are measured 
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under this approach by the number of deposit and loan transactions processed over a given time 
period. 
 
Although the intermediation approach is adopted, different outputs and inputs are selected in 
banking literatures under the same approach. There is no disagreement on the loan been treated 
as output, but there is a longstanding controversy about whether deposits should be counted as 
output or input. As deposits have both input and output characteristics, classifying deposits as 
either input or output cannot fully captures the dual role of the deposits. Therefore, as argued by 
Berger and Humphrey (1997), the treatment of deposits in efficiency models can affect the 
efficiency estimates and thus deposits should be considered as both inputs and outputs, which is 
known as dual approach. 
 
Even though the dual approach can take into account both input and output characteristics for 
deposits, we classify deposits as input rather than output in our analysis due to both empirical 
and statistical reasons. Empirically, the Chinese banks treat deposits as the base and derivation 
of loans, and pay more attention to the input characteristics of deposits than the output ones. 
Moreover, from statistical point of view, although the dual approach is well explained in theory 
and applied in empirical studies, including deposits for both inputs and outputs does not satisfy 
the monotonicity condition ( Shen et al (2009)). Based on these facts, it is more appropriate to 
consider the deposits as input alone in our study. 
 
5.5.2 Specification of outputs and inputs prices 
 
After solving the deposits issue, we need to define the specific inputs and outputs elements. 
Within the intermediation approach, the exact set of inputs and outputs used in empirical studies 
depends largely on data availability and author’s choices. In our study, the variables are selected 
based on previous studies for consistency and the availability of data. And all data have been 
deflated to year 1997 price. 
 
There are three outputs included in the study, namely total loans, other earning assets and 
non-interest income. Bank loans are widely considered as the most important output for 
commercial banks which works as financial intermediaries that collect deposits from customers 
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and lend to investors. The total loans (y1) include short term loans, trade bills, discounted bills, 
medium and long term loans, and other loans. Except profits generated from bank loans 
(interests), bank also conduct several investments which can further contribute to bank profits. 
Therefore, in addition to bank total loans, other earning assets (y2) are included, such as short 
term and long term investment, deposits with central bank and other banks. To account for 
recent substantial growth in fee-based service and asset-backed securitisation, we also include 
non-interest income as proxy for off-balance sheet activities, although compared to banks in 
Western countries, Chinese banks are far less active in the off-balance sheet business. 
Non-interest income (y3) comes from fee, commission and other operating income. 
 
There are also three inputs included in our analysis, namely funds, labor, and capital. Funds (x1) 
are defined by the total deposits, which includes short term and long term deposits from both 
individual and corporate customers, and other short term and long term funding. Labour (x2) is 
specified as the registered full time employees in banks and physical capital (x3) is often termed 
as fixed assets, which provide the essential materials for bank operation. Correspondingly, the 
input prices are defined as follows.  
 
The price of fund (w1) is calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits. The price 
of labor (w2) is calculated as the ratio of personnel expenses to total number of employees. The 
price of fixed assets (w3) is measured by the ratio of other operating expenses to the fixed 
assets. 
 
The inputs and outputs variables are also defined in Table 5.3 below. Moreover, descriptive 
statistics for all variables used in this study are summarized in Table 5.4. As there is large 
deviation in our sample of banks, we group those descriptive statistics based on ownership 
difference, namely state-owned banks, joint equity banks and city commercial banks. 
 
Besides those three inputs and outputs, one additional variable is included to control for risk. In 
theory, comparison of bank’s performance should be conducted among banks with the same 
quality and riskiness. However, each bank is different in quality, and thus has different risk 
characteristics. These differences may not be captured by the input and output included in the 
model. Therefore, as suggested in Mester (1996) that ‘unless quality and risk are controlled for, 
one might easily miscalculate a bank’s level of inefficiency.’ Hughes and Mester (1993) also 
argued that the quality of a bank’s asset and the probability of a banks’ failure could influence a 
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bank’s cost in a variety of ways. Two variables are usually used for measuring risk among banks, 
one is non-performing loans, and another is equity capital. 
 
Table  5.3: Definitions of outputs, inputs, input prices and other variables 
 
Outputs  
y1 
Total loans: include short term loans, trade bills and bills discounted, medium 
and long term loans, other loans 
y2 
Other earning assets: short term and long term investment (securities & 
bond), deposits with central bank and other banks 
y3 Non-interest income: fee, commission and other operating income 
Inputs  
x1 Funds (total deposits) 
x2 Labour (personnel expense) 
x3 Capital ( fixed assets) 
Input prices  
w1 Price of fund: interest expense/total deposits 
w2 Price of labour: personnel expense/total number of employees 
w3 Price of capital: other operating expenses/fixed assets 
Total costs Sum of interest expenses, personnel expenses and other operating expenses 
Z0 Equity capital (fixed input) 
 
In empirical studies, the volume of non-performing loans (Hughes and Mester (1993) and 
Mester (1996)), nonperforming ratio (the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans) (Altunbaş 
et al. (2000) and Huang (2000)) and loan loss provision (Hasan and Marton (2003)) are used to 
control for asset quality. However, Berger and DeYoung (1997) suggest that whether it is 
appropriate to include nonperforming loans and loan loss provisions in estimating the bank’s 
cost function depends on the extent to which these variables are exogenous.  
 
Non-performing loans and loan loss provisions would be exogenous if caused by negative 
economic shocks or unpredicted events (“bad luck”), but they could also be endogenous, 
because of the poor management in managing and monitoring the loan portfolio and controlling 
for the operating expenses (“bad management”). As argued by Berger and DeYoung (1997), 
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‘under the bad luck hypothesis, loan quality is driven by external events, and as such efficiency 
measurement should control for nonperforming loans in cost and profit functions. Under the 
bad management hypothesis, however, loan quality is driven by internal events. As a result, 
controlling for nonperforming loans in cost and profit functions will artificially increase 
measured efficiency’. Therefore, this study will not employ nonperforming loans in the cost 
function for the reason that nonperforming loans in the Chinese banking system are generally 
considered endogenously due to poor risk management in assessing, screening and monitoring 
loans. 
 
Another control variable usually employed in efficiency measurement is equity capital. There 
are two reasons why equity capital should be taken into account. First of all, it may influence 
the probability of banks’ failure, known as insolvency risk. Equity capital acts as cushion, 
which can fully absorb the losses of nonperforming loans. Apart from concerns of risk, a bank’s 
capital level will directly affect interest costs by providing an alternative funding source of 
loans as a substitute for deposits or other funding sources. Moreover, we are particularly 
interested in the recapitalization which enhances the equity level in Chinese domestic banks. As 
a result, the level of equity capital is included in our model. 
 
5.5.3 Data collection and sample 
 
As discussed before, there are various types of deposit taking institutions in China. In this study, 
we only focus on three major types of domestic commercial banks, namely state-owned 
commercial banks, joint equity commercial banks and city commercial banks. Policy banks are 
excluded as they are responsible for government policy implementation such as loan issue to 
state-owned enterprises and subsidise certain industries. They hardly take deposit, and do not 
compete in the retail market. Foreign banks are also excluded, as they do not operate under the 
same market condition as domestic commercial banks. They are still subject to several 
regulatory controls during our examination period, even though the restrictions are reduced 
largely after the WTO. Moreover, we do not consider both rural and urban cooperatives, as they 
are too small, the information is not fully available and information credibility may be 
suspicious due to looser publication requirements.  
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The time span considered in this empirical study is from 1997 to 2006. The selected time period 
covers the latest round banking reform. This stage of banking reform is induced by the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 and intensified due to fulfill the WTO entry requirements in 2001. The 
reform continues to be strengthened by the going-public of the state-owned banks in 2005 and 
full openness of financial market in 2006. 
 
There are 371 observations in total with maximum 55 banks in 2006 and minimum 17 banks in 
1997. Although the sample data does not include all the Chinese commercial banks, our sample 
of banks show good representation of the whole banking market in China, as banks in the 
sample cover 95.2% assets, 93.7% deposits and 94.3% loans of the aggregate banking sector in 
China. Moreover, the number of banks included in this study exceeds sample size adopted in 
other empirical studies which focus on Chinese banks. The fact that our sample covers the 
majority of the banking market suggests that our empirical findings will present a major image 
of how efficiently the Chinese banking system has been operated. 
 
Annual data is mainly collected from Bankscope database which provides detailed financial 
information for banks all over the world. Whenever Bankscope does not provide enough 
information or has missing/questionable values, we carefully collect or double-check the data 
from other alternative data sources as best as we can, such as annual issues of Almanac of 
China’s Finance and Banking, 1997-2006; and China Statistical Yearbook, 1997-2006. We also 
use annual reports provided by individual banks via their official websites as complementary 
sources in tracing missing or unavailable data points. All financial variables are measured in the 
Chinese domestic currency Renminbi (RMB), and denoted in millions. Since all original data 
are collected on the nominal value, all the monetary values are deflated by using GDP deflators 
which are collected from the World Bank with the year 1997 as reference.  
 
All of the data in the fitted regressions are log-mean-corrected; i.e. expressed as deviations from 
the sample means after having been transformed to natural logarithms. This has three 
advantages: it ensures that the translog function which is an approximation to an arbitrary 
second order function has the point of approximation at the sample mean; it allows us to check 
the properties of the fitted translog function at the sample mean by examining the first order 
estimated coefficients; and it enables computation of the variance of linear functions of the 
estimated coefficients around the sample mean from the variance-covariance matrix of the 
regression coefficients.  
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Table  5.4: Summary of descriptive statistics for all variables 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
State-owned banks 
Total assets 40 3413023.00 1026720.00 1573947.00 6216693.00 
Total costs 40 131903.60 105155.40 81314.65 758195.00 
Total loans 40 1912308.00 533463.80 1014225.00 2925586.00 
Other earning assets 40 1353113.00 579835.70 476685.00 3137090.00 
Non-interest income 40 10730.21 7621.36 2048.77 36185.93 
Total deposits 40 3061104.00 980742.00 1430983.00 5541498.00 
Interest expense 40 84282.09 107718.60 37165.60 728672.00 
Personnel expense 40 15640.16 6618.27 5238.90 29097.92 
Other operating expense 40 25622.27 10450.20 9519.31 53326.46 
Fixed assets 40 60049.80 13850.45 29049.00 95928.40 
Joint equity banks 
Total assets 110 296909.90 252209.20 18380.00 1423465.00 
Total costs 110 9221.48 7359.27 672.00 40248.16 
Total loans 110 168407.90 143664.20 5106.00 753593.10 
Other earning assets 110 117540.10 103723.20 12226.00 631659.80 
Non-interest income 110 1133.68 1533.79 27.00 12039.00 
Total deposits 110 256743.00 224394.10 15939.00 1274425.00 
Interest expense 110 4933.71 3749.72 485.00 20480.88 
Personnel expense 110 1222.40 1148.42 64.75 6118.60 
Other operating expense 110 2256.89 1962.52 122.25 9789.60 
Fixed assets 110 3924.40 3951.52 356.00 21759.08 
City commercial banks 
Total assets 221 38357.66 43068.58 2516.00 225976.00 
Total costs 221 1253.71 1194.56 94.09 5781.67 
Total loans 221 18685.06 20653.76 1175.00 103916.90 
Other earning assets 221 17599.23 21808.75 1138.00 117330.50 
Non-interest income 221 162.59 192.86 0.85 1071.08 
Total deposits 221 32904.09 39567.69 2142.00 204418.10 
Interest expense 221 703.84 715.22 42.04 3819.96 
Personnel expense 221 188.26 163.10 20.82 985.14 
Other operating expense 221 352.63 288.17 26.56 1635.82 
Fixed assets 221 536.69 447.93 71.07 2318.47 
*All variables are measured in the Chinese domestic currency RMB, and denoted in millions, at 
constant prices. 
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5.6 Empirical results 
 
This section presents the main results of the analysis undertaken. The results are analysed in 
detail in the following subsections, the first of which presents results concerning regression 
estimation, such as estimated coefficients, elasticites and scale economies. The next subsection 
discusses efficiency scores for whole sample and sub-samples based on ownership difference. 
The third subsection explains the robustness tests. 
 
5.6.1 Estimation results 
 
5.6.1.1 Estimated coefficients 
 
Table 5.5 and 5.6 below presents the parameter estimates for panel data models and pooled data 
models respectively. On the whole, the statistics such as R-square, F-statistic and Likelihood 
ratio show goodness of fit for our regressions. And the signs of the major estimated parameters 
are consistent with our expectation and generally in line with other studies and the theory. 
 
The estimated parameters for all three outputs are positive at the sample mean. The coefficient 
estimates of the total loan (Y1) and other earning assets (Y2) are highly significant at 1% level. 
While the coefficient estimate of non-interest income (Y3) is statistically insignificant. This can 
be explained by the fact that the traditional business still dominate in the Chinese banking sector, 
which account for about 55% of the total banking costs. However, the amount of fee-based 
activities is quite trivial; even though there is substantial growth in recent years. The sum of the 
parameters on the three outputs is less than one, indicating increasing returns to scale at the 
sample mean. Moreover, the parameters on the interaction term for Y1Y2 and Y2Y3 are 
negative indicate that there might be some scope economies in the joint production of loans 
with other earning assets, and other earning assets with off-balance sheet activities, despite they 
are statistically insignificant. 
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Table  5.5: Estimated parameter coefficients for panel data models 
 
 Time invariant Time varying 
 GLS MLE 
 FE RE P&L B&C 92 
Parameters Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
Y1 0.515*** 16.760 0.590*** 19.230 0.593*** 20.140 0.589*** 24.130 
Y2 0.124*** 4.490 0.207*** 7.630 0.208*** 8.060 0.202*** 8.340 
Y3 0.010 0.880 0.021 1.770 0.018 1.580 0.020 1.940 
W2 0.281*** 12.460 0.260*** 11.660 0.251*** 11.000 0.223*** 10.770 
W3 0.106*** 5.310 0.101*** 4.880 0.105*** 5.200 0.116*** 6.830 
Y11 0.002 0.040 -0.009 -0.210 -0.011 -0.260 -0.022 -0.580 
Y22 0.092** 2.200 0.095** 2.120 0.092** 2.150 0.064** 2.020 
Y33 0.012* 1.840 0.013* 1.890 0.012* 1.820 0.010* 1.840 
Y1Y2 -0.061 -0.870 -0.054 -0.710 -0.044 -0.600 -0.002 -0.040 
Y1Y3 0.029 1.250 0.059*** 2.450 0.059*** 2.540 0.061*** 2.920 
Y2Y3 -0.026 -1.070 -0.029 -1.160 -0.028 -1.140 -0.030 -1.310 
W22 -0.003 -0.190 -0.026* -1.740 -0.026* -1.840 -0.022* -1.740 
W33 0.022 1.040 0.005 0.230 0.007 0.310 0.013 0.660 
W2W3 0.035 1.250 0.062*** 2.110 0.059*** 2.080 0.018 0.720 
Y1W2 0.025 0.780 -0.014 -0.420 -0.024 -0.760 -0.043 -1.540 
Y1W3 0.068** 1.970 0.079** 1.980 0.084*** 2.070 0.090*** 2.440 
Y2W2 -0.054* -1.820 -0.030 -0.950 -0.027 -0.880 -0.031 -1.090 
Y2W3 0.001 0.030 0.000 -0.010 -0.001 -0.030 -0.007 -0.170 
Y3W2 -0.001 -0.110 0.003 0.220 0.005 0.410 0.012 1.060 
Y3W3 -0.010 -0.620 -0.016 -0.910 -0.018 -1.090 -0.016 -1.110 
T -0.011 -1.480 -0.029*** -5.380 -0.028*** -5.070 -0.049*** -5.130 
TSQ 0.003*** 2.040 0.005*** 2.950 0.005*** 3.020 0.004*** 2.080 
Y1T -0.022*** -2.340 -0.031*** -3.150 -0.032*** -3.310 -0.031*** -3.540 
Y2T -0.012 -1.300 -0.008 -0.770 -0.008 -0.880 0.003 0.390 
Y3T 0.002 0.710 0.003 0.920 0.003 0.900 -0.001 -0.240 
W2T -0.004 -0.770 -0.010*** -2.080 -0.010*** -2.200 -0.011*** -2.140 
W3T -0.009 -1.510 -0.005 -0.800 -0.005 -0.740 -0.003 -0.530 
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Z0 0.016 0.740 0.063*** 2.940 0.063*** 3.040 0.035** 1.980 
Z00 0.004 1.210 0.011*** 2.880 0.011*** 3.100 0.009*** 2.630 
Y1Z0 0.106*** 2.610 0.108*** 2.500 0.110*** 2.650 0.107*** 2.780 
Y2Z0 -0.115*** -2.570 -0.121*** -2.510 -0.125*** -2.700 -0.116*** -2.740 
Y3Z0 -0.032 -1.610 -0.046*** -2.180 -0.045*** -2.220 -0.042*** -2.250 
W2Z0 0.039 1.670 0.037 1.520 0.040 1.700 0.036 1.650 
W3Z0 -0.066*** -2.150 -0.069*** -2.110 -0.069*** -2.200 -0.057*** -2.000 
Z0T 0.024*** 3.440 0.030*** 4.180 0.031*** 4.480 0.029*** 4.630 
constant -0.089*** -2.270 -0.174*** -3.700 0.210*** 2.770 0.109*** 2.280 
         
R square 0.967  0.989      
Sigma u 0.598  0.222  0.064  0.156  
Sigma v 0.096  0.096  0.010  0.008  
gamma 0.947  0.841  0.865  0.950  
eta       0.138*** 7.610 
LLR     236.778  263.324  
All variables are in log terms. 
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% significance level respectively. 
 
The estimated parameters on price of labour (W2) and price of capital (W3) are both positive at 
the sample mean and highly significant at 1% level. Moreover, we observe that coefficient 
estimate of time trend (T) is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that Chinese banks 
experienced technical change over the sample period, which shift down the cost frontier. 
Furthermore, the significant positive parameter of equity (Z0) indicates that holding equity 
capital is costly for Chinese banks. The elasticity of cost with respect to equity can also be 
interpreted as negative of the shadow return on equity (see Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001)). 
The positive coefficient indicates that the shadow return on equity is negative at the sample 
mean. This negative shadow return on equity result (permitted using the assumption of weak 
disposability of the production technology) implies that at the sample mean the Chinese banks 
were showing relatively high level of capitalization. This was likely to be a response to the 
recent banking reform and to indicate the recapitalization carried out in preparation for the entry 
to WTO. The derivation of the property of negative shadow return under recapitalization is 
demonstrated in Fethi et al (2011). This will be discussed in more detail later. 
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The estimate for gamma indicates that about 90% of the total error’s variance is accounted for 
by cost inefficiency rather than by the random error, providing compelling evidence that the 
estimation of the cost function as a frontier is appropriate. In addition, the estimate for eta is 
found to be statistically significant, which suggest that time varying models might be more 
suitable. 
 
Except those results discussed above, the estimation results from B&C 95 and CMCV model 
presented in Table 5.6 provide additional information. Highly significant estimated coefficients 
on three environmental variables show that size, ownership and equity capital ratio affect both 
mean and variance of inefficiency term.  
 
Table  5.6: Estimated parameter coefficients for pooled data models 
 
 Time varying 
 B&C 95 C MCV 
Parameters Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio 
Y1 0.466*** 11.620 0.513*** 9.970 
Y2 0.130*** 3.840 0.184*** 3.400 
Y3 0.004 0.310 0.014 0.700 
W2 0.162*** 7.950 0.162*** 5.660 
W3 0.135*** 6.620 0.156*** 4.700 
Y11 0.010 0.200 -0.061 -0.840 
Y22 0.060** 1.970 0.121*** 2.660 
Y33 0.003 0.330 0.001 0.110 
Y1Y2 0.060 0.650 -0.074 -0.670 
Y1Y3 -0.004 -0.130 -0.022 0.580 
Y2Y3 0.015 0.530 0.027 0.810 
W22 -0.036*** -2.480 -0.017 -0.920 
W33 0.003 0.130 0.036 1.210 
W2W3 0.039 1.210 0.008 0.200 
Y1W2 -0.045 -1.090 0.008 0.150 
Y1W3 -0.027 -0.500 0.056 0.740 
Y2W2 0.060 1.610 0.081 1.600 
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Y2W3 -0.034 -0.660 -0.141** -1.990 
Y3W2 0.009 0.600 -0.012 -0.660 
Y3W3 -0.009 -0.450 0.019 0.760 
T -0.022*** -4.460 -0.011*** -2.460 
TSQ -0.001 -0.390 -0.005*** -2.850 
Y1T -0.014 -1.140 0.008 0.580 
Y2T -0.001 -0.060 0.023* 1.920 
Y3T -0.001 -0.350 -0.003 -0.600 
W2T -0.015*** -2.560 -0.012* -1.720 
W3T 0.013* 1.880 0.010 1.140 
Z0 0.486*** 8.940 0.274*** 7.350 
Z00 0.021*** 3.710 0.008 1.130 
Y1Z0 0.036 0.580 0.215*** 2.150 
Y2Z0 -0.201*** -3.030 -0.222*** -2.090 
Y3Z0 -0.004 -0.140 -0.028 -0.690 
W2Z0 -0.055 -1.390 -0.121*** -2.410 
W3Z0 0.067 1.440 0.073 1.080 
Z0T 0.026*** 2.590 -0.014 -1.040 
Constant -0.294*** -6.880 -0.127*** -3.720 
     
TA -0.222*** -7.060 -0.215*** -2.400 
DS -0.439** -1.980 2.215*** 2.150 
ER -20.703*** -8.510 -64.684*** -35.480 
Constant 1.002*** 9.910   
     
TA   -0.876*** -3.530 
DS   5.880*** 4.210 
ER   -129.105*** -10.230 
LLR 169.610  75.037  
All variables are in log terms. 
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% significance level respectively. 
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5.6.1.2 Elasticities 
 
Next we access annual elasticity results for each output, input price, equity and time, which are 
illustrated in Table 5.7 below. Figures 5.2-5.9 also plot the trend of elasticity’s change over the 
sample period. As eta (see Table 5.5) suggests the time varying model is more appropriate, and 
all three time varying models give similar results. Here B&C 95 model is chosen to illustrate the 
results because it includes time varying inefficiency and is the most general specifications of 
the composed error model apart from the CMCV specification; however the CMCV 
specification has a lower value for the likelihood function. The elasticity can be obtained by 
differentiating the log of total costs with respect to the log of each output, input price, equity 
and time. In the following, we discuss each in turn. 
 
Table  5.7: Annual elasticity for outputs, input prices, equity and time 
 
Year ey1 ey2 ey3 ew1 ew2 ew3 ez0 et 
1997 0.916 0.141 0.015 0.601 0.322 0.077 -0.143 -0.059 
1998 0.851 0.142 0.008 0.613 0.302 0.085 -0.101 -0.056 
1999 0.794 0.145 0.017 0.629 0.272 0.099 -0.068 -0.059 
2000 0.731 0.165 0.014 0.638 0.249 0.113 -0.039 -0.058 
2001 0.675 0.181 0.028 0.660 0.223 0.117 -0.009 -0.058 
2002 0.627 0.206 0.028 0.660 0.208 0.132 0.006 -0.058 
2003 0.596 0.202 0.028 0.670 0.207 0.123 0.038 -0.049 
2004 0.519 0.235 0.032 0.674 0.183 0.143 0.075 -0.051 
2005 0.514 0.230 0.030 0.693 0.170 0.137 0.095 -0.042 
2006 0.512 0.217 0.027 0.717 0.153 0.130 0.121 -0.033 
Average 0.673 0.186 0.023 0.655 0.229 0.116 -0.002 -0.052 
 
The elasticity of outputs can be calculated as 
mit
it
m y
TCey
ln
ln
∂
∂
=  (m=1, 2, 3), which are shown in 
the first three columns of the Table 5.7 and Figure 5.2. As shown in the Table and in the Figure, 
there is a clear continuous decreasing trend for the elasticity of bank loans (ey1) throughout the 
ten years under study. While the elasticity for other earning assets (ey2) and non-interest 
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income (ey3) experience small increase over the sample period. 
 
Figure  5.2: Annual elasticity of outputs 
 
 
 
Figure  5.3: Marginal costs of outputs 
 
 
Note that elasticity above can help obtain bank marginal costs ))((
m
mm y
TCeyMC = for loans, 
other earning assets and non-interest income, which are plotted in the Figure 5.3 below. As we 
can see from the graph, there is continuous decrease in marginal cost for both loans and 
non-interest income, while marginal cost of other earning assets enjoy small increase. 
Decreasing marginal cost of loans and non-interest income suggest banks are becoming more 
efficient at providing loan services and off balance services as we would expect in an evolving 
successful banking system. The increasing marginal cost of other earning assets indicates that 
taking loan and government debt on to the balance sheet was becoming a more expensive 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
ey1
ey2
ey3
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
MC1
MC2
MC3
Chapter 5 
 185 
operation for the banks over the sample period. Despite the marginal cost of bank loan 
experiences dramatic drop over last ten years, it has been generally higher than that of other two 
outputs. This indicates that it is more resource consuming to provide an additional loan than it is 
to invest in securities and fee-based services, which should be related with the screening and 
monitoring costs involved in granting loans. However, the difference among three outputs has 
become small through time. 
 
The elasticity of input prices can be calculated by
jit
it
j w
TCew
ln
ln
∂
∂
= , (j=1, 2, 3) which are 
documented in the fourth, fifth and sixth column of the Table 5.7 and also plotted in the Figure 
5.4 below. Both table and figure show that the elasticity for price of labour (ew2) decrease over 
time, while the elasticity for price of loan (ew1) and fixed assets (ew3) presents an opposite 
trend. This may suggest that banks reduce their budget on employees but invest more in 
traditional business and fixed assets, such as buildings, offices and other facilities. This may 
coincide with the fact that the Chinese banks get redundancy in last decades but expand their 
branches and offices to increase their market shares on the ground of increasingly intensive 
competition. It also suggests that banks are becoming more capital intensive and less labour 
intensive over time. 
 
Figure  5.4: Annual elasticity of input prices 
 
 
The elasticity of equity capital can be computed by 
it
it
z
TCez
0
0 ∂
∂
= , which are listed in the 
seventh column of the Table 5.7 and plotted in Figure 5.5.  
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Figure  5.5: Annual elasticity of equity capital 
 
 
 
The elasticity of equity capital (ez0) allows us to evaluate the shadow return on equity (SROE) 
which is calculated from the negative of the elasticity of a bank’s total cost with respect to the 
level of equity capital derived in section (derived in section 5.4.4), 
it
it
z
TCSROE
0∂
∂
−= . The 
result is presented in Figure 5.6. The SROE provides a measure of how much banks are willing 
to pay for the equity, since it indicates the amount that bank would save in other costs as a result 
of an increase in the level of equity. 
 
Figure  5.6: Annual shadow return on equity 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 5.6, there is a clear decreasing trend for the shadow price of equity capital. 
It is interesting to identify that the sign of SROE is positive for the first half of sample period, 
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but becoming negative since 2002 after the WTO entry. The change of sign can be explained by 
increase in capital ratio in the Chinese banks under the WTO requirement which requires 
domestic banks to fulfill Basel II. To achieve the target, on the one hand, the state directly 
injected equity capital to recapitalize domestic banks; on the other hand, the central bank placed 
quotas on the amount of loans a bank can issue, which act as an indirect way of increasing 
capital ratio as assets has been reduced.  
 
Fethi et al (2010), in applying a similar model to the massive recapitalization of the banking 
industry in Turkey in the period following that country’s financial crisis of 2001, discovered 
that the recapitalization was associated with the shadow return on equity turning negative. 
There seems to be as clear policy lesson here: massive recapitalization, for example as 
practiced in China in preparation for WTO entry, has a short run impact of reducing the 
shadow return on equity and may possibly cause it to turn negative; this is consistent with the 
banking firms being required to hold levels of equity input well above the long run 
equilibrium level so that they are effectively operating during the adjustment period in an 
uneconomic region of the production function. This finding has implications for many 
transition economies and even developed economies in the aftermath of banking crisis.  
 
In short, recapitalization process imposes short run adjustment cost which makes the shadow 
return on equity turn to negative. This suggests policy makers must be aware that gains in 
efficiency improvement may be offset by the recapitalization costs. 
 
Moreover, by comparing the shadow return on equity between two sub-groups based on 
ownership difference, we find out that on average the state owned banks tend to have a higher 
shadow cost of equity than non state-owned banks, which is shown in Figure 5.7. This suggests 
that the state-owned banks are relatively under capitalized and more leveraged, which reflects 
the need for government direct injections of capital. 
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Figure  5.7: Annual shadow return on equity for two ownership groups 
 
 
 
The elasticity of time can be obtained by 
t
TCet it
∂
∂
= , which are tabulated in the last column of 
the Table 5.7 and also plotted in the Figure 5.8 below. The value calculated from equation above 
can be interpreted as the technological progress, which can shift the cost frontier down by 
adoption more efficient production techniques. The negative sign of the elasticity of time 
indicates there is technological progress for Chinese banks under the period we considered, 
which shift the cost frontier down by 5.2% per year on average.  
 
Figure  5.8: Annual elasticity of time 
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5.6.1.3 Scale economies 
 
This subsection assesses the presence of scale economies which has been the subject of 
extensive discussion in the early efficiency literature. Identification of scale economies has 
many empirical implications. For example, the existence of scale economies is usually 
considered as powerful supporting evidence for merger and acquisition by bank managers; it 
also allows inference on market structure and competition. The measure of scale economies can 
be classified into short run measure and long run measure.  
 
The difference between those two measures is that the short run measure assumes the level of 
equity is held fixed, while the long run measure allows for the level of capital to change in 
response to changes in output. The short run measure implies that any increase in output must 
be totally financed by interest bearing debt, so that the cost of debt is forced to increase more 
than would be realistic. Furthermore, since the definition of total costs employed here does not 
include the cost of equity, the measure of short run scale economies is likely to overestimate the 
true scale parameter. Alternatively, Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001) derive a measure of scale 
economies assuming that the observed level of equity capital minimizes economic cost at the 
shadow price of equity, usually known as long run scale economies. 
 
The short run scale economies is typically obtained by 
1
3
1
)
ln
ln
( −
=
∑ ∂
∂
=
j jit
it
it y
TCSE
                                               [5.22]
 
 
The long run scale economies can be calculated as 
∑∑
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z
TCSE
                                 [5.23]
 
 
If the SE is smaller (larger) than one, it indicates the presence of scale economies 
(diseconomies). The first column of Table 5.8 below shows short run yearly scale economies, 
the average scale economies is 1.291, suggesting diseconomies of scale in the Chinese banking 
industry during the period under examination. This implies that all else being equal, an increase 
in banks size leads a more than proportional increase in costs. The second column of the Table 
Chapter 5 
 190 
5.8 lists long run annual scale economies, which is consistent with the result from the short run 
equation, also suggesting that Chinese banks experience diseconomies of scale. For the first 
half of our sample period, both short run and long run scale economies provide similar figures. 
However, for the second half of the sample period, as we expected, the long run scale 
economies are lower than that from short run calculation which overestimate the scale 
economies. On average, the short run scale economies report 1.291, while the long run scale 
economies state 1.246. 
 
Figure  5.9: Long run and short run scale economies 
 
 
 
Table  5.8: Long run and short run scale economies 
 
Year Short run SE Long run SE 
1997 1.044 1.059 
1998 1.128 1.126 
1999 1.168 1.191 
2000 1.265 1.268 
2001 1.268 1.269 
2002 1.280 1.247 
2003 1.331 1.257 
2004 1.467 1.313 
2005 1.479 1.291 
2006 1.487 1.262 
Average 1.291 1.246 
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5.6.2 Efficiency scores 
 
This section will discuss aggregate cost efficiency scores across the whole sample first, and 
then look at annual efficiency change for full sample. After that, annual efficiency scores for 
sub-samples based on ownership difference will be considered next. Lastly, we will look at 
robustness test. 
 
5.6.2.1 Overall cost efficiency for full sample 
 
Table 5.9 below presents overall cost efficiency of the Chinese banks between 1997 and 2006 
for each individual model we employed. The aggregate estimates for cost efficiency are 
different under various models. The fixed effect (FE) model reports the lowest cost efficiency 
with the highest standard errors among all models, this might be due to the fact that the FE 
model is very sensitive to outliers (Sickles, 2005). The evidence from the FE model suggests 
that Chinese banks could save costs up to 70% if they operate on the cost frontier. There is a 
considerable difference in efficiency scores obtained with the fixed effect (FE) model and the 
random effect (RE) model. More specifically, the level of cost efficiency estimated by the 
random effect model is as twice as that produced by the fixed effect model, which is 68.6% and 
32.9% respectively. As we expected, the fixed effect model reports lower efficiency scores than 
that from the random effect model.  Moreover, the random effect model produces lower 
standard errors than the fixed effect models. Furthermore, both RE and P&L model estimated 
under different methods report similar level of cost efficiency, approximately 70%, which 
suggest domestic banks in China waste 30% costs. But the P&L model gives lower standard 
errors.  
 
Those three models discussed above are time invariant. In the following we will discuss three 
time varying models. Generally speaking, the time varying models report 10%-20% higher 
efficiency scores with lower standard errors than that from the time invariant models. As 
reported in Table 5.5 above, eta the parameter for the change in cost efficiency through time are 
found to be statistically significant, which suggests that efficiency change across time. So the 
time varying models might be more appropriate for our sample.   
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Table  5.9: Aggregate efficiency scores from full sample 
 
Models Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
FE 0.329 0.169 0.067 1.000 
RE 0.686 0.129 0.304 1.000 
P&L 0.714 0.125 0.315 0.967 
B&C 92 0.852 0.113 0.459 0.987 
B&C 95 0.871 0.105 0.465 0.988 
CMCV 0.908 0.087 0.427 1.000 
 
The B&C 92 model which specifies inefficiency is a function of time alone produces roughly 
similar levels of cost efficiency to the B&C 95 model which specifies the mean of inefficiency 
is a function of a set of environmental variables (here are total assets, ownership dummy and 
equity capital ratio). Both of them report that the Chinese banks are about 86% cost efficient. 
But the B&C 95 model reports lower standard errors than the B&C 92 model.  
 
The conditional mean conditional variance (CMCV) model improves the B&C 95 model by 
specifying a set of environmental variables which not only affect the mean of inefficiency, but 
also influence the variance of inefficiency. It reports the highest level of cost efficiency with the 
lowest standard errors among all models. The level of cost efficiency obtained by the CMCV 
model lies just above 90%, suggesting that the Chinese banks could theoretically have produced 
the same output while incurring only 90% of their actual costs.  
 
5.6.2.2 Annual cost efficiency for full sample 
 
After discussing the aggregate cost efficiency, now we would like to consider annual efficiency 
scores across the sample, which enable us to identify the trend of efficiency changes over the 
time. Table 5.10 below presents annual efficiency scores under various models, and Figure 5.10 
depicts the trend line of those efficiency levels against time.  
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Table  5.10: Annual efficiency scores from full sample 
 
Year FE RE P&L B&C92 B&C95 CMCV 
1997 0.196 0.752 0.777 0.764 0.893 0.952 
1998 0.228 0.727 0.754 0.768 0.883 0.950 
1999 0.249 0.718 0.746 0.772 0.851 0.938 
2000 0.277 0.704 0.732 0.775 0.805 0.920 
2001 0.295 0.692 0.721 0.773 0.780 0.910 
2002 0.332 0.685 0.714 0.784 0.722 0.873 
2003 0.350 0.684 0.714 0.787 0.727 0.890 
2004 0.377 0.667 0.695 0.791 0.705 0.889 
2005 0.376 0.668 0.697 0.806 0.730 0.906 
2006 0.382 0.661 0.689 0.821 0.813 0.935 
 
Six models show different trend of changes in efficiency levels. As we can see from the Figure 
5.10, the FE model and B&C 92 model clearly show a continuous increase in cost efficiency 
through the sample period. However, the RE and P&L shows an opposite trend. The B&C 95 
model and CMCV model illustrate there is a continuous decrease in efficiency level from the 
beginning of sample period to the year of 2004, but cost efficiency start to rise since 2005. 
 
Although six models show inconsistent trend of efficiency changes across the time, there are 
two main reasons for us to believe the B&C 95 and CMCV model give more reliable efficiency 
level and trend. One is from statistical aspect, significant eta suggests that the time-varying 
models are more appropriate. But the structure specified by the B&C 92 model artificially 
imposes the trend on efficiency change, either always increase or always decrease. Thus the 
trend obtained by the B&C 95 model and CMCV are more close to the true efficiency changes 
for our sample of banks. In addition, the B&C95 and CMCV models have lower standard errors. 
This suggests that there is small deviation in efficiency among our sample of banks. Another is 
from empirical aspect, the trend shown by the B&C 95 model and the CMCV model is 
consistent with the fact that the Chinese banks suffer decrease in their cost efficiency because of 
the impact of the Asian financial crisis in our early sample period and massive nonperforming 
loans write-off after the WTO entry in 2002. Since the recapitalization and liberalization, 
commercial banks in China experience increase in their cost efficiency, which can be explained 
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by better capital structure, better asset quality and better management from introduction of 
foreign strategic investors. 
 
Figure  5.10: Annual efficiency scores from full sample 
 
 
 
5.6.2.3 Overall cost efficiency by ownership  
 
After looking at the efficiency for our sample of banks as a whole, now we consider the level as 
well as the changes of efficiency for three sub-groups of banks based on ownership difference, 
namely state-owned banks, joint equity banks and city commercial banks. As indicated above, 
eta the parameter for the change in cost efficiency through time are found to be statistically 
significant, so in the following we mainly focus on results from the time varying models, 
namely B&C 92, B&C 95 and CMCV model.The annual mean efficiencies for each sub-group 
are presented in Table 5.11 below, and Figures 5.11-5.13 describe the yearly movement under 
each model 
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Table  5.11: Annual efficiency scores from sub samples 
 
 B&C 92 B&C 95 CMCV 
 S J C S J C S J C 
1997 0.847 0.768 0.619 0.907 0.852 0.701 0.869 0.961 0.949 
1998 0.864 0.794 0.626 0.937 0.820 0.662 0.880 0.953 0.943 
1999 0.880 0.817 0.635 0.948 0.813 0.656 0.897 0.930 0.939 
2000 0.894 0.838 0.639 0.938 0.791 0.615 0.856 0.914 0.915 
2001 0.907 0.857 0.675 0.945 0.811 0.625 0.880 0.914 0.895 
2002 0.918 0.874 0.701 0.928 0.841 0.640 0.843 0.925 0.853 
2003 0.928 0.889 0.728 0.932 0.859 0.661 0.841 0.933 0.880 
2004 0.937 0.902 0.739 0.918 0.869 0.687 0.856 0.933 0.887 
2005 0.944 0.914 0.761 0.938 0.875 0.785 0.900 0.935 0.904 
2006 0.951 0.925 0.775 0.954 0.881 0.827 0.941 0.940 0.935 
Average 0.907 0.846 0.735 0.935 0.866 0.753 0.897 0.943 0.911 
*S: state-owned banks, J: joint-equity banks, C: city commercial banks 
 
With respect to the level of efficiency, the results derived from the B&C 92 and B&C 95 models 
achieve a consensus that the state-owned banks are the most efficient from cost perspective, and 
the city commercial banks are the least efficient. The efficiency levels shown in the Figure 5.11 
and 5.12 also clearly demonstrate that the trend line of the state-owned banks always stand at 
the top and the city commercial banks always locate at the bottom over the entire ten-year 
period. However, it is interesting to notice that the CMCV model suggests a different ranking. It 
indicates that the joint equity banks are the most cost efficient banks; while the state-owned 
banks are the least efficient ones. This finding is consistent with Fu and Heffernan (2007), 
Kumbhakar and Wang (2005), Berger et al (2009) and Shen et al (2009).  
 
In the case of the change of efficiency level, although yearly movement represented in the 
Figures 5.11-5.13 appear to be different, they actually show the same trend as a whole. The 
overall trend is increasing in cost efficiency for three types of banks. Furthermore, not only all 
three types of banks improve their efficiencies, the difference in efficiency levels among them 
is finally reduced at the end of our sample period, especially the state-owned banks and joint 
equity banks achieve at a similar level of efficiency in the end.  
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Figure  5.11: Annual efficiency scores from sub samples (B&C 92) 
 
 
 
Figure  5.12: Annual efficiency scores from sub samples (B&C 95) 
 
 
 
Figure  5.13: Annual efficiency scores from sub samples (CMCV) 
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5.6.3 Robustness tests 
 
5.6.3.1 Rank Correlation 
 
As different estimation approaches generate different efficiency estimates, the choice of models 
may affect the regulatory policy and manager’s decision that are drawn from the result analyses. 
Therefore, it is more important to consider the efficiency rankings rather than efficiency levels, 
when we compare the results from different models. In other words, those efficiency estimates 
derived from the different approaches should be consistent with each other in identifying the 
best and worst practice. If various models rank institutions in similar order, then decision 
makers such as regulators, managers, investors are more confident about the robustness of the 
result and could draw reliable conclusions for the best-practice and the worst-practice and thus 
design their policies accordingly. For evaluating ranking consistency for our results, we carry 
out both Spearman’s and Pearson’s correlation tests. 
 
Table 5.12-5.13 below contain the Spearman’s and Pearson’s correlation coefficients showing 
how close the rankings of banks are among each model. In general, all of these correlation 
coefficients from both Spearman and Pearson test are positive and statistically significant at 5% 
level, even though the strength of correlation is different between different methods. As both 
Spearman and Pearson test generate similar size of correlation coefficients, in the following, we 
take correlation coefficients from the Spearman test as an example for explanation purpose.  
 
It would be expected that the rankings between same types of models (i.e. time invariant and 
time varying) would be fairly high. Indeed, the rank order correlations among three time 
invariant models namely FE, RE and P&L model are quite strong. The correlation coefficient 
between FE and RE is 0.785, and the same level of correlation between FE and P&L. A 
substantial higher level of correlation (0.991) is found out between the RE and P&L.  
 
A comparatively weak correlation is observed among three time varying models, namely the 
B&C 92, the B&C 95 and the CMCV model. We observe that B&C 92 has relatively low 
correlation with another two time-varying models. But we find out high correlation between the 
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B&C 95 and CMCV model. Although B&C 95 and CMCV model suggest different ranking 
based on ownership in section 5.6.2.3, this is not necessary to be inconsistent with high 
correlation between those two models. The ranking for ownership is based on group of banks, 
while the ranking test here is based on individual bank. 
 
Table  5.12: Spearman’s correlation coefficients 
 
 FE RE P&L B&C 92 B&C 95 C M-V 
FE 1.000*      
RE 0.785* 1.000*     
P&L 0.784* 0.991* 1.000*    
B&C 92 0.764* 0.843* 0.871* 1.000*   
B&C 95 0.402* 0.570* 0.574* 0.549* 1.000*  
CMCV 0.377* 0.361* 0.395* 0.478* 0.735* 1.000* 
*indicates significant at 5% significance level. 
 
 
Table  5.13: Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
 
 FE RE P&L B&C 92 B&C 95 C M-V 
FE 1.000*      
RE 0.779* 1.000*     
P&L 0.767* 0.997* 1.000*    
B&C 92 0.721* 0.876* 0.885* 1.000*   
B&C 95 0.488* 0.478* 0.460* 0.456* 1.000*  
CMVV 0.386* 0.402* 0.475* 0.497* 0.783* 1.000* 
*indicates significant at 5% significance level. 
 
All in all, the correlation tests show that our results under different models are generally 
consistent with each other by ranking the efficiency level, especially within the same model 
group. This implies that although the levels of cost efficiency estimates under different frontier 
models are quite different across banks, it is still possible that these methods will generate 
similar rankings for banks by their efficiency scores across frontier methods. As discussed 
Chapter 5 
 199 
above, identifying the rough ordering of which financial institutions are more efficient than 
others is usually more important for policy decision making than measuring the level of 
efficiency itself. 
 
5.6.3.2 Monotonicity and concavity tests 
 
As discussed in Section 5.4.2, properties of the translog cost function need to be satisfied to 
ensure that cost efficiency estimates are reliable. For this reason, we carry out monotonicity and 
concavity tests. Here, we show the test results from the B&C 95 model as illustration. These test 
results are reported in Table 5.14, with all the required properties checked at the sample mean 
and across the whole sample.  
 
As we can see from the table, monotonicity conditions are strongly satisfied at the sample mean, 
where the elasticities of outputs and input prices are statistically significantly higher than zero, 
suggesting that the cost function is non-decreasing in y and w. In addition, they are satisfied at 
the majority of the sample points.  
 
Concavity condition is satisfied at the sample mean and across 95.5 percent of the sample 
points, since the Hessian matrix with respect to the input prices is negative semi-definite. The 
satisfaction of both monotonicity and concavity properties indicates that our fitted model is a 
true cost function and that cost efficiency estimates are reliable.  
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Table  5.14: Properties (monotonicity and concavity) of the fitted cost function at the 
sample mean and across the whole sample 
 
Monotonicity  Elasticity Parameters 
Standard 
error 
% of sample points with cost 
increasing in outputs and 
input prices 
at the sample 
mean 
ey1 0.589 0.038 99.2 
at the sample 
mean 
ey2 0.202 0.016 99.7 
at the sample 
mean 
ey3 0.021 0.012 88.4 
at the sample 
mean 
ew2 0.223 0.041 99.2 
at the sample 
mean 
ew3 0.117 0.027 100 
     
Concavity 
Objective 
function 
Principle 
minors 
Values 
% of sample where H(w) is 
negative definite 
at the sample 
mean 
H(w) First order 
-0.208 
-0.196 
95.2 
  Second order -0.075 94.1 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
Over the past several decades, substantial research efforts have gone into measuring the 
efficiency of financial institutions, particularly commercial banks in a small number of 
developed countries, especially heavily concentrated on the US and Western Europe. Recently, 
although there is an increasing number of works examining bank efficiency in developing 
countries, China, one of the fast growing economies, is still left behind. 
 
China has experienced significant banking sector reform over the last ten-years. Especially 
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since the WTO accession in 2001, the pace and strength of banking reform has been intensified, 
which mainly focus on the recapitalization and liberalization. The recent banking reform 
greatly enhances the competition and thus we believe that it may have some potential impacts 
on bank efficiency. The main objective of this chapter is to fill in these gaps and contribute the 
latest evidence in the literature to evaluate the level of efficiency and its changes. 
 
This chapter using the latest banking data attempts to investigate the efficiency level from cost 
perspective in the Chinese commercial banking market during the period from 1997 to 2006. In 
our study, we employ six models under the stochastic frontier approach to ensure the robustness 
of our results, namely, the fixed effect model, random effect model, Pit and Lee model, Battese 
and Coelli 1992, Battese and Coelli 1995, and conditional mean conditional variance model. 
 
We first assess the level of efficiency and its changes for our sample of banks as a whole over 
the entire ten-year period.The fixed effect model reports the lowest efficiency level (33%) with 
the highest standard errors, while the conditional mean conditional variance model generates 
the highest efficiency levels (90%) with the smallest deviations. The other four models report 
the overall mean cost efficiency for Chinese commercial banks around 70%-80% indicating 
that banks in the sample on average could reduce their costs up to 30%-20% by comparing their 
performance with the best-practice bank in the sample. In the case of the variation of efficiency 
level for the sample as a whole, although there are some fluctuations during the sample period, 
the cost efficiency finally improved in the end compared to its initial level. 
 
Moreover, we examine the efficiency based on ownership difference. It is interesting to find 
that apart from the conditional mean conditional variance model, all the models achieve a 
consensus that the state-owned banks exhibit the highest cost efficiency, while the city 
commercial banks report the lowest level of efficiency. However, the conditional mean 
conditional variance model finds the opposite evidence that the state-owned banks are the least 
efficient and the joint equity banks are the most efficient.  
 
Furthermore, the gap among three sub groups is narrowed over the last ten years. Especially the 
difference between the state-owned banks and the joint equity banks is reduced, and achieving 
similar level of cost efficiency in the end.  
 
Another important finding is that we find that shadow return on equity is positive for the first 
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five years, but becoming negative since 2002 after the WTO entry. The change of sign can be 
explained by increase in capital ratio in the Chinese banks under the WTO requirement which 
requires domestic banks to fulfill Basel II. To achieve the target, on the one hand, the state 
directly injected equity capital to recapitalize domestic banks; on the other hand, the central 
bank placed quota on the amount of loan a bank can issue, which act as an indirect way of 
increasing capital ratio as assets has been reduced.  
 
As the levels of efficiency estimates under different frontier methods are quite different across 
banks, it is usually more important to consider the efficiency rankings rather than efficiency 
levels, when we compare the results from different models. As a consequence, we carry out 
both Spearman’s and Pearson’s rank order tests. The correlation coefficients show 
thatefficiency estimates from different approaches are consistent with each other, which ensure 
the robustness of our results. Furthermore, we check the properties of the translog cost function 
by conducting monotonicity and concavity tests. Both conditions are strongly satisfied at the 
sample mean and cross the whole sample, which indicate our fitted models are true cost 
functions and that cost efficiency estimates are reliable. 
 
In conclusion, these empirical results show clear evidence that the cost efficiency of the 
Chinese commercial banks is greatly enhanced over our examination period, and the gap among 
different ownership types of banks has shrunk. The improved cost efficiency enjoyed by the 
Chinese banks show that they react positively to recent banking reform which focus on 
improving their asset quality, capital adequacy and competitiveness. 
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Chapter 6: Explaining profitability in the Chinese 
banking industry: the structure performance 
hypothesis vs the efficient structure hypothesis 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
There is overwhelming evidence that a well-functioning financial system is essential for both 
economic growth and stability, as it plays an important role in capital allocation (due to scarce 
resources), fund mobility and investment. Until today, the capital market in China is still 
underdeveloped and incomplete. Thus China’s banking sector is the most important component 
of the financial system, with 76% of total assets in financial market in 2006. As the Chinese 
financial system is mainly bank-based, firms and individuals heavily rely on indirect financing 
channel from banks. In order to sustain the phenomenon of continuous and rapid economic 
growth in China, we need ensure that the Chinese banking sector is healthy and profitable. 
 
As explained in Chapter 2, the Chinese banking sector has been characterized by high 
concentration, low profitability, poor efficiency and massive non-performing loans for quite a 
long period of time. In 1997, the Chinese government started a new phase of comprehensive 
banking reform with the objective of transforming domestic banks into market-functioning and 
profitable institutions, in order to cope with challenges posed by full openness of the financial 
market in 2006 under the WTO agreement. Although the banking reform is still ongoing, some 
fruitful outcomes have been achieved such as greater competition (lower concentration), better 
asset quality, higher equity capital ratio and improved efficiency.  
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As the recent banking reform aimed to enhance both the efficiency and competition as a way 
of improving the overall performance and competitiveness of the banking sector in China, it is 
worth analyzing the impact of banks’ efficiency and market structure on performance of the 
banking firms in China. Moreover, the success of the banking reform is very important for 
China’s economic growth and sustainability in the future, so our conclusions, even if very 
tentative, might serve as useful suggestions on the future direction of the ongoing reform. 
 
A large number of empirical studies in the industrial literature find that a firm’s profitability is 
positively related to market power (measured by either market concentration or market share). 
However, there is no consensus about the causation. There are two major explanations for this 
universally agreed positive relationship; one is the traditional structure conduct performance 
hypothesis (Bain, 1951), and another is the efficient structure hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973).  
 
Studies that advocate the structure performance hypothesis simply assert that a firm with 
greater market power (price maker) can earn higher profit (monopolistic rents). However, 
studies that support the efficient structure hypothesis argue that profit differentials are the result 
of differences in efficiencies among firms. That is, efficiency is the underlying driving force for 
profitability, where a firm with greater efficiency has lower cost and allows it to gain a greater 
market share through price competition or acquisition of less efficient firms, and becoming 
more profitable. Therefore, in the efficient structure paradigm, the positive relationship 
between profits and market structure is spurious, because efficiency is the principal determinant 
of both profitability and market power. 
 
According to Berger (1995), the above two hypotheses can be further divided into two 
sub-hypotheses; hence there are four hypotheses in total. That is, the structure performance 
hypothesis can be decomposed into the structure conduct performance (SCP) and the relative 
market power (RMP), which has been tested in Chapter 3 and no evidence to support both 
hypotheses. The SCP states that firms in a more concentrated market can obtain higher profit as 
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collusion is easier and less costly in that market. Therefore, the firm is able to set prices more 
favourable to itself (in the case of banking, higher loan rates and lower deposit rates) and gain 
more profits. The RMP declares that only those firms with greater market share and well 
differentiated products are able to exercise market power and earn abnormal profits. The 
difference between the two sub-hypotheses under the structure performance hypothesis is that 
the SCP emphasizes the overall market concentration and suggests that all firms in the market 
can benefit from the high concentration, whilst the RMP focuses on the relative individual 
market share of firm and implies that only large firms can take advantage of market power.  
 
Further, the efficiency can be in the form of X-efficiency or scale-efficiency, so the efficient 
structure hypothesis can be broken down into X-efficiency hypothesis (ESX) and Scale 
efficiency hypothesis (ESS). The ESX shows that firms with superior management and/or 
production technologies have lower costs and therefore generate higher profits. Whereas, the 
ESS assumes that firms have equally good management and technology (same X-efficiency), 
but some firms simply produce at the optimal scale of operation, and therefore have lower unit 
cost and hence earn higher unit profit than the remaining incumbent firms. 
 
However, some contemporary studies have challenged the acceptability of the positive 
relationship predicted between efficiency (or market share) and profitability; this can be 
explained by the quiet life (QL) hypothesis (Hicks, 1935). The quiet life hypothesis assumes 
that the managers of firms with relatively large market power have less pressure to efficiently 
use resources since they can make profits using their price-setting power. This hypothesis 
predicts that large firms in the market use their market power to be unchallenged in the 
market and earn profits without improving their productivity and efficiency (non-competitive 
behavior). Thus, an increase in market power comes with a deterioration of efficiency which 
makes firms unable to earn higher profits. The quiet life hypothesis also provides an 
explanation in the case of a weak or the absence of a presumed positive relationship between 
profitability and efficiency/market structure (Smirlock,1985). 
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine the profit-structure (efficiency) relationship by 
identifying key determinants of profitability in the Chinese banking industry over the period 
1997-2006 under the debate of structure performance hypothesis and the efficient structure 
hypothesis. There are three objectives to be fulfilled. First, to implement Berger’s (1995) test to 
see which hypothesis is favoured by the banking sector in China. Second, to examine the 
evidence for the Hicks (1935) quiet life hypothesis. Third, to fill a gap in the empirical literature 
applied to China about the performance-market structure relationship in banking industry. 
 
We innovate this study by employing the shadow return on equity (see Chapter 5) as an 
alternative measure of bank profitability. Besides, only macroeconomic variables are included 
as additional factors that may influence bank performance. Bank specific variables which are 
usually included in previous literature are not considered in our study (see Section 6.4 below 
for an explanation).  
 
This chapter is structured into six sections. Section 6.2 provides an overview of the literature on 
the performance-market structure relationship, with emphasis on empirical studies applied 
Berger’s (1995) methodology. Section 6.3 details the methodological framework and specifies 
tested hypotheses. Section 6.4 considers variables selection and describes the data. Section 6.5 
presents and discusses the empirical findings and finally Section 6.6 concludes.  
 
6.2 Literature review 
 
The ability of firms to exercise market power by setting prices is a major concern to both 
economists and policymakers. A considerable number of empirical studies has examined the 
nature of the relationship between the structure of the market in which firms operate 
(concentrated vs competitive markets) and their performance. Two main research streams can 
be distinguished: the market structure paradigm and the efficiency paradigm.  
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The relation between firm performance and market structure (or efficiency) has been tested 
extensively in the banking industry, with most of the research focusing on the US and the EU, 
recently on emerging economies. The results, however, appear mixed and there is no 
conclusive evidence to indicate the superiority of one explanation over another. 
 
In the following, we first briefly review the major theoretical literatures concerning the 
structure performance relationship. Then we will focus on the empirical literatures in banking 
sector which apply the methodology proposed by Berger (1995). 
 
6.2.1 Theoretical background of performance structure 
relationship 
 
Early attempts to evaluate the relationship between the market structure and firm performance 
are explained by the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis, which basically states 
that the structure of the market can affect firms’ performance through their conduct. The key 
idea of the SCP hypothesis is that markets characterized by a structure with relatively limited 
number of firms and high barriers to entry will conduct pricing strategy aiming at achieving 
joint profit maximization through collusion, price leadership, or other tacit pricing 
arrangements. This type of price conduct should in turn yield profits and prices that are greater 
than under the competitive competition. In other words, the market concentration lowers 
competition and increases profit by fostering (explicit or tacit) collusion in the market. The bulk 
of the empirical banking studies broadly come to the conclusion that concentration positively 
influences profit levels which consequently results in higher loan pricing and lower deposit 
rates (Gilbert, 1984; Molyneux and Forbes, 1995). This SCP hypothesis has been explained in 
detail and tested in Chapter 3. 
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The SCP hypothesis: 
 
       structure                     conduct                     performance 
Higher market concentration    exercise market power (collusion)    higher profit 
 
However, Shepherd (1982) found not all market participants in the concentrated market can 
benefit and earn higher profits. He asserted that only firms with large market shares and 
well-differentiated products are able to exercise market power and make supernormal profits, 
which is referred to the Relative-Market-Power hypothesis (RMP). He emphasized the 
importance of price discrimination, as most markets are believed to contain submarkets with a 
unique demand elasticity, so that only firms with a large market share can exercise market 
power and influence prices. Therefore, the RMP hypothesis stresses the individual market share 
which provides direct market power, whereas collusion represents indirect market power. This 
gives strong incentives for merger and acquisition activities. That is, gaining market share 
through acquiring another firm (external growth) could provide a direct and much quicker way 
to expand and obtain market share than internal growth, thus generate higher profits.  
 
The RMP hypothesis: 
 
Larger market share    greater market power    higher profit 
 
Thus, the major difference between the two sub-hypotheses under the structure performance 
paradigm is that the SCP focuses on the overall concentration of the market, while the RMP 
stresses the individual market share. Although both hypotheses have different emphasis, they 
indicate that the market structure (or market power) is the underlying driving force behind the 
profitability.  
 
An alternative hypothesis which emerges from criticism of the structure performance 
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hypothesis is the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis. Demsetz (1973) and Peltzman (1977) first 
challenged the structure performance hypothesis and argued that a positive relationship 
between profit and market concentration stems not from market power, but from the greater 
efficiency of firms with a larger market share, which then produces both higher concentration 
and greater profitability. If one controls for efficiency, the link between profitability and market 
structure variables will become insignificant and thus economically meaningless. Therefore, 
under the efficiency hypothesis, efficiency drives both profit and market concentration.  
 
More efficient firms have lower costs, which enable them to gain bigger market share and 
higher profits and in turn leads to greater concentration in the market. Firms that operate more 
efficiently may adopt two different strategies to achieve higher profits. The first alternative is to 
maximize their profits by maintaining existing levels of output, but setting a higher price. The 
second alternative is to maximize their profits by reducing prices and expanding their 
operations, which may be achieved either through internal growth or by acquiring less efficient 
counterparts in the market (external growth). As a consequence, gaining market share by 
efficient firms is the driving force behind the process of market concentration.  
 
The efficient structure hypothesis: 
 
Larger market share     higher market concentration (endogenous) 
Superior efficiency    lower cost    higher profit 
 
The efficient structure (ES) hypothesis has been usually proposed in two different forms, 
depending on which type of efficiency being considered. In the X-efficiency form, firms with 
superior management and/or production technologies have lower costs and therefore generate 
higher profits. In the Scale-efficiency form, it suggests the same relationship described above 
but focuses on economies of scale rather than differences in the quality of management or 
production technology. Larger firms can explore scale economies and obtain lower unit costs. 
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Thus, according to the ES hypotheses, a positive correlation between concentration and 
profitability does not necessarily indicate a causal economic relationship, but could be 
spurious.  
 
Although the two competing broad categories of hypotheses (structure performance vs 
efficiency structure) have a very different understanding of the direction of causality between 
market structure and performance, they indeed reflect the same positive relationship between 
market power and profitability. They just differ in the aspect of how market power can be 
obtained in the first place. That is, the structure performance hypothesis takes market power as 
exogenous, which is derived from market concentration or market share, and the direction of 
causality runs from the market structure of an industry to firm profitability through firm 
behaviour such as collusion or pricing strategy. By contrast, the market structure is not 
exogenously determined under the efficiency hypothesis, but rather that it is the result of the 
superior efficiency. The efficiency hypothesis takes firm-specific efficiency as given; the 
market power is acquired by maintaining or improving such efficiency. Under this hypothesis, 
we would see causality running from an individual firm’s efficiency to profitability via market 
share, as more efficient firms will be able to increase their market shares, resulting in higher 
concentration. Hence, the efficiency hypothesis claims that greater market concentration is not 
necessarily a consequence of the collusive behaviour of firms but a consequence of the firm’s 
enhanced efficiency. 
 
The relationship between firm performance and market structure is not only empirically 
interesting; it also has profound policy implications. The two hypotheses suggest different 
implications for merger and antitrust policy as well as regulatory work. If the structure 
performance hypothesis is favoured, the enlarged market share and increased market 
concentration will enable firms to set prices less favourable to consumer. So antitrust policy and 
regulatory action for preventing accumulation of market power would be necessary. However, 
if the evidence supports the efficiency hypothesis, mergers and acquisitions that are motivated 
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by greater efficiency should be encouraged, which should increase consumer and producer 
surplus. Thus, advocates of the structure performance hypotheses believe antitrust and 
regulatory policy is socially beneficial (lower unit cost, more favourable price and greater 
output), while the efficient structure hypotheses supporters consider it is socially costly. As a 
consequence, given that the banking system affects economic development and growth as well 
as poverty alleviation, it is important to identify the policy which is conducive to its efficient 
operation. 
 
An additional hypothesis, the Quiet Life hypothesis is not a necessary part of the standard 
structure performance relationship, but it is often discussed within this framework. It is mainly 
used to explain the weak or possible absence of a significant profit-structure relationship. The 
reasoning of this argument is that as firms have more market power, either through market share 
or concentration, the management is less focused on improving efficiency, since setting prices 
at more favorable levels will increase revenues. The quiet life hypothesis states that firms do 
increase revenues as a result of increased market power, but because of higher inefficiencies, 
this does not lead to higher profitability. Berger and Hannan (1998) found that the quiet life 
effects in the banking sector appeared to be several times larger than social losses associated 
with the mispricing of products from market power. If the quiet life hypothesis holds, then the 
positive profit-structure relationship is partially offset by cost increases from poorer efficiency 
which may explain why the profit-structure relationship is so weak in many banking papers (see 
the survey by Gilbert, 1984).  
 
The Quiet Life hypothesis: 
 
Larger market share     lower efficiency     lower profits 
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6.2.2 Empirical evidence from Berger’s methodology 
 
6.2.2.1 Early evidence before Berger’s method 
 
A significant amount of empirical work conducted by many researchers in developed countries 
(with most of the research focusing on the US and the EU, more recently in emerging 
economies) has been devoted to quantifying and estimating the relationship between profit 
levels, concentration, and market share. However, empirical results concerning this relationship 
are inconclusive to indicate the superiority of one hypothesis over the other.  
 
Gilbert (1984) reviewed early profit concentration studies in banking sector and concluded that 
they presented a mixed set of results and found a weak relationship, and tend to suffer from a 
variety of methodological flaws. Gilbert noted that the primary shortcoming of these early 
studies may be misspecification due to omitted variables and the failure to distinguish between 
market power and efficiency as a source of concentration and profitability.  
 
It is worth noting that the previous literatures examined the competing hypotheses without 
including direct measures of efficiency. The common approach employed in the early empirical 
studies is that firm’s market share is used as a proxy for a firm’s efficiency, and no distinguish 
between X efficiency and scale efficiency. For more details, please see Chapter 3. The finding 
of a significant positive coefficient of concentration and an insignificant coefficient of market 
share supports the structure performance hypothesis, and vice versa (supports the efficiency 
hypothesis). However, using market share as a proxy for the efficiency effect causes 
ambiguity in interpreting the result and thus indicates the significant limitation of early 
approach. 
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6.2.2.2 Empirical evidence from the US using Berger’s test 
 
Berger (1995) first tackled the problem by explicitly incorporating two efficiency measures as 
explanatory variables in the regression equations, namely the X-efficiency and scale 
efficiency. By incorporating the direct measure of efficiency, it can help to distinguish among 
four alternative hypotheses in explanation of structure-performance relationship and by 
nesting all four hypotheses in the specification simultaneously, can avoid ambiguity. This 
specification thus allows stronger conclusions to be drawn about any causal relationship 
between market structure and profitability. 
 
Using an extensive US data set, Berger (1995) investigated performance-structure relationship 
for the US banks. The empirical result provided some support for the X efficiency and relative 
market power hypothesis. However, the explanatory power of the tested model was very low, as 
the efficiency and market power variables explained relatively little of the variance of 
profitability. And he suggested that future research should look beyond the simple market 
structure and efficiency variables for explanations of the variation in bank profitability and 
recommended adding some control variables that may affect profitability.  
 
Later Berger and Hannan (1997) replicated four approaches used in the previous literature, and 
added several innovations. For example, both profit rates and price levels were employed as 
the dependent variables to proxy for banks’ performance. Other factors such as the population, 
branching restrictions and the business failure rate were included in the estimation to control 
for the differences in market size, regulatory restrictions and business conditions respectively. 
In contrast with Berger’s (1995) finding, they found more support for the structure-conduct 
performance hypothesis than for the relative market-power or efficient-structure hypotheses. 
Berger and Hannan (1997) also tested the ‘quiet life’ hypothesis and their findings supported 
the quiet life hypothesis. 
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Following Berger (1995), Frame and Kamerschen (1997) also employed direct measures of 
bank efficiency in examining the profit structure relation. But unlike Berger (1995), who used a 
nationwide bank sample, Frame and Kamerschen (1997) only focused on a sample of legally 
protected rural banks, as they believed that the existence of entry barrier was critical to study 
structure performance relationship. Moreover, their empirical test only distinguished between 
the X-efficiency hypothesis and relative market power hypothesis. They found support for the 
relative market power hypothesis but reject the X-efficiency hypothesis for their sample of data.  
 
More recently, Tregenna (2009) analyzed the effects of structure on profitability for banks in 
the US during the pre-crisis period from 1994 to 2005. In the empirical analysis, efficiency was 
not found to be a strong determinant of profitability, suggesting that banks high profits during 
this period were not earned through efficient performance. Robust evidence was found that 
concentration increases bank profitability. This was held even when the largest banks were 
excluded from the sample. The analysis has important policy implications relevant to the 
current crisis, in particular the need for much strong a regulation of the market structure, pricing 
behavior and use of profits. 
 
6.2.2.3 Empirical evidence from the EU using Berger’s test 
 
Similarly, some the EU studies also apply Berger’s (1995) method to investigate the structure 
performance relationship outside the US.  
 
Berger’s (1995) study was first followed in the EU by Goldberg and Rai (1996) who studied the 
structure performance relationship in the European banking industry by employing data on 
banks across eleven European countries over the period 1988–1991. Goldberg and Rai (1996) 
found evidence favouring the relative market power hypothesis for all banks except for those 
located in countries with low concentration ratios, where the evidence supported the X 
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efficiency hypothesis. 
 
Punt and Rooij (1999) later applied the Berger’s approach and provided an empirical evaluation 
of profit-structure relationship in eight European banking sectors for the period 1992 – 1997. 
Testing results revealed that X–efficiency was the crucial factor explaining the profit-structure 
relationship. Some support was also found for the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, 
although not as convincing as for the former hypothesis. Moreover, there were no indications 
of unfavorable price setting behavior as a result of increased market power. 
 
Aguirre and Lee (2001) examined the structure-performance relationship for banks operating 
under different regimes (separated vs universal banking) in ten developed countries during the 
period of 1985-199924. The results showed support for the efficient structure hypothesis and 
suggested that in an ever growing integrated financial system, banks can benefit significantly 
from the implementation of a universal banking system. 
 
Responding to the wave of consolidation in the Euro area in 1990s, Kapopoulos and Siokis 
(2005) examined whether the consolidation process should be rationalized on the basis of the 
benefits of efficiency or it should be attributed to the attempt of banks using greater market 
power to generate monopoly rents. The empirical results supported three of the four distinct 
hypotheses, but did not support the SCP hypothesis. It implies that the European banking 
industries did not favor collusion, and gave limited support to the RMP hypothesis that only 
banks with large market share and well differentiated products are able to exercise market 
power in pricing and consequently enjoy higher profitability. Moreover, the empirical results 
provided strong evidence for the efficiency hypothesis. This suggested that the rising 
concentration resulting from merger and acquisition activities were attributed to the faster 
growth exhibited by the more efficient banks. 
                                                 
24
 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the U.K. are classified as universal banking countries while 
Belgium, Japan, and the U.S. are classified as separated banking countries. 
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6.2.2.4 Empirical evidence from the developing countries under Berger’s test 
 
Recent research testing the market structure and the efficient structure hypotheses have 
expanded to various regions in the world including developing nations. But still a limited 
number of those studies involve direct measures of X and scale efficiencies in the emerging 
countries. 
 
Al-Obaidan (2008) distinguished between the market structure paradigm and the efficiency 
paradigm by incorporating a direct measure of technical inefficiency in the six Arab GCC 
banking markets during 1996-2005. The empirical results confirmed the efficiency hypothesis. 
And it suggested that more technically efficient banks earned higher profits and consequently 
gained higher market share. The results also supported the view that restricting internal and/or 
external growth affected the economic efficiency of commercial banks. 
 
Following Al-Obaidan (2008), Al-Muharrami and Matthews (2009) conducted similar research 
to examine the profit structure relationship in the GCC banking industry over the period from 
1993 to 2002. But they found that the banking industry in the Arab GCC countries was best 
explained by the SCP hypothesis. The evidence clearly supported the view that concentration 
was the principal structural determinant of profitability.  
 
Using the same approach, Fu and Heffernan (2009) carried out the first Berger’s test of market 
structure and bank performance in China for the period 1985-2002. The empirical results found 
the relative market power hypothesis best described the Chinese banking sector during the first 
reform stage (1985-1992). In the second phase (1993-2002), although the results supported the 
X-efficiency version of the efficiency hypothesis, there was no evidence that efficiency has a 
positive effect on market structure. In addition, there was no evidence to support the quiet-life 
hypothesis, probably because strict interest rate controls prevented the domestic banks from 
earning monopoly profits. 
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Chortareas et al. (2011) advanced the existing literature by testing the market power and 
efficient structure hypotheses for nine Latin American countries over 1997-2005. They 
produced evidence supporting the efficient structure hypotheses. The findings were particularly 
robust for the largest banking markets in the region, namely Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Also 
capital ratios and bank size were found to be the most important factors in explaining profits for 
Latin American banks. 
 
Table  6.1: Recent studies on hypotheses explaining the performance-structure 
relationship 
 
Author Country SCP RMP ESX ESS QL 
Berger (1995) US - + + - na 
Berger and Hannan (1997) US + - - - + 
Frame and Kamerschen (1997) US na + - na na 
Tregenna (2009) US + - - - na 
Goldberg & Rai (1996) EU - + + - na 
Punt and Rooij (1999) EU + - + - na 
Aguirre and Lee (2001) developed countries na - + + na 
Kapopoulos and Siokis (2005) EU - + + + na 
Al-Obaidan (2008) GCC countries - - + + na 
Al-Muharrami and Matthews 
(2009) 
GCC countries + - - - na 
Fu and Heffernan (2009) China - + + - - 
Chortareas et al. (2011) Latin America - - + + na 
Note: a ‘+’ marks empirical support for the hypothesis, a ‘-’ marks lack of support, and ‘na’ 
means the hypothesis was not tested. 
SCP: Structure Conduct Performance, RMP: Relative Market Power; ESX: X-efficient 
Structure; ESS: Scale Efficient Structure; QL: Quiet Life 
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Overall, although Berger’s (1995) approach has been applied to many countries, it seems that a 
relatively few number of studies focus on the determinants of bank performance in developing 
countries, especially only one study on China, thus a lot more efforts are required. Moreover, as 
these studies differ in methodology used to estimate efficiency (parametric vs non parametric) 
as well as control variables in the estimation, the results documented in the existing literature 
with respect to the different hypotheses are not very consistent. Table 6.1 summarizes the 
evidence of reviewed studies, which explored the performance-structure relationship under the 
Berger’s (1995) approach. 
 
6.3 Methodology and tested hypotheses 
 
6.3.1 Testing models 
 
In our empirical testing procedure, we closely follow Berger’s (1995) methodology in testing 
the relationship between market structure and bank performance in the Chinese banking sector. 
Berger’s test model combines all four hypotheses (namely SCP, RMP, ESX and ESS) together 
into one testing regression and includes a set of exogenous variables which account for factors 
explaining the profitability variation. Berger’s approach attempts to distinguish among all four 
competing hypotheses by using direct measures of both market structure and efficiency, and all 
four hypotheses are represented by different variables separately.  
 
The standard Berger’s test model equation basically regresses a measure of bank performance 
(price or profitability) on variables measuring concentration, market share, X efficiency, scale 
efficiency and a vector of exogenous variables which affect bank performance. Generally 
speaking, a significantly positive coefficient for one variable (e.g. market concentration), and in 
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which the coefficients of other variables are either insignificant or small, indicates the 
corresponding hypothesis (e.g. the SCP) is valid. Note that all four hypotheses may be valid 
simultaneously, that is, the four key variables have significant positive coefficients, and this 
may be taken as evidence of the marginal contribution of all four hypotheses. The basic testing 
model can be expressed as: 
 
ititititittitit ZEFFSEFFXMSCONfp εp += ),-,-,,(or  
1
                         [ 6.1] 
 
p =a measure of profitability, such as ROA or ROE 
p=a measure of bank output price, such as interest rate 
CON=a measure of market concentration, such as N-firm concentration ratio or 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
MS= individual market share of a bank 
X-EFF= a measure of X efficiency 
S-EFF= a measure of scale efficiency 
Z= a vector of exogenous variables 
ε = random error 
 
Moreover, for the validity of two efficiency hypotheses (EXS and ESS), a necessary condition 
has to be satisfied. That is the market structure variables (both concentration and market share) 
must be positively related to efficiency estimates (both X-efficiency and scale efficiency). This 
is because that the efficiency hypotheses claim that efficiency is the underlying driving force 
for profitability, where a firm with greater efficiency allows it to gain a greater market share and 
in turn lead to higher concentration and profit. To test this condition, two additional equations 
are estimated and test whether the coefficients on X-efficiency (X-EFF) and scale efficiency 
(S-EFF) are significantly positive in Equations (6.2) and (6.3). 
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ititititt ZEFFSEFFXfCON ε+= ),-,-(
2
                                   [ 6.2] 
ititititit ZEFFSEFFXfMS ε+= ),-,-(
3
                                            [ 6.3] 
 
As we have discussed before, the relationship between bank performance and market structure 
variables is not necessary to be positive, it could be negative or absent. This is what Hicks’ 
(1935) quiet life hypothesis claims that firms with greater market power opt for a more relaxed 
environment in which less effort is made for maximising efficiency, at the expense of somewhat 
lower profits. As a result of this slack management, firms with greater market power are 
inefficient. The following Equations (6.4) and (6.5) are employed to test Hicks’ (1935) quiet life 
hypothesis. For the hypothesis to be held, the coefficients on concentration (CON) and market 
share (MS) should be negative and statistically significant. 
 
ititittit ZMSCONfEFFX ε+=− ),,(
4
                                   [ 6.4] 
ititittit ZMSCONfEFFS ε+=− ),,(
5
                                    [ 6.5] 
 
However, when estimating our testing equations above, we may face an important challenge. 
That is simultaneous equation bias problem, if you look at Eq. (6.1) - (6.3). Actually there is no 
simultaneous equation bias, as the Berger’s model is recursive. If we substitute Eq. 6.2 and 
6.3 into Eq. 6.1, we will have: 
 
itititit
itititititititititit
ZEFFSEFFX
ZEFFSEFFXfZEFFSEFFXffp
ε
εεp
+
−−−−=
],-,-
),,,,(),,,,([or  321
 
 
Re-write in a compact form: 
itititititit ZEFFSEFFXfp εp += ],-,-(or  
6  
 
And it shows only involves exogenous variables, therefore the OLS or panel Fixed effect 
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estimates are consistent for this recursive system. 
 
6.3.2 Empirical testing model specification 
 
In the empirical testing model, each of the two alternative measures of profitability is regressed 
on four key explanatory variables, namely the concentration, market share, X-efficiency and 
scale efficiency. And four additional exogenous variables are also included, which are real GDP 
growth rate, real GDP per capita, annual inflation rate, and state ownership dummy. All 
variables will be explained later in Section 6.4. 
 
The following equation is used to empirically test the validity of the four hypotheses in the 
Chinese banking industry: 
 
itittt
ititittit
DSINFGDPPGDPG
EFFSEFFXMSCON
εββββ
ββββαp
+++++
++++=
8765
4321
            
--
       
                       [ 6.6] 
 
p =ROA or SROE 
CON= Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on total assets 
MS= individual market share of a bank based on total assets 
X-EFF= a measure of X-efficiency (SFA) 
S-EFF= a measure of scale efficiency (SFA) 
GDPG=real annual GDP growth rate 
GDPP=real annual GDP per capita 
INF=annual inflation rate 
DS=dummy of state ownership 
ε =error term 
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6.3.3 Tested hypotheses 
 
In the following, we consider each of five tested hypotheses in turn. 
 
Hypothesis 1- the structure conduct performance hypothesis (SCP): 
 
Hypothesis 1 is related to the relationship between market concentration and profitability. 
Under the SCP hypothesis, bank profitability is significantly positively related to market 
concentration. If the coefficient for concentration (CON) 1β  is positive and statistically 
significant in equation (6.6), then the SCP hypothesis is supported. In this case, the positive and 
significant coefficient for concentration signifies that higher market concentration is associated 
with higher profits for banks.  
 
Hypothesis 2-the relative market power hypothesis (RMP): 
 
Under the RMP hypothesis, market share (MS) is the key variable in equation (6.6), and bank 
profitability should be significantly positively related to market share. With positive and 
significant coefficient for 2β  indicating that larger individual market share is associated with 
higher bank profits. Thus positive and significant coefficient for market share would support 
the RMP hypothesis.  
 
 
Hypothesis 3-the X-efficiency hypothesis (ESX): 
 
Hypothesis 3, the X-efficiency hypothesis suggests that bank profitability is significantly 
positively related to X-efficiency. This hypothesis is supported if the coefficient 3β  for 
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X-efficiency (X-EFF) is positive and statistically significant in equation (6.6). This would 
imply that more X-efficient banks are more profitable.  
 
Hypothesis 4-the scale efficiency hypothesis (ESS):  
 
The scale efficiency hypothesis states that bank profitability should be significantly positively 
related to the scale efficiency. If the coefficient for scale efficiency (S-EFF) 4β  is significantly 
positive in equation (6.6), this is in favour of the scale efficiency hypothesis. It would suggest 
that bank operate on optimal scale would generate higher profit.  
 
A necessary condition for the efficient-structure hypotheses (both ESX and ESS) to hold is that 
efficiency estimates have positive effect on market structure variables (concentration and 
market share), that is 1l  and 2l  in Equation (6.7) and 1δ  and 2δ  in Equation (6.8) should 
be significantly positive. To establish the presence, two equations are estimated below: 
 
ititttititt DSINFGDPPGDPGEFFEFFXCON εlllllll +++++++= 6543210 -S-    [ 6.7] 
ititttititit DSINFGDPPGDPGEFFSEFFXMS εδδδδδδδ +++++++= 6543210 --     [ 6.8] 
 
Hypothesis 5-Quiet life hypothesis (QL): 
 
The quiet life hypothesis is not a necessary part of the performance-structure paradigm, but the 
failure to account for the possibility of the quiet-life effect may lead to biased results in testing 
the above hypotheses. If the quiet life hypothesis holds, it tends to offset the positive 
profit-structure relationship, since gains from market power are partially offset by cost 
increases from the poorer efficiency. This could help explain why the profit structure 
relationship is not present or so weak in many pervious banking studies. To test the quite life 
hypothesis, the following two additional equations are estimated. 
Chapter 6 
224 
 
ititttittit DSINFGDPPGDPGMSCONEFFX εγγγγγγγ +++++++=− 6543210      [ 6.9] 
ititttittit DSINFGDPPGDPGMSCONEFFS εθθθθθθθ +++++++=− 6543210      [ 6.10] 
 
According to the quiet life hypothesis, the signs of the coefficients 1γ and 1θ on CON and/or 2γ
and 2θ on MS should be significantly negative in equation (6.9) and (6.10). Thus, banks with 
greater market power are less efficient due to a relaxed environment and slack management.  
 
All the above equations are estimated by pooled ordinary least square (OLS) method and panel 
fixed effect method. Prior to estimate the equations, Hausman test has been conducted, and it 
suggests that the fixed effect is preferred over the random effect. 
 
6.4 Variables specification and Data collection 
 
6.4.1 Selection and specification of regression variables 
 
6.4.1.1 Dependent variable: profit vs price 
 
One main issue to be addressed in the market structure and performance research is selecting 
an appropriate measure to represent a firm’s performance. Bank performance is measured in 
many different ways in the empirical literature. Two measures of performance are commonly 
used in the empirical studies testing the structure performance relationship. One is the price or 
net interest margin (the difference between loan rate and deposit rate) of particular banking 
products and services in order to capture the performance of the bank, while another is the 
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profitability measure, such as return on assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE). Evanoff and 
Fortier (1988) suggested a number of reasons why the profit measure is preferable to price 
measure. Firstly, using the price of a single banking product as a measure of performance may 
be misleading because banking is a multi-product business. Secondly, profit measures may be 
more informative, where all products profits and losses are consolidated into one figure, and 
they avoid the problem of cross subsidization. Thus, profit is more suitable for the measure of 
bank performance as a comprehensive performance indicator since it integrates both cost and 
revenue into one measure. 
 
There are two alternative measures of profitability which have been used extensively in the 
literature, namely return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The ROA reflects 
management’s ability to utilize the bank’s assets to generate profits, specifically, it measures the 
profit earned per currency of assets. This ratio depends mainly on the bank’s policy as well as 
some external factors related to the general state of economy and government regulations. The 
ROE reflects the effectiveness of management in utilizing shareholders’ funds. In other words, 
it measures profit generated by per currency of equity capital. Although two measures reflect 
different aspect of profitability, the ROA is preferred as measure of bank profitability in our 
study. This is because the equity in Chinese banks has suffered important artificial changes due 
to the State’s recapitalization programs during our examination period, which lead to large 
variation in the ROE figure, and result in poor regression fitness and insignificant estimates. 
Instead of using ROE, this study innovates by employing the shadow return on equity (SROE) 
as an alternative measure of bank profitability, which is obtained from the result in Chapter 5. 
The advantages of using the SROE is that the SROE is estimated from the cost minimization 
function which is more reliable and more close to the true return on equity, while ROE is 
calculated from accounting figures in bank statement, which can be easily influenced and 
manipulated. 
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6.4.1.2 Market structure variables 
 
Two market structure variables are employed in this study, namely market share and market 
concentration. Market share is defined as the proportion of individual bank’s total assets to total 
assets of all sample banks in a given year:
∑
=
= N
i
it
it
it
TA
TAMS
1  
 
Consistent with many industrial organization studies, the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) 
is used to measure market concentration. The HHI is defined as the sum of the squared market 
share of total assets for each bank: 2
1
)( it
N
i
t MSHHI ∑
=
= . Generally speaking, the more banks 
there are in a market, the lower is the value of the HHI, other things being equal. The HHI is 
preferred over the N-firm concentration ratio as it takes into account both the number of banks 
and the inequality of market shares. It includes all banks present in the market, so in principle it 
captures all movements of concentration. But the concentration ratio only includes the market 
shares of a few largest banks in the data set and, thus, only captures some of the movements in 
the market. 
 
6.4.1.3 Efficiency variables 
 
In this empirical study, efficiency measures are derived from a translog cost function by using 
the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). Efficiency measures (both X-efficiency and scale 
efficiency) used in our test are obtained from the results in Chapter 5. 
                                                                                    
X-efficiency is estimated under the Battese and Coelli (1995) (B&C 95) model and the 
conditional mean conditional variance (CMCV) model (please see detail in Chapter 5). The 
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reason for choosing efficiency estimates from these two models is that statistical estimation in 
Chapter 5 suggests that the time varying model is more appropriate. And other time varying 
model B&C (92) impose strict structure on efficiency trend, so we do not consider here. 
 
Scale efficiency indicates whether banks with similar production and management technology 
are operating at optimal economies of scale. Following Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001), scale 
efficiency is calculated from the parameters of the translog cost function. 
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If S-EFF< 1, indicating banks are operating below the optimal scale levels and have the ability 
to lower costs by increasing output further, while if S-EFF> 1then banks are required to 
downsize in order to achieve the optimal input combinations. 
 
6.4.1.4 Control variables 
 
In addition to the key variables used to test four specific hypotheses, other factors that might 
influence bank profit are also included in the regression. Unlike previous studies, bank specific 
variables such as size and risk are not incorporated in our model, because we believe efficiency 
measures which reflect the bank specific differentials already take into account those effects. 
Therefore, we only incorporate three macroeconomic variables and one dummy variable.  
 
Three macroeconomic variables are selected to control general economic environment and 
accounted for influence of economic cycles, namely the real GDP growth rate, real GDP per 
capita and annual inflation rate. 
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One dummy variable is employed to proxy the impact of ownership structure on bank 
performance.The type of bank which is captured by the stateownership dummy (DS) reflect the 
degree of government influence and difference in corporate governance as well as type of 
activity that a bank conducts. We test whether the state ownership affects bank performance, it 
equals to 1 if the bank is state-owned, and 0 for non-state owned. 
 
Table 6.2 below summarizes the definition and specification of variables used in our 
regression models. 
 
Table  6.2: Variables used in the regression 
 
Variables Definition  Specification 
Dependent variable:   
ROA Profitability Ratio of net income to total assets 
SROE Profitability  -(Elasticity of total costs with respect to 
equity) 
   
Explanatory variable:   
CON Market concentration  HHI based on total assets 
MS Individual market share Share of total assets by each bank 
XEFF X efficiency B&C 1995, CMCV model 
SEFF Scale efficiency Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001) method 
   
Control variable:   
GDPG GDP growth rate  
GDPP GDP per capita  
INF Inflation rate  
DS Ownership dummy State banks=1, non-state banks=0 
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6.4.2 Data collection 
 
Annual bank level data is mainly collected from Bankscope database. Whenever Bankscope 
does not provide enough information or has missing/questionable values, we collect or 
double-check the data from other official sources as best as we can, such as annual issues of 
Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 1997-2006; and annual issues of China Statistical 
Yearbook, 1997-2006. We also use annual reports provided by individual banks via their 
websites as complementary sources in tracing missing or unavailable data points, in some cases. 
All financial variables are measured in the Chinese domestic currency RMB and at constant 
price by using the GDP deflators.  
 
Table 6.3 provides some summary statistics of the variables included in our estimation. It is 
worthy to discuss some of the key variables. 
 
Table  6.3: Summary statistics of dependent and explanatory variables 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 371 0.005 0.458 -0.007 0.039 
SROE 371 -0.035 0.117 -0.335 0.325 
MS 371 0.036 0.071 0.005 0.196 
CON 371 0.146 0.023 0.118 0.166 
S-EFF 371 1.259 0.250 0.760 2.008 
X-EFF95 371 0.771 0.105 0.465 0.988 
X-EFFCMCV 371 0.908 0.087 0.427 1.000 
INF 371 0.026 0.006 0.016 0.034 
GDPG 371 0.094 0.012 0.071 0.111 
GDPP 371 10890 3193 6038 16084 
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6.5 Empirical results 
 
The main research question in this study is to test which is the driving force determining the 
bank performance in China, market power or efficiency. This section presents the findings of 
our empirical analysis. First, we consider the evidence for four main hypotheses in Berger’s 
test, and then we discuss the results for quiet life hypothesis.  
 
6.5.1 Estimation results for Berger’s test 
 
The regression results based on the ROA and the SROE under two estimation methods are 
documented in Table 6.4. Because using X-efficiency measures from the B&C 95 model and 
the CMCV model give similar regression estimates, here we only show results based on the 
B&C 95 model for illustration.  
 
Table 6.4 shows that no matter which estimation technique is used, the coefficient on 
concentration (CON) is positive and significant when the ROA is used as the dependent 
variable, but insignificant under the SROE. Therefore, the SCP hypothesis is partially 
supported, which suggest that banks in a concentrated market can earn higher return on asset. 
 
Similar to estimates on CON, the estimated coefficients on market share (MS) are also 
significant under the ROA, but insignificant under the SROE, either the OLS or the FE 
estimation is considered. Thus the RMP hypothesis is held under the ROA, although the 
coefficient is not correctly signed. The sign of coefficient on MS is negative; it indicates that 
banks are less profitable with larger market shares, which is inconsistent with the RMP 
hypothesis. This negative relation can be explained by the fact that banks with larger market  
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Table  6.4: Estimation resultsfor market power hypothesis vs efficiency hypothesis 
 
 
OLS FE 
Dependent variables ROA SROE ROA SROE 
 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
CON 15.641*** 5.160 0.722 1.270 16.757*** 5.920 0.229 0.440 
MS -3.950*** -3.590 0.552 1.620 -12.240*** -7.150 0.075 0.110 
SEFF 0.210 1.502 0.132*** 4.620 0.132 0.300 0.906** 1.820 
XEFF95 0.559 1.200 0.095*** 2.910 0.063 0.210 0.402** 1.900 
INF -5.412 -1.020 0.931 0.760 -5.897 -1.200 0.646 0.590 
GDPG 6.802* 1.850 0.408 0.410 8.492 1.210 0.316 0.340 
GDPP 0.007** 2.290 0.004 0.650 0.005*** 2.760 0.003 0.110 
DS -0.432 -1.600 -0.033 -0.510 
    
Constant -3.702*** -4.160 -0.097 -0.650 -3.252*** -3.250 -0.207 -1.370 
R2 0.392 
 
 
0.478 
 
 
0.412 
 
 
0.528 
 
 
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% significance level respectively. One tailed test for efficiency estimates.
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share are mainly state-owned banks, they suffer low profitability due to massive accumulated 
NPLs, although the amount has been reduced substantially in recent years.  
 
For the scale efficient structure (ESS) hypothesis, the estimated coefficients of scale 
efficiency (S-EFF) are found to be positive under all specifications, but only significant in the 
SROE regression. Therefore, the ESS hypothesis is only favored when the SROE is dependent 
variable. This suggests that more scale efficient banks will have higher SROE. 
 
Similar to the ESS hypothesis, the acceptance of the X-efficient structure (ESX) hypothesis 
also appears to depend on the SROE based regression. The significant positive coefficients on 
X-efficiency (X-EFF) show that the ESX hypothesis is held when the regression is estimated 
using the SROE under both OLS and FE estimation. However, under the ROA neither the 
OLS nor FE is applied, the estimated coefficients on X-EFF are insignificant though is 
positive. 
 
In sum, our empirical results show that the decision about which hypothesis is favoured is 
subject to which profitability measure is used. The evidence under the ROA based estimations 
shows that market power is the driving force to explain the bank profitability in China, as the 
SCP hypothesis is supported when the ROA is used as dependent variable. When the SROE is 
used as dependent variable, the efficiency hypotheses (both X-efficiency and scale-efficiency) 
are favoured, which suggest that the SROE is mainly efficiency driven. That is, banks with 
higher efficiency can generate higher SROE. 
 
The other control variables do not provide much insight into the questions being addressed in 
this study, as most of estimates are insignificant. This can also partially explain why the value 
for R2 is relatively low, since the set of selected control variables do not give significant 
explanatory powers. But it is interesting to find that regression based on the SROE has higher 
R2than the ROA. 
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Although some macroeconomic factors are insignificant, the annual inflation rate, real GDP 
growth rate and GDP per capita are all found to be positively related to banks’ profitability. 
This indicates that in a good economic environment banks are more capable of generating 
higher profits. The coefficient on the ownership dummy (DS) shows the non-state banks are 
more profitable than state banks, although the relationship is statistically insignificant. 
 
In addition, Table 6.5 below shows the results for the test of the necessary condition for 
efficiency hypotheses, which are specified in Eq (6.7) and (6.8). The signs on the coefficients 
for both X-EFF and S-EFF are significantly positive, and indicate the satisfaction of the 
necessary condition, which states that efficiency has positive effect on market power. 
 
6.5.2 Estimation results for Quiet Life Hypothesis 
 
In addition to the four main market power and efficiency hypotheses, the quiet life hypothesis 
is also tested in our study. The Table 6.6 shows the results of the test for the quiet life 
hypothesis. To satisfy the hypothesis, the signs of the coefficients on CON and/or MS should 
be significantly negative in the estimation of Eq. (6.9) and (6.10). 
 
As shown in Table 6.6, the coefficients on both MS and CON are significantly negative when 
scale efficiency (S-EFF) is used as dependent variable. It shows that the presence of 
anti-competitive behavior adversely affects the scale efficiency. That is, the banks with greater 
market power are less scale efficient. However, those estimates are significantly positive 
under the X-efficiency (X-EFF) based regression. This suggests that, even though some big 
banks enjoyed some market power, there is no evidence to show banks are less X-efficient at 
the expense of profit. In summary, quiet life hypothesis is favored if scale efficiency is 
considered but not supported under X efficiency. 
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Table  6.5: Estimation resultsof necessary conditions for efficiency hypothesis 
 
 
OLS FE 
Dependent variables MS CON MS CON 
 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
         SEFF 0.029*** 7.090 0.002** 1.860 0.034*** 5.330 0.018** 2.540 
XEFF 0.009** 1.830 0.014*** 5.050 0.008** 1.860 0.017*** 3.570 
INF 0.110 0.620 0.519*** 5.270 0.091 0.980 0.466*** 4.450 
GDPG -0.003 -0.010 -0.477*** -4.980 -0.012 -0.130 -0.471*** -4.660 
GDPP -0.001 -0.900 -0.001*** -13.370 -0.001* -1.910 -0.001*** -11.400 
DS 0.180*** 58.610 0.001 0.380 
    
Constant 0.041*** 2.940 0.240*** 30.550 0.070*** 6.630 0.215*** 17.930 
R2 
0.944 
(p-value=0.000)  
0.865 
(p-value=0.000)  
0.411 
(p-value=0.000)  
0.859 
(p-value=0.000)  
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% significance level respectively. One tailed test for efficiency estimates. 
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Table  6.6: Estimation results of Quiet Life hypothesis 
 
 
OLS FE 
Dependent variables SEFF XEFF SEFF XEFF 
 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
         MS -5.014*** -8.240 2.227*** 4.190 -2.533*** -5.260 0.054 0.070 
CON -0.504*** -2.440 4.849*** 4.840 -1.745*** -4.100 2.986*** 4.510 
INF 1.955 0.850 -0.995 -0.490 1.419 1.690 -0.203 -0.160 
GDPG 0.767 0.340 1.031 0.530 0.223 0.270 1.668 1.310 
GDPP 0.001 0.340 0.001** 2.510 0.001* 1.860 0.001*** 2.730 
DS 0.519*** 4.240 -0.266** -2.490 
    
Constant 1.482*** 4.540 -0.388 -1.360 1.065*** 8.840 -0.056 -0.300 
R2 
0.434 
(p-value=0.000)  
0.309 
(p-value=0.000)  
0.406 
(p-value=0.000)  
0.379 
p-value=(0.000)  
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% significance level respectively. One tailed test for efficiency estimates.
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6.6 Conclusion 
 
The banking sector in China has undergone dramatic changes over the last ten years, as a result 
of financial deregulation and liberalization under the recent banking reform. The ultimate 
objective of the recent banking reform is to promote competition and efficiency as a way of 
improving the bank performance. This has been primarily induced by the WTO entry, which 
bring about full openness of financial market in China. 
 
Rapid changes in the market structure of the Chinese banking industry raises questions about 
the consequences of these developments for the relationship between the structure of the 
banking industry and bank profits. Empirical studies often find a positive relationship between 
market structure and profitability. Broadly speaking, two main explanations for the existence of 
this positive profit-structure relationship have been brought up in the literature, namely the 
market power hypothesis (the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and relative 
market power theories) and the efficiency hypothesis (Scale efficiency (ESS) and X-efficiency 
(ESX). In other words, an increase in profits could be a result of a rise of market power or 
improvement in efficiency.  
 
This profit-structure relationship is frequently explored within industrial as well as financial 
economics. However, most previous studies examined the profit-structure relationship without 
incorporating direct measure of efficiency. Berger (1995) first solved the problem by 
employing direct measures to distinguish different hypotheses. Hence, Berger (1995) model 
results in this chapter have much stronger statistical properties than the traditional SCP model 
used in Chapter 3; consequently the Berger’s version of the analysis is strongly preferred. In 
this study, we apply Berger’s approach and examine the validity of different explanations for 
the profit-structure relationship in one of the fast growing economies - China. In addition, the 
quiet life hypothesis and the effects of macroeconomic factors on bank performance are also 
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assessed. 
 
This study has mainly addressed three related issues for the banking sector in China using an 
unbalanced panel data set over the period 1997 – 2006: the existence of a profit structure 
relationship in the Chinese banking sector, explanations for this relationship and effects of other 
factors on bank performance. 
 
By investigating which of those possible determinants (market structure and efficiency) of 
profitability is dominant in the Chinese banking sector, our empirical results support the market 
power explanation when the profitability is measured by the ROA. However, the efficiency 
justification is favored if alternative performance measure SROE is considered. Thus, it may 
suggest that the ROA is mainly market power driven, but the SROE is efficiency determined. 
Moreover, by examining the effect of macroeconomic factors, banks are found to be more 
capable of generating higher profits in a good economic environment. And non state owned 
banks are more profitable than state owned banks suggested by the state ownership dummy. 
 
In addition to the four market power and efficiency hypotheses, the quiet life hypothesis is 
also tested in our study. The quiet-life hypothesis claims that firms with greater market power 
are less efficient due to the relaxed environment that produces no incentives to minimize costs. 
It is interesting to find that banks in China with greater market power are less scale efficient but 
more X-efficient
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 
7.1 Summary of findings 
 
Over last three decades, the Chinese banking sector has experienced significant changes 
since the economic reform initiated in China in 1978. Especially after the entry into the 
WTO in 2001, which brought full openness of Chinese financial market to foreign 
competitors, the pace and strength of the banking reform have been accelerated and 
intensified. Hence, a new round of banking reforms has been launched from 1997 to 2006, 
which designed to modernise the Chinese banking sector and enable domestic banks to 
compete with foreign banks.  
 
We believe that the banking reform implemented by the Chinese government under this 
critical period, such as recapitalization, liberalisation and deregulation, have a potential 
impact on the competition, efficiency and performance of the Chinese banking sector. In 
such a context, regulators and policy makers and bank managers are concerned whether the 
banking reform is effective in improving the competitiveness and cost efficiency as a way 
of improving the overall bank performance. Therefore, the primary objective of this thesis 
is to provide empirical analysis to evaluate whether the recent banking reform can 
effectively achieve these targets during crucial period under our consideration. 
 
To fulfil our objectives, we employ an unbalanced panel dataset which covers 55 domestic 
commercial banks in China with total 371 observations during the reform period from 1997 
until 2006. We firstly estimate the level of market competition in the Chinese banking sector 
by using both traditional structure conduct performance (SCP) and new empirical industrial 
organization approach (NEIO) Panzar-Rosse method.  
 
We find out that with this approach the Chinese banking market is still moderately 
concentrated and that it is dominated by the state-owned banks, despite the state-owned 
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banks having seen their monopoly position weakening with the rapid expansion of the joint 
equity banks and city commercial banks, indicated by the decreased trend in both CR4 and 
HHI. Moreover, the Panzar-Rosse H statistic suggests that Chinese banks operate under a 
condition of monopolistic competition rather than monopoly in such a moderately 
concentrated market as China. By dividing the whole sample into two sub-sample periods 
(1997-2001 and 2002-2006), the empirical results show that there is an increase in 
Panzar-Rosse H statistic indicating Chinese banking market become more competitive and 
suggests recent banking reform is effective in improving market competition. 
 
Under the traditional SCP method, two continuing debate hypotheses (SCP vs efficiency) 
are tested for the explanation between market structure and bank performance. Our 
empirical results find no support for the SCP hypothesis in Chinese banking industry. 
 
As the traditional SCP method employs market share a proxy for efficiency, we adopt 
Berger (1995)’s method which improves the SCP method by incorporating a direct measure 
of efficiency. Therefore, in order to implement Berger’s test as well as assess whether the 
banking reform has a positive impact on the efficiency, we measure the cost efficiency for 
Chinese banks. In our study, six models are estimated under the stochastic frontier approach 
to ensure the consistency and robustness of our results, namely fixed effect model, random 
effect model, Pitt and Lee model, Battese and Coelli (1992) model, Battese and Coelli (1995) 
model, and conditional mean conditional variance model. 
 
We first assess the level of efficiency and its changes for our sample of banks as a whole over 
the entire ten-year period. The fixed effect model reports the lowest efficiency level (33%) 
with the highest standard errors, while the conditional mean conditional variance (CMCV) 
model generates the highest efficiency level (90%) with the smallest deviation. The other 
models report the overall mean cost efficiency for Chinese commercial banks around 
70%-80%. In the case of change of efficiency level for the sample as a whole, although there 
are some fluctuations during the sample period, the overall cost efficiency generally 
improved by the end of our sample period.  
 
Moreover, we examine the efficiency based on ownership difference, namely state-owned 
banks, joint equity banks and city commercial banks. It is interesting to find that apart from 
the CMCV model, all the models achieve a consensus that the state-owned banks exhibit the 
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highest level of cost efficiency, and the city commercial banks report the lowest level. 
However, the CMCV model finds the opposite evidence that the state-owned banks are the 
least efficient and the joint equity banks are the most efficient. Although the ranking appears 
differently under alternative models, all models show that the efficiency difference among 
three sub groups narrowed over the period under our consideration. One explanation for the 
difference in result is that the CMCV model ensures that all conditioning effects are used to 
determine the inefficiency difference whereas the other models use the conditioning effect to 
determine the position of the frontier itself. 
 
Furthermore, an important finding is that we find the shadow return on equity is positive for 
the first half of our sample period, but becoming negative since 2002. The change of sign 
can be explained by the increase in the capital ratio in the Chinese banks under the WTO 
requirement which requires domestic banks to fulfill Basel II. This suggests that policy 
makers should be aware of that gains from efficiency increase could be offset by the 
recapitalization cost. 
 
After obtaining the efficiency estimates, we carry out Berger’s test which examines the 
validity of different explanations for the structure performance relationship as well as assess 
the quiet life hypothesis and the effects of macroeconomic factors on bank performance. 
 
By investigating which of these possible determinants (market structure and efficiency) of 
profitability is dominant in Chinese banking sector, the empirical evidence provide mixed 
results which depend on performance measurement (dependent variable). The results 
support the market power explanation (the SCP) when the profitability is measured by the 
ROA. However, the efficiency justification is favored if alternative performance measure 
SROE is used. Thus, this may suggest that the ROA is mainly market power driven, while 
the SROE is efficiency determined. Moreover, the quiet life hypothesis which claims that 
firms with greater market power are less efficient due to the relaxed environment that 
produces no incentives to minimize costs, is held when scale efficiency is considered, while 
not accepted under the X efficiency. Furthermore, by examining the effect of 
macroeconomic factors, banks are found to be more capable of generating higher profits in 
a good economic environment. In addition, state-owned banks are found less profitable 
than non state-owned banks. 
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In short, banking reform in China implemented before and after the from 1997 to 2006 
greatly enhances the capital ratio, improves the asset quality, as well as increases the 
competition and efficiency, hence enabling Chinese domestic banks to compete with 
foreign banks after the full openness of financial market. 
 
7.2 Policy recommendation 
 
7.2.1 Policy recommendation from competition study 
 
The empirical findings of this study not only fill the gap in the literature; we also believe 
that our study could have general application to emerging countries whose banking system 
undergoes reform changes. More importantly, the empirical findings of this study have 
fundamental implications for policy makers, regulators and bank managers. The policy 
implications from this study are summarised as follows. 
 
Firstly, we look at a possible policy suggestions derived from our competition study. A 
substantial fall in the CR4 and HHI as well as significant increase in the Panzar-Rosse H 
statistic indicates great improvement in the competition in Chinese banking market after the 
WTO entry, but the level of competition is much lower than other countries, which have H 
statistics range from 0.6 to 0.8 (Claessens and Laeven (2004)), compared to the figure of 0.6 
in Chinese banking market. This implies that there is still much room for improvement of 
competition condition in Chinese banking sector in the future. More fundamental 
institutional changes may be required before China can reap the full benefits of increasing 
competition following the entry of the WTO. This sort of conclusion may help policy makers 
and regulators make more efforts for improving competition of the banking system by 
further liberalizing and creating a more suitable environment for competition. 
 
For example, to increase the number of banks, the government should facilitate entry of 
foreign banks into the Chinese banking market, and make the whole process smoother and 
easier. Moreover, the government should encourage private banks which are founded by 
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wealthy enterprises and individuals, because there is very few private bank in China so far. 
Furthermore, the central authority should design more incentives for city commercial 
banks to operate in other cities. This will help enhance competition and improve city 
commercial banks’ efficiency from effectively spreading risk and achieving economies of 
scale. 
 
Apart from increasing the number of competitors in the market, government can also 
encourage the innovation and diversity of financial products and services. The more 
products and services banks can offer, the more choices customer can have, the more 
competitive the market is. In addition, although the government has liberalized most of 
interest rates and deregulated several business segments, the government should reduce the 
intervention further in order to make banks truly look after interests for the shareholders 
rather than government, and let market mechanism play dominant role. 
 
7.2.2 Policy recommendation from efficiency study 
 
Our empirical findings of efficiency study indicate that Chinese banks exhibit diseconomies 
of scale. This suggests that banks are too large to efficiently use their resources and earn 
profits. Chinese banks, especially state-owned banks which are considerably over-sized, 
could improve their scale efficiency by reducing the size. Moreover, the evidence also 
shows that state-owned banks are less cost efficient than non state-owned banks. This 
suggests that the ownership structure need to be further diversified. The foreign and private 
capital need to be absorbed to dilute the dominated state ownership. 
 
More interesting, we find a negative shadow return on equity after the re-capitalization 
process, which drives the level of equity capital away from the long run equilibrium. In 
other words, banks are required to hold higher level of equity capital than they should in 
long run equilibrium. As a consequence, holding excessive equity impose significant cost 
for bank, which will in turn reduce the profitability and efficiency. Therefore, policymakers 
and regulators should be cautious that benefit gained from increased capital adequacy ratio 
and improved balance sheet could be offset by the cost of re-capitalization. 
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The finding of this study, however need to be interpreted cautiously and carefully given the 
full market liberalization process of the Chinese banking system is an ongoing process, not 
fully completed yet. 
 
7.3 Direction of future study 
 
Arising from the research done in this thesis, we can suggest potential directions for future 
work. 
 
The Boone indicator is a new measure of competition. It was first introduced and applied 
by Boone (2000, 2004) and Boone et al. (2004), and now it is being broadly applied to 
measure competition in both financial and non-financial sectors. The main idea behind the 
Boone indicator develops the idea that when competition becomes more intense, less 
efficient firms are punished more harshly than more efficient firms. These will be a 
negative relationship between profitability or market share and marginal cost. The strength 
of this relationship (i.e. the profit elasticity with respect to cost) will vary with the intensity 
of competition. 
 
Productivity growth is a major source of economic growth; thus, an understanding of how 
and why productivity measures change is of great interest to economists and policymakers. 
We can extent the study of efficiency in Chapter 5 to estimate Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) change and decompose it into scale efficiency change, cost efficiency change and 
technological change (see Bauer (1990), Orea (2002), Lovell (2003) and Fethi et al 
(2009)).The advantage of TFP decomposition allows the researcher to determine the source 
of productivity growth and distinguish between shifts in the frontier and movements of 
firms towards the frontier. 
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